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1. Elite pacts in democratie transition and
consolidation
1.1 Introduction
Following a brief experience with military rule (1953-1958) power was transferred
to a civilian government through an elite pact; the 1958 Frente Nacional (National
Front) agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The National Front
had a formal life of 16 years and officially expired in 1974. However, many of the
pact s explicit and implicit power sharing mechanisms continue in force and still
constitute the basic framework for contemporary politics in Colombia. There is,
therefore, a direct and implicit relationship between the polit Y established by the
National Front and the nature of democratic practices in Colombia.
The concept of elite pacts is a central element of theory which has evolved to
explain the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance which took
place in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars of ten cite Colombia as
evidence that the existence of elite pacts offers the best possibility of a successful
transition (Karl 1990: 9; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 281; Huntington 1991: 166;
Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 18; Mainwaring 1992: 310). Some contend that
elite pacts may, in fact, be the only mechanism for ensuring the success of a
transition process as "all of the unpacted democracies existing at different times
in other Latin American countries were destroyed by authoritarian reversals"
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 45). Their conc1usions are largely based on the
characteristics of Colombia's National Front agreement and the subsequent
consolidation of a liberal democratic system which has not been reversed by a
reoccurrence of authoritarian intervention.
When considered within the parameters of theories related to elite pacts Colombia
may be seen to take on some of the characteristics of a country which has
successfully made the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. On
the surface, Colombia has avoided the political and economic instability chronic
to much of Latin America. It has one of the oldest liberal democracies in the
hemisphere. Elections, considered free and fair by the international community, are
held on a regular basis and civilian rule has been interrupted only once during this
century by a military dictatorship (1953-1958). Comprehensive human rights,
extending to economic, social, cultural and environmental rights are guaranteed in
the 1991 Constitution and by Colombia's adherence to international human rights
instruments, and succes sive governments have promised full implementation of
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those rights. Since the 1970s Colombia has also sustained the highest aggregate
economic growth rate in Latin America. As a result of these factors, Colombia is
sometimes described as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America.
However, democracy in Colombia is a paradox. The legacy of the National Front
agreement is, in practice, a restricted polit Y characterized by extreme levels of
political violence. Almost 15,000 persons were killed in political violence between
1990 and 1994, more than the total number of officially documented kilings
which occurred during the years of military dictatorshipinChile,Argentina,
Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay (Jus ti cia y Paz, VoL7, No.2, 1994, p.6-7).1
Tens of thousands of Colombian civilians have also been the victims of torture,
intimidation or other forms of gross human rights violations and at least 600,000
persons are internally displaced by arme d conflict.
Political violence occurs in the con text of the 40 year old armed conflct between
the Colombian government and various guerrila groups. The conflict creates the
conditions and the ideological rationale for gross and systematic human rights
violations committed against civilian non-combatants by agents of the Colombian
state. These persons are usually members of legally constituted political or social
organizations which act outside of the narrow framework of Colombia' s traditional
polity. Their efforts to broaden the base of political participation and build new
political structures which transcend the National Fronts legacy are perceived to
constitute a threat to the status quo. It is these legal organizations, not the
guerrilas, which are the principle target of government sponsored repression.
Using the case of Colombia, this study wil demonstrate the limitations of elite
pacts as a mechanism for democratic transition and consolidation. It wil also
establish that elite pacts in Colombia have directly and implicitly created the
conditions which allow for the paradox between a formal liberal democracy polit Y
and endemic political violence and human rights abuses to exist.
1.2 Colombia as a case study for testing the implications of elite
pacts
Unlike much of Latin America, Colombia has never been governed for an
extended period of time under a military dictatorship. As a result, it is often not
A Truth Commission convened in Argentina in 1984 offcially documented 9,000 victims of
extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances in Argentina during the "Dirty War" ,
However, unofficially human rights organizations claim the num ber is 30,000. New
information released in confessions of former military officers made in April, 1995,
collaborates that the actual number of deaths is significantly higher than the official record.
See Christine Legrand, "End to the pact of silence" in Guardian Weekly, 19 March, 1995.
Similar situations may exist in other countries.
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discussed in literature reIated to the transition and consolidation of democratic
governance which occurred in Latin America during the 1980s. However,
Colombia provides a unique historical case study. Colombia experienced a
transition from military to civilian rule in 1958 which was achieved through an
elite pact mechanism; the National Front agreement between the Liberal and
Conservative parties. Colombia returned to a formal system of liberal democratic
governance which has not subsequently been revers ed by authoritarian
intervention. The system has had almost 40 years to evolve, providing an adequate
time period to test theories related to democratic transitionand consolidation by
elite pacts against the outcomes which have been produced by the National Front.
This study wil argue that elite pacts negotiated in Colombia, in the form of the
1958 National Front agreement and its legacy in Colombia's contemporary polit y,
have resulted in the consolidation of a restricted political system which: (i) does
not meet the minimal definitions of procedural democracy of ten used by scholars;
(ii) can only be sustained through the repression of leg all y constituted groups in
civI1 society who oppose the narow biparisan framework left in place by the
National Front; and, consequently, (iii) is characterized by endemic political
violence and gross and systematic human rights violations.
Furthermore, this study wil argue that the direct legacy of the National Front eIite
pact is a crisis of legitimacy of the Colombian state. The crisis is one of
governability and the legitimacy of the institutions of the state in the eyes of civI1
society and it has its roots in the existence of, and interaction between: (i) the
restricted nature of the formal political system and the exc1usion of large sectors
of the Colombian population from participation in the democratic proeess; (ii)
growing economic disparity between rich and poor sectors of Colombian society
despite decades of rapid economic growth; (iii) the breakdown of the rule of law;
(iv) military autonomy in the management of central political issues which should
be under civilian control, inc1uding policy related to public order and counter-
insurgency; and (v) almost absolute impunity enjoyed by agents of the Colombian
state who are responsible for human rights violations. The extreme 1eveIs of
political violence and human rights violations are, at the same time, both a cause
and a consequence of the crisis.
As elite pacts are a crucial element to understand the paradox of democracy and
human rights violations in Colombia, this study wil use theories which apply elite
pacts as a central analytical concept to explain democratic transition and
consolidation. However, this study wil argue that regime transition theories cannot
fully account for the Colombian paradox. This inability is found, in large part, in
their limited consideration of the actors which condition the transition and
consolidation processes. Transition theories tend to focus almost exc1usively on
interactions between elite actors. They contend that elite interactions determine the
process through which the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance
takes place and the characteristics of the political regime which is subsequently
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consolidated. Transition theories tend, therefore, to ignore or play down the
importance, dynamics and implications of: (i) interactions between elites and civil
society; and, more specifically, (ii) conflcts between e1ites and groups in civil
society as factors which condition the transition process. However, in Colombia
its is precisely the interactions and conflicts between elites and groups in civil
society which determined the objectives and mechanisms of the 1958 National
Front elite pact.
The National Front was an elite response to new challengersincivil society which
upset the traditional hegemony of the Liberals and Conservatives. These new
challengers arose from the silent revolutions of profound social, economic and
demographic changes which began in Colombian society during the 1930s and
have since rendered historical patterns of political behaviour and control obsolete?
Confronted with the silent revolutions the pact-makers, institutionally represented
by the Liberal and Conservative parties, attempted to restore their hegemony by;
(i) subordinating and regaining the loyalty of the military; and (ii) demobilizing
the new challengers, either by integrating them into the restored traditional
bipartisan polit Y or through repression.
Scholars contend that the direct result of transition to democracy by pact has
historically been a stable limited democracy (Karl 1990: 12; Karl and Schmitter
1991: 281; Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 14). The National Fronts formal
restrictions regarding political participation confirm this analysis in the Colombian
context. Furthermore, scholars argue that pacted transitions facilitate the eventual
emergence of a consolidated democracy (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 14),
and that, under the conditions of modern politics, explicit pacts between all
politically significant actors are a virtual necessity for the consolidation of
democracy (Valenzuela 1985; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 281).3 On this last point,
however, this study wil argue that rather than expanding political participation
over time to include new groups, the original Colombian pact-makers acted with
the explicit objective of sustaining their exc1usive controlover the political system.
They explicitly exc1uded the majority of the population from meaningful
participation in the political process.
2 The silent revolutions refer to structural transformations which have occurred in Colombian
society since the 1930s (see Chapter 3). The result has been to undermine traditional
mechanisms for mobilizing political support and weaken party sectarianism. Pécaut calls this
process the silent revolutions (Cited in Uprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990: 144).
3 These scholars define "modem politics" as including: (i) mass enfranchisement and
extensive human rights; (ii) class, sectoral and professional interests are likely to be
defended by specialized organizations; (iii) the armed forces possess an overwhelming
superiority in the use of violence; (iv) the state has responsibilities for the regulation of the
market and the redistribution of income; and (v) the economic system is tightly integrated
with, and hence vulnerable to the international market.
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Furthermore, this study wil argue that the social and political conflict created by
the exc1usive National Front has necessitated the establishment of two new elite
pacts in Colombia subsequent to 1958. These pacts have been established between
the original civilian pact-makers and the Colombian Public Forces.4 The objective
of these pacts is to protect the mutual "vital interests" of the participants by
sustaining the polit Y established by the National Front in the face of growing legal
and ilegal opposition in civil society. The mechanisms of these pacts which
constitute their structure are entrenched in the institutional and procedural
framework of the Colombian political and legal systems. Transition scholars
cannot fully account for the Colombian paradox because they do not consider
these additional pacts which have been established between civilian and military
elites.
The two new elite pacts include:
A pact of autonomy for the Public Forces, in paricular the military. The pact
grants the military de facto freedom in establishing the ideological framework of
policy related to public order and implementation of that policy. The primary
formal mechanism for the pact is the extensive use of state of emergency powers
to expand the authority and jurisdiction of the Public Forces. Extraordinary
legislation passed under emergency powers is frequently placed in ordinary law
after the state of emergency has expired. The military's expanded authority has
been accompanied by large budget increases and the creation of paralleI military
structures, in the form of paramilitary organizations, which enhance the military's
operational capability but are not formally part of the Public Forces and, therefore,
are not accountable to any democratIc civilian oversight.
A pa et of impunity under which agents of the state responsible for human rights
violations have not been hel d accountable for their actions through the due process
of law. The principle formal mechanism for the pact of impunity is the Colombian
fuero militar (military justice system). Under the Colombian constitutions (Artic1e
221 of the 1886 constitution and Artic1e 226 of the 1991 constitution), any crime
committed by a member of the Public Forces, including any form of human rights
violation, is considered an "act of service" and prosecuted under the código penal
militar (military penal code). It is estimated that the military system has a
conviction rate of between one and three percent in cases of alleged human rights
violations, meaning that impunity is effectively absolute.
4 Article 216 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 defines the Fuerzas Públicas (Public
Forces) as integrating the Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (Armed Forces of Colombia), the
Policía Nacional (National Police) and the various intelligence ageneies operating under
those agencies. The terms Public Forces and the military wil be used interchangeably in this
study.
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With the pact of democracy (the National Front agreement), the existence of the
pacts of autonomy and impunity allow the paradox between formal liberal
democracy and political violence to exist. Finally, scholars largely overlook the
fact that elite pacts and accommodation have been used extensively throughout
Colombian history. The National Front is, therefore, only unique in the sense that
it formally institutionalized the exc1usive dominance of the two traditional parties
in the constitution and legal system. Previously, elite pacts existed as
"conversations between gentlemen". The National Front and its legacy II
Colombia's contemporar democracy can, therefore, ortlybe'understood in an
historical context.
1.3 Defining deIDocracy
A definition of democracy is required to permit a comparison between theory and
the reality of the practice of democracy in Colombia. Western scholars often use
Robert A. Dahl's c1assical definition of procedural democracy or polyarchy.5
According to Dahl, democracy is a system of government that meets three
essential conditions: (i) meaningful and extensive competition among individuals
and organized groups, inc1uding political parties and interest groups, for
government power; (ii) a high level of political participation in the selection of
leaders and policies, through regular and fair elections. No major (adult) social
group is excluded from the process; (iii) the existence of civil and political
liberties, inc1uding freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to join
and form organizations, which are sufficient to ensure the integrity of political
competition and participation (Dahl 1971: 3-29).
Terry Lynn Karl provides a similar definition of democracy as "a set of
institutions that permit the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing
their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled
elections which are held in the context of the rule of law (and) guarantees for
political freedom,..". Seen in this context, "democracy is a political concept
involving several dimensions: (i) contestation over policy and political competition
for office; (ii) participation of the citizenry through partisan, assocional, and other
forms of collective action; (iii) accountability of rulers to the ruled through
mechanisms of representation and the rule of law (Karl 1990: 2),
In addition, scholars focusing on Latin America often stress civilian controlover
the military as a defining element of democracy. Dahl explicitly states that
"polyarchy is, of course, impossible unless the military is sufficiently depoliticized
to permit civilian rule (Dahl 1971: 50). Alfred Stephan (1988) also emphasizes
5 The term polyarchy is based on Joseph Schumpeter's definition of procedural democracy as
a system in which the voters may influence the policy of their country by voting for freely
competing candidates representing real policyalternatives (Schumpeter 1965: 269),
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civilian controlover the military and Karl refers to civilian controlover the
military and "limited military prerogatives" as the fourth of her defining elements
(Karl 1990: 2). These definitions of democracy are generally used by scholars
working with theories related to democratic transition and consolidation, inc1uding
O' Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986); Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989);
Karl and Schmitter (1991); Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992); and Mainwaring,
O'Donnell and Valenzuela (1992).
This study will consider that the defining elements of democracy aresymbiotically
linked to each other and that the absence of one element can undermine the other
elements. The defining elements of democracy must, therefore, be approached as
a whole and understood in relation to each other. Dividing countries into
categories and giving them "scores" based on their adherence to some defining
elements while others are absent does not seem to have very much real meaning.6
The definition of democracy provided by Dahl and Karl is based on the Western
experience of liberal democracy and focuses on the procedural aspects of
democratic governance. Scholars using the procedural definitions of democracy
argue that economic and social dimensions must be kept conceptually distinct from
the political definitions of democracy. If not, they maintain, there is no way to
analyze how variations occurring in the political regime are related to variations
in these other dimensions (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989: xvi).
Many scholars, especially those from the South,7 have criticized procedural
minimalist definitions as incomplete. For example, they often emphasize economic
factors, inc1uding the distribution of income, which effect the physical well being
of persons, the abilty of disadvantaged groups to participate in the political
process and, therefore, the real exercise of power.8 In this context, many argue
that the transition to democracy in Latin America brought no change in the
underlying impediments to democratic governance, inc1uding "racism, repression
of labour, failure to provide the majority of the population with a decent standard
of living and/or the opportunity for social mobility and the high concentration of
wealth and income in the hands of a tiny minority" (Loveman 1994: 113). Under
conditions of impoverishment O'Donnell points out that "if one finds a rather low
percentage of the population enjoying the rights and guarantees established by a
formally democratic constitution, then the democratic character of the case is in
6 Numerous attempts have been made to codify and quantify the existence of democracy
across political systems. Among the best known is Raymond Gastil Freedom in the World:
Political Rights and Civil Liberties, published since 1973 by Greenwood Press and since
1988 by University Press of America. Also see Charles Humana, 1986. World Human
Rights Guide. New York: Facts on File.
7 I use the term South to refer to what traditionally has been called the Third World. This
term is commonly used by scholars from Latin America.
See Amin 1991; Palacio 1990; Jonas and Stein 1990; Petras and Morley 1992.
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doubt" (O'Donnell 1995: 24).
It is beyond the scope of this study to enter the theoretical discussion of the
relationship between economic policies and performance, democracy, and the
violation of civil and political human rights. However, this study wil argue that
economic disparity is a major cause of social conflct in Colombia. Therefore, it
is necessary to consider economic, social and cultural human rights insofar as they
relate to the conflct dimensions of the democratic consolidation process. In the
absence of a scholarly framework for analysis, this study wilusethe-economic,
social and cultural human rights guarantees found in the Colombian Constitution
of 1991 and Colombia's obligations under international human rights instruments.
These guarantees are understood to form the legal framework within which
Colombia's democratic institutions are obligated to conduct policy. The systematic
denial of these rights for the majority of the population has implications for the
political system in that organized demands in civI1 society for broader political
participation are centered around demands for better living conditions.
Consequently, even a procedural minimalist definition of democracy must be
c10sely linked to broader economic and social human rights.
1.4 Two transitions to democracy
Having established the defining elements of democracy this study wil now discuss
the conventional wisdom which considers that elite pacts offer the best possibility
for democratic transition and consolidation. O'Donnell contends that change from
authoritarian rule to a democratic governance requires two distinct transitions. The
first transition involves removing the previous authoritarian regime and
establishing a democratic government. The second transition is the consolidation
of democratic institutions and values (O'Donnell 1992: 18). In a similar vein,
Valenzuela notes that, after the first transition to democratic governance has been
completed, the second transition involves both the elimination of residues of the
old system that are incompatible with the workings of a democratic regime and
the building of new institutions that reinforce the democratic rules of the game
(Valenzuela 1992: 71). Przeworski and Mainwaring also distinguish between the
extrication of authoritarian rule and the constitution a of a democratic regime
(Przeworski 1992: 116-126; Mainwaring 1992: 296),9 Literature related to
democratic transition and consolidation can, therefore, be understood as two
generations of debate,
9 A democratic regime is a broader concept than simply government. It involves the
institutionalization of democratic rules, implicitly meaning that such rules are widely
accepted among the major actors in the political system (Mainwaring 1992: 296). According
to Przeworski, democratization of govemments concerns institutions, Democratization of
regimes concerns the broader relationship between state institutions and civil society
(Przeworski 1992: 123).
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"Transition" refers to the interval between one political regime and another.
Regime change can begin when incumbent authoritarian leaders permit an increase
in civil rights enjoyed by individuals and groups. The process of incremental
extension of civil liberties and political rights is referred to as liberalization
(O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 7). Because of the highly fluid, reversible,
and thus inherendy uncertain nature of the transition process, structural conditions
are treated as general parameters or constraints rather then as determinants of
action. "(M)acrostructural factors are still "there", .., but even those meditations
are looser, and their impacts more indeterminate, than in normal circumstances"
(O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 5). The possibilities for liberalization,
therefore, depend more on the strategic dynarcs and choices within and between
the regime and opposition than on structural factors.
"Democratization" is the process whereby "the rules and procedures of citizenship
are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other non-
democratic principles, or expanded to inc1ude persons not previously enjoying such
rights and obligations, ... or extended to cover issues and institutions not
previously subjected to citizen paricipation" (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4,
1986: 8). Democratization or democratic consolidation deals with the rights and
obligations of the citizenship and theaccountability of the rulers. The authors
emphasize that the two processes are distinct, the transition process is inherently
uncertain, and successful democratic consolidation does not implicitly follow from
a successful transition. Both processes are considered reversible by authoritarian
intervention (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 8).
1.4.1 The importanee of elite pacts in the first transition to
democracy
In 1979, over two-thirds of the people of Latin America were living under military
rule. By 1993, not a single military regime remained in Central or South America
or the Spanish-speaking Caribbean. As the result of the demise of military regimes
scholars widely claimed that the process of democratization in Latin America had
begun.
Transitions to Civilian Government in Latin America 1958-1993
Colombia
Paraguay
Chile
Guatemala
Brazil
Uruguay
1958
1993
1990
1986
1985
1984
El Salvador
Argentina
Bolivia
Honduras
Perú
Ecuador
1984
1983
1982
1982
1980
1979
Source: Loveman (1994: 106)
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Beyond O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), there is a growing body of
theoretical literature which discusses the relationship between the modes of
transition from authoritarian regimes to elected civilian governments, the
characteristics of the government which emerges from the transition process and,
therefore, the prospects for consolidating a democratic system of government. 10
To date, scholars analyzing the process of transition to democratie government
have focused mainly on relationship between the issues of; (i) why authoritarian
regimes became enviable and subsequently broke down; (ii) the proeess through
which the transition to democracy took place; and (iii) theeffect of transition
process in determining the characteristics of the resulting democratic government.
Karl and Schmitter identify four possible processes through which the transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule can be achieved: (i) transition by pact where
elites agree on a multilateral compromise among themselves; (ii) by imposition
where elites use unilateral and effective force against aresistant incumbent to
achieve a regime change; (iii) by reform where broad sectors in civil society
mobilize from below and impose a compromised outcome without resorting to
violence; and (iv) by revolution when the population rise up in arms and defeat
the previous authoritarian rulers militarily (Karl 1990: 8-9; Karl and Schmitter
1991: 274-275).
Latin America has experienced all four modes of transition in recent decades.
However, scholars argue that only processes of transition achieved through elite
pacts have resulted in stable democracies. Higley and Gunther contend that, in
countries with long records of political instability and authoritarian rule, distinctive
elite transformation, carried out by the elites themselves, constitute the main and
possibly the only route to democratic consolidation. For consolidation to occur,
they argue, elites which had previously been disunified must become consensually
unified regarding the basic procedures and norms by which politics wil henceforth
be played (Higley and Gunther 1992: xi). O'Donnell and Schmitter note that two
of the three Latin American democracies that survived the wave of military coups
and authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia and Venezuela,
originated in elite pacts (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 45).11 Therefore,
there appearS to be a consensus regarding (i) the importance of elite interaction
and decision making in the transition process itself and (ii) the importance of pacts
10 The most comprehensive analysis of the process of transition from authoritarian rule has
been carried out in the four volume work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Transition
From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (1986). In addition, see Malloy and
Seligson (1987); Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989); Karl and Schmitter (1991); Mainwaring,
O'Donnell and Valenzuela (1992); Higley and Gunther (1992).
ii The current situation in Venezuela is unstable. In response to economic reforms and socIal
unrest, the military stag ed a coup attempt in 1989 and two attempts in 1992. Rumors of an
imminent coup are widespread in the wake of the 1995 economic crisis and banking sector
collapse.
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between elites actors as dominant mechanism for establishing democratic
government.
Based on the work of various scholars, elite pacts can be said to have the
following characteristics: (i) pacts are negotiated compromises in which contending
forces agree not to threaten each other's "vital interests" (O'Donnell and Schmitter
V 01.4, 1986: 38). Sartori calls this "politics-as-bargaining" rather than "politics-as-
war" (Sartori 1987: 224-26). Pacts are only successful when they inc1ude all
potentially threatening interests (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 10); (ii)elite groups
maintain some or all of their previous influence in the new dynamic of power
(Karl and Schmitter 1991: 10); (iii) the compromise and power sharing
arrangement inc1udes both pre-existing traditional elites and new challengers (Karl
1986: 198); (iv) pacts serve to ensure that the new polit Y wil survive. Despite
their inc1usionary nature they are intended to restrict the scope of representation
as a guarantee to the traditional dominant c1asses that their vital interests wil be
respected (Karl 1990: 11-12; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 281); (v) decisions made
by elite actors respond to, and are conditioned by, socioeconomic structures and
political institutions which are already present. These conditioning factors can
either enhance or restrict the options available to the political actors attempting to
construct democracy (Karl 1990: 6);12 (vi) pacts are a series of accords that are
interlocking and dep end upon each other, They inc1ude an agreement between the
military and civilians over the conditions for establishing civilian rule, between
political parties to compete under the new rules of governance, and a "social
contract" between state agencies, business associations and trade unions regarding
property rights, market arrangements and the distribution of benefits (O'Donnell
and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 38-47; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 10; O'Donnell 1992:
26); (vii) while they are ultimately both substantive (concerning the main tenets
of policy) and procedural (concerning the rules of policy-making), pacts initially
emphasize rule-making because "bargaining about bargaining" is the first and most
important stage in the process of compromise (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 10).
Some scholars argue that pact-making among elites results in the construction of
democracy by antidemocratic means. In this sense, elite pacts limit the degree of
uncertainty facing all actors by establishing c1ear parameters for political and
economic activity. Clear rules for the transition process are an essential element
12 For example, based on the work of Barrington Moore (1966) scholars seem to agree that the
absence of a strong landowner elite engaged in labour-repressive agriculture enhances the
prospects for a political democracy. Karl demonstrates that the emergence of Venezuela's
petroleum sector as the country's leading source of foreign exchange created the conditions
for the dismantling of the landowner elite and, subsequently, the conditions for the
breakdown of the military rule. Elite actors involved in the transition to civilian rule in
Venezuela in 1958 were, therefore, not confronted or restrained by a powerful
antidemocratic rural elite (Karl 1986: 196-219).
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of successful democratization. However, at the same time, negotiatlOns and
compromises which reconcile the interests of elites can institutionalize a
conservative bias into the resulting polit y, creating a new status quo which restricts
further progress toward political, social and economic democratization (O'Donnell
and Schmitter VoL. 4,1986: 38; Karl 1986: 198; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 281).13
Karl notes that pacts "(a)re anti-democratic mechanisms, bargained byelites,
which seek to create a deliberate socioeconomic and political contract that
demobilizes emerging mass actors while delineating the extent to which all actors
can paricipate or wield power in the future. They mayaccomplish this task by
restricting contestation (as Colombian paries did in 1958 by agreeing to alternate
in power regardless of the outcome of elections), restricting the policy agenda
itself (as Venezuelan parties did in 1958 by agreeing to implement the same
economic program), or by restrieting the franchise (as Chileans did beginning with
the electoral law of 1874). Regardless of which strategic option is chosen, the net
effect of these options is the same: the nature and parameters of the initial
democracy that results is markedly circumscribed" (Karl 1990: 11-12).
Many scholars appear to either ignore the antidemocratic nature of pacts or regard
it as a unfortunate but necessary requirement to ensure transition, Where the
antidemocratic nature of pacts is acknowledged, scholars appear to assume that at
least some participants in the transition process are acting in good faith and are
intent on establishing the basis for a consolidated democracy. They contend that
political participation wil be expanded over time to include other sectors of civil
society, Mainwaring argues that democracy has not succeeded unless political
elites were committed to it as a first choice of regime type. Furthermore, the
outstanding distinctive feature which explains why the oldest democracies in Latin
America are found in Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia is the commitment of
political elites to establishing and maintaining a polyarchy. In all three countries,
after periods of bitter fighting, political elites realized that for survival they needed
to compromise and construct an institutional system that placed preserving
democracy above immediate partisan objectives. They have continuously
reaffirmed this commitment to preserving democracy. This elite commitment and
the resulting institutional arrangement made democracy possible despite formidable
obstac1es (Mainwaring 1992: 310). Karl (1986a), on the other hand, argues that
political elites might view democracy as a means of realizing other objectives.
Democracy then becomes an instrumental means of securing the political elites'
interests,
For the purpose of this study it is important to underline two factors. Firstly,
representatives from Colombia's two traditional parties dominated the negotiations
which led to the establishment of the National Front in 1958. No new civilian
13 The same scholars, nevertheless, argue that transition by pact is the transition that most
likely leads to political democracy.
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challenger was present. Therefore, the pact was not a compromise and
powersharing agreement which inc1uded both pre-existing traditional elites and
new challengers, Secondly, while the agreement inc1uded a pact between the
military and civilian elites over the conditions for establishing civilian rule, the
pact can not be considered a "social contract" where, for example, trade unions
were inc1uded. It was, therefore, an exclusive pact defined by the traditional elites
alone, Rather than characterizing the Colombian transition as a compromised pact,
the National Front was imposed by traditional elites to secure their vital interests.
1.4.2 The second transition of consolidating democracy
The process of transition from authoritarian to democratic governance in Latin
America took place primarily during the decade of the 1980s. Subsequently, some
scholars have shifted their focus to study the second generation of theory related
to democratic transition; the process of consolidating democratic regimes.
Theory related to the process of democratic consolidation in Latin America
represents a new field of study to which relatively few scholars have thus far
dedicated themselves. The early literature on the process of consolidation is
characteristically more pessimistic than the literature on the first transition from
authoritarian rule. AIso, there has been a broadening of the conceptual field. The
widespread reliance on strategic choice models has given way to theories that
stress economic, social-structural, and institutional factors which fall within the
discussion of more substantive definitions of democracy. This added complexity,
together with the evolving nature of literature, makes an assessment of the state
of the debate on democratic consolidation more difficult than in the case of the
transition from authoritarian rule.
There appears to be an evolving consensus among scholars on two points. Firstly,
democratic consolidation requires the elimination of residues of the old system that
are incompatible with the workings of a democratic regime and the bu ilding of
new institutions and practices which reinforce democratic values. Secondly, the
definition of a consolidated democracy draws on the existing minimal procedural
definition of democracy. A country can be said to have a consolidated democracy
when all of the major actors accept these minimal definitions of the rules of the
democratic game (O'Donnell 1992: 48-49; Valenzuela 1992: 60-62, 70-71).
At the same time, a series of central issues where no scholarly consensus yet
exists also appears to be emerging. For the purpose of this study, these scholars
can be placed into two different groups. Scholars in the first group play down the
linkage between the mode of transition and issues related to the process of
consolidation. For example, Przeworski (1992) states that where a country is
heading, not where it is coming from, is the most important consideration. Actors
shape outcomes through their choices in away that is not necessarily influenced
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by historical legacies. Therefore, by themselves neither the old regime nor the
mode of transition determines how democratic consolidation occurs.
To the contrar, a sec ond group of scholars maintains that there is a direct
relationship between the mode of transition and the process of consolidation itself.
This relationship is implicit and has significant implications in determining: (i) the
characteristics of the government which is consolidated following the transition
from authoritarian rule; (ii) the issues facing the new government; and (iii) the
extend to which actors who held power under the previous 'system maycondition
or restrict the actions of the new civilan government and, therefore, the building
of democratic institutions and practices. In addition, although democratic
consolidation is a new process, the actors and the structures are strongly
influenced by history (O'Donnell 1992, 1995; Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter
1991) .
Among the scholars of the second group there no longer appears to be a consensus
on which mode of transition holds the best prospects for democratic consolidation.
As in the past, Burton, Gunther and Higley continue to argue that elite agreements
are the main, and possibly the only, route to democratic consolidation in states
with a long record of political instability and/or authoritarian rule (Burton, Gunther
and Higley 1992: xi). They emphasize the importance of institutionalizing
procedures, within an elite settlement, which serve to stabilize the political
environment by establishing a procedural consensus, and institutionalizing
behavioral norms which restrain expressions of conflct and encourage patterns of
elite interaction as the key elements of a successful consolidation process (Burton,
Gunther and Higley 1992: 22-23).
In previous work, O'Donnell argued that transition by elite pact offered the best
prospects for democratic consolidation (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986:
37). However, in more recent writings he suggests that elite pacts may leave the
power of former authoritarian actors relatively intact. Among the obstacles to the
process of consolidation identified by O'Donnell are the persistence of "decidedly
authoritarian actors who control important resources of power; a widespread
attitude among important actors of neutrality or indifference regarding the type of
political regime put in place; the prevalence in many social spheres of profoundly
authoritarian patterns of domination .., (and) the consequences of a deep economic
crisis and the aggravation of social inequalities" (O'Donnell 1992: 19). In this
situation new democracies may experience a "slow death" where civilian
authorities remain subordinate to the military's power. Slow death is "a gradual
suffocation ,.. accomplished through the gradual erosion of the freedoms,
guarantees and proeesses that are vital to democracy ,.. These are periods, usually
measured in years, of feeble and decaying democratization". Therefore, in the new
polit Y "... some features of democracy mingle with astrong tincture of surviving
or revived authoritarianism" (O'Donnell 1995: 27). O'Donnell and Schmitter
previously called this form of government a demoeradura or a "civilian
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government with military sovereignty" (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986:
41).
O'Donnell notes that the high degree of continuity of members of the former
Brazilian bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the current system presents a serious
obstacle to democratic consolidation. O'Donnell also argues that previous patterns
of political behaviour may accompany the continued presence of these actors. Prior
to the coup of 1964 "the predominant st yle of doing politics", consisted of
"conversations among gentlemen"14 where the relationship between c1asses were
characterized as c1ientelistic. Within the state apparatus, relations are based on the
distribution or appropriation of sinecures, and politicians exchange support and
"favours" for the interests which they embody. This oligarchical st yle of doing
politics has not disappeared with the transition to democracy (O'Donnell 1992: 34-
37),
Much of the insight into the characteristics of post-transition governance in Latin
America comes from scholars outside of the elite pact related schools of thought.
Loveman c1assifies the form of governance which has been consolidated in many
Latin American countries as "protected democracy".15 In this context the military
continues to serve as the "guarantor" of the security of the nation. The actions of
persons and groups in civil society which, in the opinion of the militar, threaten
the nation's transcendent "permanent interests" or "common good" are not
tolerated and continue to be subject to repression. This may occur even if such
actions are formally legaL. Formal compliance with democratic procedures,
therefore, masks the permanent threat of "veto by the guardians's sword"
(Loveman 1994: 108-110).
As with O'Donnell, Loveman argues that the mode of transition to civilian rule
may leave former authoritarian actors with significant residual power. He points
out that the mechanisms for perpetuating that power are often entrenched in the
very constitutions, legal systems and democratic institutions and practices on
which new democracies are founded. Entrenching anti-democratic mechanisms in
the new polit Y usually occurs as a condition of transfer demanded by authoritarian
actors to guarantee their continued influence (Love man 1994: 114-119).
14 It is not accidental that this expression is of Colombian origin. See Alexander Wilde,
"Conversations Among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia". In Juan Linz and
Alfred Stephan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratie Regimes: Latin America (1978),
15 The idea that democracy must be protected against itself by providing for the suspension of
civil liberties and rights, and for the right of the executive and the armed forces to exercise
"extraordinary powers", date from 1811-1825, when the first proto-constitutions and
republican charters were established in Europe. Protected democracy is a particular
institutional arrangement and it is not uniquely to Latin America. It emerged from the
French rev ol uti on and was subsequently adopted in France and elsewhere in Europe as well
as in post-colonial Africa and parts of Asia (Loveman 1994: Note 12).
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Chilean scholar, Manuel Antonio Garretón, writes that transitions to civilian rule
in Latin America usually took place within the institutional framework established
by the former authoritarian regime. New civilian actors were force d to work from
within the framework in an attempt to democratize these existing institutions. The
result, according to Garretón, has been the consolidation of "incomplete
democracies, a regime basically democratic but riddled with inherited authoritarian
enclaves: nondemocratic institutions, unresolved human rights problems, and social
actors not wiling to play by democratic rules" (Garetón 1995: 147),
Karl anticipated similar problems when she hypothesized that the phases of
transition or early consolidation may involve significant trade-offs between some
form of political democracy, one the one hand, and equity, on the other. The new
democracies may be unable to carr out substantive reforms that address the
problems of poverty and unequal distribution that continue to characterize the
continent. They would then "become the victims of their successful consolidation,
and the democratic transitions of the 1980s that survive could prove to be the
"frozen" democracies of the 1990s" (Karl 1990: 13). ü'Donnell (1992, 1995),
Mainwaring (1992), Loveman (1994) and others also argue that deep and
aggravated economic and social inequalities undermine the prospects for
democratic consolidation.16
1.5 Pacts of autonomy and pacts of impunity
Historian Ricardo Peñaranda writes "democracy and violence in Colombia have
coexisted for such a long time that the two phenomena have paradoxically become
two faces of the same coin ... making Colombia one of the most convulsed
societies in the world" (Peñaranda 1992: 294). As stated in Chapter 1.2, this study
argues that contemporary political violence in Colombia is a direct legacy of the
restricted polit Y established by the 1958 National Front elite pact. Central to the
contradiction of democracy and violence is the relationship between the civilian
elites and the Public Forces.
16 During the decade of transition to democracy, minimum urban salaries, earned by over half
the continent s labour force, fell by 74 percent in Perú, 58 percent in Ecuador, 50 percent in
Mexico, 30 percent in Brazil, and 21 percent in Chile. The income-gap between rich and
poor has widened, unemployment has increased and the social sector spending has declined
by more than 50 percent (Rosenthal 1990). In 1991, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America, found that 44 percent of the continent s population, 183
milion persons, were living below the poverty line, an increase of 112 milion persons over
1970. Almost half that num ber, or 88 milion persons, were characterized as destitute or
living in extreme poverty. A later report, done by UNICEF (1993) concluded that 48 percent
of Latin Americans were living below the poverty line. For this reason the decade of
democratization has also been called the "lost decade".
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The Colombian Public Forces have been subordinate to civilian authority
throughout Colombian history. The subordination of the military to civilian
authority was institutionalized in the National Front pact and continues to the
present day (Blair Trujilo 1993: 81-84; Bustamante 1989: 20-21; Restrepo 1992:
287-288; Wilde 1978: 58-59; Hartlyn 1988: 58; Uprimny and Vargas Castaño
1990: 151-152). Subordination occurs de jure, within the constitutional and legal
framework of Colombia's democratic institutions, and de facto in the actual
practice of the relationship between dominant factions of the bipartisan civilian
elite and the military. 17
At the same time, the National Front also institutionalized a fundamental
redefinition of the role of the military establishment in Colombian politics,
inc1uding the relationship between the military and: (i) the civilian leadership of
the Liberal and Conservative parties; (ii) civil society itself. The agreement created
a new axis of civilian elite-Public Forces alliance based on the protection of
common interests in the face of perceived threats from new challengers in civil
society. Within this new axis of allance the military renounced any previous
partisan identity and "became the guarantors of the rules of the political game as
defined by the National Front, thus assuring the dominance of the Liberal and
Conservative parties" (Bustamante 1989: 20).
Sustaining the civilian elite-military relationship and the role of the military as
"guarantors" of the National Front polit Y has required the negotiation of two new
elite pacts since the 1970s; (i) a pact of autonomy which allows the military to
protect common interests defined through the mechanisms of the civilian elite-
Public Forces allance; and (ii) a pa et of impunity for agents of the state alleged
to be responsible for gross and systematic human rights violations. The pacts and
their mechanisms are institutionalized in Colombia's constitution, legal system and
democratic institutions which are the legacy of the National Front.
This study argues that it is precisely the pacts of autonomy and impunity which
allow the paradox between democracy and violence in Colombia to exist. The two
new elite pacts are fundamentally anti-democratic. They are based in and reinforce
the anti-democratic characteristics of the original National Front elite pact. The
pacts of autonomy and impunity are also symbiotically related; an offcial state
policy which results in high levels of human rights violations also requires that
agents of the state be shielded from the due process of law (LIDERLIP 1991: 25-
55).
17 Chapter 3 will argue that military subordination was a characteristic of the coup d'etat of
1953 and the regime of General Gustavo Rojas Pinila (1953-1957). General Rojas Pinila
was "thrust into power" in 1953 by civilian elites, he was removed from power in 1957 by
those same elites and Rojas Pinila did not have a base of power independent of civilian
politicians (Hartlyn 1988: 48; Bustamante 1989: 20; Blair Trujilo: 168-169; 81).
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The Colombian situation is unique in Latin America, largelyas a result of the
dynamics of the civilian elite-Public Forces alliance. However, comparisons can
be drawn with other Latin American countries where the military has retained de
facto autonomy despite the formal transfer of power from authoritarian to civilian
governance. These comparisons exist primarily in the analysis of the institutional
mechanisms through which autonomy and impunity are achieved. This study wil
argue that extending anti-democratic characteristics of former authoritarian
governance into the new civilian polit Y compromises the democratic value of post-
transition governments throughout Latin America. Consequently, " gaps and
weaknesses in the regimes' democracy affect the totality of social life and make
it difficult for social and political actors to emerge and express their alternative
proposals" (Garretón 1995: 156).
1.5.1 Pacts of autonomy
Loveman maintains that "nowhere in Latin America did the transition to elected
civilian government eliminate the principal constitutional, juridical and political
impediments to consolidating civilan controlled constitutional democracy"
(Love man 1994: 116). Former authoritarian actors retain considerable power and
autonomy after the transition process. Importantly, this situation is neither
temporary nor transitory as assumed by transition theorists and elite pact models
described in Chapter 1.4. Rather, the mechanisms which guarantee the continued
autonomy of the military are institutionalized in the constitutional, legal and
procedural framework of the post-transition democratic polity.
Mechanisms found in new democratic regimes throughout Latin America which
institutionalize the power of former authoritarian actors within the post-transition
polit Y inc1ude:
(i) regimes of exception as a basis element of post-transition constitutions in Latin
America. 18 In most countries, the constitutions under which new civilian regimes
were formed were written during the period of military dictatorship and either
18 Regimes of exception are constitutional and statutory provisions that permit the temporary
reorganization or redefinition of govemmental authority and procedures for the explicit
purpose of dealing with an emergency situation, which may include war, natural disasters,
epidemies, economic "emergencies", rebellions, strikes and civil war. The most typical
regimes of exception involves either the partial or complete suspension of civil liberties and
rights, an expansion of the presidents decree power, delegation by the congress of its
legislative authority to the executive, a total suspension of the constitution for the duration
of the emergency, and the expansion of miltary jurisdiction over civilian populations
(Loveman 1994: Note 31).
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reaffirm or broaden regimes implemented by military authorities; 19
(ii) constitutional provisions which effectively establish the military as a "fourth
branch of the government" and limit Presidential and Congressional oversight of
military institutions and budgets;
(iii) legislation related to internal security which criminalizes certain forms of
political opposition. The legislation typically creates special legal jurisdiction for
the military related to "crimes against the state" and extends'military jurisdiction
over civilians. In this situation the military continues to define the ideological
basis of "internal security" after the initial transition proeess;
(iv) formal representation of the military in civilian policy making (Loveman
1994: 120-125; McSherry 1992: 466-469; Garetón 1995: 153-155).
These mechanisms constitute an effort on the part of former authoritarian actors
to institutionalize their power and extend that power into the future, Consequently,
"the military everywhere reserved residual sovereignty and ... civilian politicians
accepted the reality of military guardianship" (Loveman 1994: 117). According to
Garretón "as long as the transition remains incomplete, the quality (his emphasis)
of democracy wil remain poor," resulting in a democratic "situation" rather than
a democratic "regime" (Garretón 1995: 151-153).
In addition, former military dictatorships won a significant political victory during
their terms in office by: (i) eliminating left and center-left political opposition,
either through outlawing political organizations and/or physically eliminating
opposition forces through human rights violations; and (ii) limiting competition in
post-transition elections by restricting political participation. By removing the
political opposition authoritarian regimes implicitly restricted future democratic
participation and created the conditions which would allowed for a "safe"
transition to civilian rule. General Augusto Pinochet of Chile called this victory
misión cumplida (mission accomplished) (Loveman 1994: 123).
Colombia is a variation on the situation in the rest of Latin America. Similar
mechanisms have been used to establish military autonomy, inc1uding: (i) the state
of exception provisions of the Constitutions of 1886 (Article 121) and 1991
(Articles 212- 213); (ii) the habitual use of state of emergency powers since 1948
to repress legal opposition in civil society; (iii) making permanent state of
exception decrees related to internal security by placing them into common law
19 Constitutions written by military regimes under which post-transition democratic governance
has been consolidated include: Bolivia 1967; Brazil 1988; Chile 1980; Ecuador 1978; El
Salvador 1983; Guatemala 1985; Honduras 1982; Panamá 1983; Paraguay 1992; Perú 1979;
and Uruguay 1967 (Loveman 1994: 127).
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after the period of exception has expired. The practice makes state of emergency
powers a permanent feature of the legal system under periods of normal
constitutional governance; and (iv) constitutional, legislative and de facto practices
which giv e the High Command of the Public Forces independence over the
management of those institutions.
However, this study wil argue that two factors distinguish Colombia from other
Latin American countries: (i) the dynamics of the relationship between the civilian
government and the Public Forces. Since 1958 the civiliangovernment and the
military have acted in alliance rather than in competition, Through this allance,
mutual interests are protected in the face of perceived threats arising from new
challengers in civil society. Therefore, autonomy is granted to the military by way
of civilian power as part of a consensual relationship rather than through cohesion
or threat. Autonomy is exercised within the parameters of the civilian elite-Public
Forces allance and is tolerated by the civilian government insofar as the military
acts as the guarantor of the political system (Wilde 1978; 61-62; Bustamante 1989
20-21: Blair Trujilo 1993: 81-83, 183-185; Uprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990:
151-152);20 and (ii) the Colombian military has a much more narrow self-
definition of its political role than other military establishments in Latin America.
Since 1958 it has been concerned primarily with internal security and has not been
involved in other areas of governance. For example, the Colombian military has
never aspired to managing state economic policy as was the case in countries like
Brazil, Chile and Argentina (Blair Trujilo 1993: 110, 113).
The narow polit Y established by the National Front has generated growing social
conflict since the 1970s. Increasingly mutually held civilian and military elite
interests are threatened by "all those who express dissatisfaction with the political
economic, and social situation or polices of the government, ... or who are
regarded as supporting the guerrilas in one way or another" (UN doc.
E\CN.4\1995\111 para.25). In the face of growing opposition from outside the
traditional bipartisan framework the civilian government is increasingly dependent
on the Public Forces to maintain the political system. Within this dynamic the
parties, "the army and the National Front needed each other" (Wilde 1978: 61).
As aresult, successive Colombian governments since 1958 have allocated growing
20 This is not to imply that either military or civilian elites are monolithic blocks. Since 1958,
dominant factions in the military establishment have allied themselves with factions within
the civilian elites of both parties which are sympathetic to the mi1itary's internally generated
security doctrines. This has implicitly resulted in conflicts between the mi1itary and non
dominant civilian factions, particular1y related to peace negotiations with guerrila groups,
However, the military acts within the parameters of its alliance with the civilian elites and
the limits established by the dominant factions of those elites. The military has not acted
independently or in defiance of those dominant factions.
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autonomy to the military related to: (i) defining the ideological rationale of
internal security and public order; and (ii) the actual implementation of state
policy related to those issues (Restrepo 1992: 287-288; Blair Trujilo 1993: 183-
185). These are central political concerns which should be under the exc1usive
jurisdiction of democratic institutions if the defining characteristics of democracy
established in Chapter 1.3 are said to exist. Correspondingly, the importance of the
military as a political actor has also increased. Bustamante notes that "as aresult
(of social conflct), the militar increasingly broaden their repressive, educational,
organizational and integrative functions ... and seek to'strengthen the central
governments capacity to control a highly dislocated society" (Bustamante 1989:
31).
Importantly, the civilian elite-Public Forces allance has also provoked a gradual
militarization of democratic institutions, social conflict and Colombian society at
large, In this context, "decisions on war and peace and social problems ... have
become first and foremost military problems" (Restrepo 1992: 287), The process
of militarization has occurred in a succession of incremental steps at the initiative
or with the compliance of the civilian government. Restrepo calls this process "a
gradual coup d etat of civil society which makes a c1assical coup unnecessary"
(Restrepo 1992: 287). Neither direct military intervention in Colombia's political
system nor a slow death as anticipated by O'Donnell are likely given the common
interests of the civilian and military elites, This is a contrast to many Latin
American countries where the militar establishment perceives civilian governance
as a threat.
1.5.2 Pacts of impunity
Scholars cited in Chapter 1.3 explicitly identify the principles of accountability and
respect for the rule of law as defining elements of democratic governance.
However, they do not appear to con sider what implications the absence of these
elements, a situation of impunity, has for the longterm success of democratic
transition and consolidation.
Impunity is the "exemption from punishment for theperpetrators of human rights
violations" (Jongman and Schmid 1994: 246-247). Impunity occurs when acts of
repression or abuses of power committed by agents of the state against the citizens
of that state are shielded from judgement or accountability be fore the rule of law.
Military regimes throughout Latin America demanded a guarantee against
accountability for past human rights violations in virtually all negotiations which
resulted in the transition to democratic governance (McSherry 1992: 464; Loveman
1994), The transition to elected civilian government required, therefore, a formal
or informal pact of impunity between the new civilian governments and the
military elite. These pacts were often imposed by the military, sometimes in
allance with elements of the civilian elite, either: (i) as a condition of allowing
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the transition to occur; or (ii) after the transition under the threat of a
reintervention in civilian rule (McSherr 1992: 469-478; Loveman 1994: 117).
Former authorItarian regimes were able to win guarantees of impunity as aresult
of their strong bargaining position in relation to civilian actors.
In Latin America, there are almost no cases where the institutions or individuals
responsible for gross and systematic human rights violations committed during the
decades of militar dictatorship have be en hel d accountable for their actions
through the due process of law (Loveman 1994: 117-119). There have been
various formal processes to promote national reconciliation for the human rights
violations and abuses of power committed by the dictatorships. For example, five
Latin American countries have convened Truth Commissions?1 However, with
the exception of El Salvador, there are no cases where these Commissions or
processes have been mandated to identify and prosecute the persons responsible.22
As with autonomy, impunity which exists on the scale experienced in Latin
America is likely to be achieved through: (i) the constitutional, legal and the
procedural mechanisms of the state; and (ii) by an agreement, formal or informal,
between civilian and military elites. Throughout the region, laws guaranteeing
impunity enacted as part of the transition process have been the main mechanism
against accountability:
(i) military dictatorships passed laws of self-amnesty in Chile (1978 and 1990) and
Guatemala (1985 and 1986) before allowing transition to occur;
(ii) in El Salvador (1987, 1993), Argentina (1983, 1986, 1987, 1989 and 1990),
Uruguay (1984 and 1986) and Brazil (1985) civilian governments passed military
amnesty laws, including a ley de Punto Final ("full-stop law") and ley de
Obediencia Debida (law of Due Obedience) during or after transition;
(iii) in Bolivia, Perú, Paraguay and Colombia civilian governments have failed to
take decisive action to prosecute cases of human rights violations, therefore
allowing de facto impunity to occur through inaction (Loveman 1994: 118;
McSherr 1992: 472).
21 Bolivia 1982-1984; Argentina 1985; Uruguay 1985; Chile 1990-1991; and EI Salvador 1992-
1993 (Hayner 1994: 600-603). A Truth Commission is proposed under the terms of the draft
peace agreement between the government of Guatemala and opposition and guerrilla groups
(Hayner 1994: 605).
22 Information regarding the identity of human rights violators was informally leaked to the
public in Argentina and Chile. In El Salvador senior military officials were identified as the
intellectual authors of human rights violations. However, the government of El Salvador
subsequently passed an amnesty law and only a few officers charged with well publicized
crimes were prosecuted. The El Salvadorean commission itself had no mandate to prosecute.
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In Colombia, "the impunity enjoyed by agents of the state who commit human
rights violations is almost total" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/111 para.107). In his 1994
report the Colombian Prosecutor General estimated that only three percent of
recorded human rights violations resulted in a judicial process and penal sanctions
imposed against the responsible persons (Procuradurza General de la Nación
1994).23 Colombian non-governmental human rights organizations estimate that
only one percent of recorded violations resulted in penal sanctions (Comisión
Andina de Juristas 1994: 2). Colombia currently has an impunity rate, therefore,
of between 97 percent and 99 percent.
The 1958 National Front agreement explicitly guaranteed that the Colombian
military "would not be held responsible for any failings or excesses" committed
during the period of military rule (Wilde 1978: 60). Civilian elites held a dominant
position in pre-transition negotiations and offered impunity as a concession to
consolidate the military's participation in the civilian elite-Public Forces alliance
(Wilde 1978: 60-61; Blair Trujilo 1993: 81-84; Restrepo 1992: 274-275).
Therefore, contrary to what occurred in other Latin American countries the
Colombian civilian elite guaranteed impunity as a deliberate and voluntary policy
choice rather than as a concession made under duress,
In the 1970s, a new de facto pact of impunity was established between the civilian
government and the military establishment. The pact coincided with the
mobilization in civil society against the government' s economic and social policies
and, correspondingly, increased military intervention in the management of public
order. The strategies implemented by the civilian government to repress opposition
entailed a de facto policy of permitting gross and systematic human rights
violations. The strategies were impossible to implement without a guarantee that
the agents of the state responsible for that implementation would not be held
accountable for the legal consequences of their actions (LIDERLIP 1991: 25-55).
As elsewhere in Latin America, impunity occurs through the constitutional and
legal framework of democratic institutions, Article 226 of the Colombian
Constitution of 1991 specifies that all crimes committed by members of the Public
Forces fall under the legal definition of "acts of service" and are tried under the
fuero militar. Under this definition, an "act of service" includes any form of
human rights violation.24 As noted, the current conviction rate of the military
justice system is between one and three percent of alleged cases of human rights
23 The number of recorded violations is commonly believed to be below the actual number as
many such violations are never reported. Therefore, the real impunity rate is actually higher.
24 Placing human rights violations under military jurisdiction is in violation of various
international human rights instruments to which Colombia is a signatory , including
resolution 47/133 of December, 1992 of the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons
against Forced Disappearance and Article LX of the 1994 Interamerican Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons,
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violations. However, this study wil argue that impunity is not a simple problem
of the actual effectiveness of the system, which is "tough and effective in
prosecuting disciplinary offenses involving disobedience of order ... but has proved
itself equally effective in guaranteeing impunity for violations of ordinary law in
respect to acts of murder, torture or kidnapping" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/111
para. 107). It also represents a fundamental lack of political wil on the part of
civilian politicians to ensure that prosecution occurs.
The pacts of autonomy and impunity, existing in Colombia andelsewhere in Latin
America, have significant implications for the consolidation of democracy. These
implications are considered in Chapter 6. Most importantly, they undermine or
negate the principle defining elements of democratic governance already identified
in Chapter 1.3. As also argued in Chapter 1.3, the defining elements of democracy
exist in relation to each other and the absence of one element effects the real
possibility that an environment for the other elements can exit, In Colombia and
Latin America due process for past human rights violations allegedly committed
by agents of the state have also been the main demand from organizations in civil
society (LIDERLIP 1991: 19-21).
1.6 Methodology and sources
This study is based on theories which have evolved to explain the recent
democratic transition and consolidation processes in Latin America. These theories
employ the concept of elite pacts as a central analytical element. Scholars often
use Colombia as a case study to demonstrate that elite pacts offer the best
prospects for democratic transition and consolidation. This study wil argue that,
contrar to conventional regime transition theory, elite pacts in Colombia have
resulted in a restricted political system which can only be sustained through force.
The situation of Colombia is unique in Latin AmerIca, largelyas a result of the
allances between civilian elites and the Public Forces. However, this study wil
challenge the validity of theories which argue that transition by elite pacts offers
the best prospects for democratic transition and consolidation, in Colombia, and
in Latin AmerIca in general, by comparing the mechanisms established in
Colombia with similar mechanisms existing in other Latin American countries. In
some cases, the work of scholars who do not use the concept of elite pacts wil
be used as a result of the inability of regime transition theory to fully account for
the Colombian paradox. These additional theories are not characterized as
"transition theory", but, nevertheless, focus on the prospects for democratic
consolidation in Latin America.
This study wil argue that comparative case studies can make an important
contribution to theory-building in political science. As argued by Bradshaw and
Wallace, "(c)ase studies can have profound theoretical implications which ... may
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ilustrate the inappropriateness or even irrelevance of a particular theory. By
studying these cases, we can challenge scholarly consensus and broaden the often
narrow focus of Western sociology ... (and) they have theoretical implications that
undoubtedly wil affect future comparative research (Bradshaw and Wallace 1991:
161).
Furthermore, this study emphasizes the importance of history . As Isaac and Griffin
note, "no sociological account, however theoretically or technically sophisticated,
is valid if it denies or masks important features of historie al reality" (Isaac and
Griffn 1989: 873 as quoted in Bradshaw and Wallace 1991: 164). As wil be
argued, an explanation of the current Colombian situation is virtually impossible
without referring to its historical constants dating back to independence.
The analysis of the situation in Colombia is based primarilyon my own first hand
experience during nearly four years of work as a human rights researcher in
Colombia. In my work I visited most regions affected by political violence. I had
regular contact with both government officials and persons representing a
multitude of sectors and organizations in civI1 society, inc1uding unions, women's
groups, organizations for internally displaced persons, street children, indigenous
and black communities. In addition, I participated in academic, community based
and international conferences and workshops related to the human rights situation
in both Colombia and in Latin America. These events provided me with valuable
insights regarding the Colombian human rights situation, More than anything else
it was this direct contact that made me question the validity of theories which
argue that elite pacts offer the best prospects for democratic transition and
consolidation.
This study uses historIcal data concerning the political, social and economic
developments after the end of Spanish colonial rule, For the time period covering
the developments until 1990, I have relied mainly on secondary sources. For the
time period 1990-1995 I have in addition to secondary sources used primary
sources, inc1uding interviews which I conducted between 1990 and 1994. Among
the written primary sources are material and statistics provided by a broad range
of Colombian human rights and social non-governmental organizations. The
Colombian government' s own human rights reports have been consulted for the
period 1990-1995 as well as a large number of United Nations documents and
Colombian and international newspapers.
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2. Bolívar's knot: The historical context of
political violence in Colombia (1828-1949)
Nobel prize winning Colombian author, Gabriel García Marquéz once described
Colombia as "Bolívar's knot". García Marquéz was referring to the dilemmas
inherent in the Colombian reality which were posed at Independence and were
never subsequently resolved.25 Despite the passing of 170 years, persons
attempting to consolidate a coherent state and democratic governance in Colombia
today are confronted by many of the same factors which thwarted Bolívar' s
attempt to create a coherent unified state from the remains of the old Spanish
empire in South America.
This chapter is not a "war by war" review of Colombian history. Rather, it wil
identify and trace the evolution of the threads in Bolivar's knot between the end
of the Wars of Independence (1828) and the beginning of the period known as la
Vialencia (1946-1966) (the Violence). Chapter 2 wil establish that the 1958
National Front agreement and the subsequent government by bipartisan elite pact
were not unique in Colombian history. Rather, these events were founded in
patterns of political behaviour that are well established and reflect an almost
instinctive or habitual elite response to crisis, Historians note that while there has
been an evolution of the dynamics of the exercise of political power throughout
Colombian history "the old order has never been defeated, but simply incorporated
into the new order through political compromise" (Pearce 1990: 24). Therefore,
these threads, or historical constants, play a decisive role in defining the
characteristics of the political regime under review in the main body of this study.
The continuum of those threads is found in Colombia' s contemporary polit Y as the
patterns of violence established during the pre-1949 era "still weight decisively in
our political culture" (Restrepo 1992: 276).
25 General Simón Bolívar led the Spanish colonies of the Andean region of South America in
the Wars of Independence against Spain. Bolivar attempted to build a coherent state from
Spain's former Andean colonies and served as President of Gran Colombia, which
comprised present day Colombia, Venezuela, Panamá, Ecuador, Bolivia and Perú, from 1819
until 1828. Gran Colombia collapsed in a revolt lead by regional elites in 1828. Many
historians trace Colombia' s inability to build a unified and coherent nation state in the 19th
and early 20th century directly to Bolívar's defeat. Consequently, they argue that Colombia
won Independence in 1828, however, the creation of a nation did not follow.
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2.1 The historIcal constant of democracy
Colombia has been governed by civilians since its independence from Spanish
colonial rule in the early 1800. The Colombian military has directly intervened in
the political system at the national leve1 on two occasions, once in 1854 and a
second time in 1828. However, both military governments were shortlived and
civilian governance subsequently restored.
19th and early 20th century government in Colombia had the basic trappings of
democratic governance found during these eras. For example, elections were he1d
on a regular basis, although fraud, in the form of vote buying, ballot stuffing,
coercion or other practices appear to have been "always present" (Wilde 1978: 31).
Colombian democracy inherited its basic structure and political culture from the
former Spanish system, inc1uding a tradition of legalism which is stil present in
the polity.
2.2 The constants of geography and regionalism
Colombia's geography has determined the historical patterns of settlement and
economic activity . The country is divided by three Andean mountain ranges
(cordileras) which are separated by two broad river valleys (los val/es del
Magdalena y Cauca). It has coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and
territories in the Amazon Basin (Amazonas) and the immense plains (los Llanos)
which extend from the eastern edge of the Andes into Venezuela. There are three
types of climatic zones: cold highlands, temperate mountain slopes and hot tropical
valleys. Dramatic changes in altitude mean that tropical and alpine conditions can
exist within a short distance from each other, giving Colombia the second highest
leve1 of biodiversity in the world after BraziL.
Hartlyn notes that "(Colombia's) rugged topography impeded effective national
integration, .." (Hartlyn 1988: 18). Colombia' s geography posed significant physical
barriers to transportation and communication which were decisive factors in the
Colombian experience of nation building. Economically, geography severely
impeded the development of a national economic infrastructure. This was, in large
part, a result of the huge costs, engineering and logistical challenges and the
inability of the weak central state apparatus to promote national integration.
Colombians were severely limited in their ability to move their products and to
develop internal and external markets. Even after the inauguration of rail
transportation and regular stream navigation on the Magdalena river in the 1870s,
it stil took four to six weeks to travel from the Atlantic ports to Santa Fé de
Bogotá, the capital city, which is located at 2,600 meters in the Central Andean
mountain range (Pearce 1990: 24).
Consequently, no Colombian national market appeared until the 1920s when the
rapidly expanding coffee sector, which grew four times in value between 1914 and
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1929 (Harlyn 1990: 28), created the conditions for the development of fledgling
manufacturing industries in the 1930s. The economy remained predominantly
agrarian until well in to the 20th century and as late as 1930 the manufacturing
sector still only employed 15,000 workers (Pearce 1990: 30). In 1905 Colombia,
together with Haiti, had the lowest levels of foreign investment in Latin America
and the real value of exports, which consisted almost entirely of agricultural
products, was only 30 percent higher than it was at Independence (Pearce 1990:
27),
Colombia, therefore, began the 20th century with one of the most economically
backward countries in Latin America. For the purpose of this study, Colombia's
late development has at least two relevant implications: (i) a weak economy and
the limited availabilty of resources, financial or otherwise, tended to produce a
weak central state apparatus. The state' s main source of revenue during the 19th
century was import and export duties which remained minimal until the growth
of coffee exports in the second decade of the 20th century (Pearce 1990: 28).
Consequently, the state did not have the resources to promote national economic
or political integration, establish its independence from the two traditional parties
or assert its authority in many regions of the country; also (ii) in this economic
context landownership was almost the sole basis of wealth and, implicitly, political
power. As a result, "the traditional values of the latifundo (large agricultural
estates) were unchallenged until the end of the 19th century at a time when most
other Latin American countries had strengthened and centralized the state and
completed their liberal economic and political reforms" (Pearce 1990: 23). No
fundamental change in Colombian demographics, such as industrialization and the
development of an urban working dass, occurred until the 1930s and 1940s and
no significant new political actors appeared from outside of the traditional
bipartisan polit Y to challenge the status quo.
Politically and socially, Colombia's geographic barriers dictated that most regions
of the country developed in relative isolation of the colonial and post-colonial
central state authority. Isolation reinforced strong regional identities to the
detriment of a Colombian national identity. Regionalism tended to encourage the
formation of local political dynamics in which central government policy could not
be implemented and elite groups functioned in a semi-autonomous manner
resulting in the "development of a number of regional centres (which are)
significant to this day" (Hartlyn 1988: 18). Throughout Colombian history,
therefore, regionalism and the ability to coopt or integrate regional interests within
a partisan political framework has been an important factor in capturing political
power, producing a fragmented polit Y and political culture based on the promotion
of regional rather than national interests.
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2.3 The constant of two dominant political parties
The controlover the formal political system exercised by the Liberal and
Conservative parties extends from their formal consolidation in the 1850s to the
present day, a period of 145 years.26 Consequently, the two traditional parties
have determined or strongly influenced almost every aspect of political life, nation
building and the characteristics of Colombian society itself. According to Wilde
"the Liberal and Conservative parties were the central and inescapable basis of
political life... They were the most fundamental national institutions in society and
more significant structurally, culturally, behaviourally than any other social
grouping (such as regions or dass) or other national institutions (such as the
church, the militar or even the state itself)" (Wilde 1978: 35). The parties,
therefore, were the dominant structures in the country and possessed the greatest
range of "power capabilities" for organizing civil society behind the m (Wilde
1978: 35). Those capabilities induded the ability to mobilize for elections and
violence, which often occurred as an extension of the elector process, distribution
of economIc rewards to supporters through the use of clientelismo (patronage).
As noted, late economic development and stagnant demographic trends meant that
no third political force, or new challengers, emerged to upset the hegemony of the
Liberals and Conservatives until the 1930s and 1940s.27 When they did happen
the "processes of industrialization and of working dass integration into political
life (beginning in the late 1930s) inevitably occurred in the context of, and were
conditioned by, the two paries" (Hartlyn 1988:16). New political actors were
either integrated into the bipartisan framework and lost their independent identity
or repressed, One candidate in the 1922 Congressional elections described this
process when he said "I see no need for a third political party when all of the
aspirations of workers fit into Liberalism" (Pearce 1990: 30).
The Liberals and Conservatives both had their roots in the Wars of Independence
(1810-1828) and were formally established in the 1850s. By that time both parties
were able to mobilize the mass of their supporters to participate in elections and
civil conflcts. Initially, they were "10ose confederations of large landowners and
merchants who possessed a considerable degree of autonomy in their regions
rather than tightly knit organizations" (Hartlyn 1988: 18), at once reflecting and
26 Uruguay is the only other Latin American country where the parties formed at Independence
stil retain power. No third political party has ever won power in Colombia at the national or
regional levels. With the exception of two members of the political party AD M- i 9 who
briefly held minor cabinet positions during the administration of Cesar Gaviria Trujillo
(1990- i 994) no third party has ever held government office at the nationalleveL.
27 The most important new challenger in the period under review in Chapter 2 was the Partido
Comunista de Colombia (Communist Party of Colombia; PCC), which based it support
among workers in the emerging agroexport (banana), petroleum and transportation (ports
and railways) sectors (Pearce i 990: 30).
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reinforcing the country's regional fragmentation. Coherent party platforms were
articulated in the late 1840s and early 1850s and nationallevel party structures and
bureaucracies were consolidated beginning in the 1880s (Hartlyn 1988: 25).
Despite strong regional pressures a degree of centralization and internal coherence
was demanded by the necessity to win elections, distribute patronage and mobilize
for war.
There does not appear to be a consensus among historians regarding the precise
origins or initial ideological distinctions between the Liberals and Conservatives
(Bushnell 1992: 19). Some scholars stress economic factors (Berquist 1992: 6 and
Kalmanovitz 1988: 169) while others contend that the mai n difference was found
in the nature of their relationship to the institutional Catholic Church (Bushnell
1992: 28; Restrepo 1992: 277; Pearce 1990: 17).28 However, historians agree that
such differences between the Liberals and Conservatives, in terms of ideology,
party policy and the reality of their actions when in office, were marginaL. One
historian conc1udes the differences were "essentially factional divisions with the
small ruling oligarchy ... (ideological differences) that may have existed were
superseded by more purely personalistic and regional disputes" (Hartlyn 1988: 19).
Another notes that "it can be said that the two parties accepted, without serious
questioning, the dominant economic ideology of the last century, that is, free
enterprise and lassiez faire, which suited all sectors of the Colombian upper c1ass
quite well ... party leaders argued about the details but did not oppose each other
as monolith blocks" (Bushnell 1992: 27). Ideological differences, therefore, were
more perceived than real and did not play a significant role in determining party
identification.
Instead, historians tend to explain the origins of the two parties in terms of the
identification of elite interests, over time and on a regional basis, with one party
or the other. Elites gradually assumed an identity within the emerging bipartisan
framework in the absence of other mechanisms, inc1uding autonomous state
institutions, to channel, promote and protect their interests. The articulation of
those elite interests and the "ideology" of a respective party became
indistinguishable (Pearce 1990: 17-22; Hartlyn 1988: 19). Party membership itself
was hereditary, handed down through generations to the point of assuming the
characteristics of political culture. "One is Liberal or Conservative as one is
Catholic, as one is Colombian-by birth. One does not even consider not being
28 The Catholic Church was closely aligned with the Conservative party between Independence
and the 1960s. Liberal reforms, based on the secular state, threatened the power of the
church which subsequently participated actively in elections and conflicts. Bushnell and
others argue that church intervention added a religious element to partisan conflict where
actors were cast in terms of "good and evil", further polarizing Colombian society and
fuelling fanaticism on both sides (Bushnell 1992: 28). Since the 1960s the church has
remained politically active and conservative in ideology. However, it has assumed a
nonpartisan posture and its power in civil society has been in decline since the L 950s.
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Liberal or Conservative, just as one would never think of not being Catholic or
Colombian through a simple act of wil" (Buitrago as quoted in Hartlyn 1988: 18).
Party affiliation, therefore, polarized Colombian society in to two political camps.
This parisan identification was the primary element of social c1eavage, replacing
race, religion, language or issues that may have provided the axis of social
c1eavage in other societies during comparable historical periods (Hartlyn 1988:
17).
2.4 The constant of political violence
"Colombia had a heritage of political violence second to none" (Wilde 1978: 29).
Historian Gonzalo Sánchez describes Colombia during the 19th century as a
"country of permanent and endemic warfare" (Sánchez as quoted by Bushnell
1992: 12). There were no fewer than 14 national leve1 civil conflicts and two
international wars between 1828 and 1902. Innumerable local and regional
conflicts also occurred, inc1uding 40 rebellions to seize departmental government
during the era of the federal constitution (1863-1886) (Pearce 1990: 20), intra-elite
wars, land struggles which to ok on a partisan identity and urban riots in the 1930s
and 1940s, "These wars never ende d in decisive victories but were short breathing
spaces before renewed fighting" (Sánchez as quoted by Pearce 1990: 17).
An estimated 40,000 persons died on the battlefield between 1830 and 1870
(Bushnell 1992: 15). Another 100,000 persons, or two percent of Colombia's
population were kiled in the largest of the 19th century civil conflicts, the
Thousand Day War (1899-1902)29 and over 200,000 persons died in the period
of the Violence. "What is inescapable (in Colombian history) is the sheer
frequency with which the political factions made use of force, or the implied threat
of force in the hope of effecting a change of rulers" (Bushnell 1992: 12). The
violence also had serious economic implications as the destruction was often
targeted at the country's productive structure, contributing to Colombia's slow
economic development.
Political violence occurred primarily in the context of bipartisan competition for
control of the state and the power to control the distribution of the resources of
the state. The importance of maintaining at least some form of access to political
power was a result of the backward economy, In impoverished 19th century
Colombia the ability to award contracts, control political and public service
appointments and make policy decIsions related to the economy was a critical, and
29 The Thousand Day War was also the largest of Latin America's 19th century cIvil conflicts
(Bushnell 1992: 15).
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sometimes the only, source of wealth. According to Wilde, "the state budget was
the only industry in a country without industries ... and the government offered
unparalleled opportunities for advancement in the absence of a developed private
sector (Wilde 1978: 26). This was especially the case during times of cyc1ical
economic downturn or recession which increased the inherent value of government
resources. For example, the Liberal rebellion which lead to the Thousand Day War
was initiated by Liberal elites who were exc1uded from government positions and
did not have other economic alternatives (Pearce 1990: 25).
Wilde and others note that "control of the bounty of the state turned on the capture
of the national Presidency. Almost every administrative position in the country
was filed through patron age down to the humblest municipal leve1 employee"
(Wilde 1978: 36). According to Bushnell "political struggles in Colombia revolved
around competition for the control of the meagar booty contained in the public
treasury or the social status that offcial positions conferred, The amount of booty
was so slight, particularly at the local leveL, that it is hard to imagine anyone
risking their li fe fighting for it. However, it was precisely in the small towns and
vilages that economic alternatives were most limited, and where control by one's
party of official decision making in such matters as the letting of contracts and
adjudication of land titles might make the difference between poverty and modest
comfort" (Bushnell 1992: 27).
The role of the political parties as catalysts for violence must also be understood
in terms of the political culture generated by partisan identification. Hatreds
between groups in civil society were fostered as a mechanism for retaining the
loyalty of supporters. Restrepo notes that "beginning in the 19th century (party
elites) nourished the sentiment of party loyalty among the subordinate c1asses,
feeding prejudices and mutual hatred ... in this way they managed to maintain
broad-based party loyalty, drawn more from hereditary hatreds then from the
ability of the parties to represent and channel the economic and social aspirations
of the subordinate minority" (Restrepo 1992: 276).
The parties themselves are frequently described as "subcultures" rather than
organizations offering distinct options for the management of state (Dix 1979: 304;
Hartlyn 1988: 27; Wilde 1978: 37). These subcultures, or party identifications,
were "so intense and deep seated that they have been called hereditary hatreds and
are responsible for much of the political violence" (Di x 1979: 304). In part,
historians attribute this aspect of political culture and social cleavage as a
consequence of "the sheer cumulative effect of injuries given and received and of
grudges passed down from father to son to grandson" (Bushnell 1992: 27), what
Wilde refers to as the cycle of "attack and revenge" which of ten assumed a
dynamic beyond the control of the partyelites themselves (Wilde 1978: 67). Some
argue that this has created a culture of violence, or predisposition in Colombian
society towards the use of violence. However, one scholar notes that it is a
"simplification to say that the Colombian people were an aggressive people from
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the beginning. Rather what you fin d is a country where the political customs of
the ruling class have led the people into war since the very first days of the
republic" (De Roux as quoted by Pearce 1990: 22).
2.5 The constant of elite pacts
The 1958 National Front agreement described in Chapter 4 was not the first time
that an elite pact has be en used to end a period of political violence in Colombia.
Rather, elite pacts are a key element of a pattern of political behaviour that is well
established in Colombian history. Dix reports there were six examples of
bipartisan power sharing arrangements in Colombian before the 1953 military
coup, inc1uding the governments of 1854, 1869, 1901, 1930, 1945 and 1949 (Dix
1979: 304). In addition a period of relatively stable coalition government
encorporating both parties existed between 1910 until 1946.
Before 1949 the Liberals and Conservatives paries both enjoyed their respective
eras in power. The first period of Liberal domination lasted from 1848 to 1885.
The Conservatives held office from 1886 until 1930 and, subsequently, the
Liberals won the elections of 1930 and remained in power until 1946. The last
period of Conservative rule from 1946 to 1953 was marked by the escalation of
inter-party and intra-party conflict which led to the Violence, Despite alternating
periods of domination the party in opposition was usually not completely excluded
from some form of participation in the exercise of that power. According to Wilde
the dominant party was "not expected to act as a party government, but to share
power with the elites of the other party. Majoritarianism was qualified. Neither
party expected to be a permanent minority without at least some participation in
the government." (Wilde 1978: 34).
Elite pacts permitted elite accommodation within the context of polarization and
political violence and "undoubtedly contributed to the survival of the two parties
into the 20th century" (Dix 1979: 304). They constituted the mechanisms through
which the rewards of power could be shared, ensuring that all significant partisan
factions capable of destabilizing the political balance were not left out. The
coalitions were usually short lived, lasting for a period of several years or less,
and were s~en as a mechanism for establishing a political truce or as a means of
transferring power from one party to the other on a gradual and less threatening
basis. In each case the coalition was led by a dominant partner. Dix notes that
"none of the coalitions had a constitutional basis" (Dix 1978: 306). Rather, the
pacts were "conversations among gentlemen", which tended to be informal,
personalistic and narrowly based" within elite elements which were dominant at
a given historical moment (Wilde 1978: 58).
Elite pacts, therefore, fit within the cyc1e of violence and reconciliation and they
have been habitually used as a mechanism for accommodation, power sharing,
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mediation and resolving conflict. As Restrepo notes "until the bipartisan National
Front, Liberal and Conservative leaders based their monopoly of power on a
singular and passionate dialectic of bitter confrontations and transitory national
reconciliations .., party leaders launched the people into cycles of civil war that
ended in pacts of national reconciliation aranged by the same leaders" (Restrepo
1992: 276). Violence frequently occurred precisely in the periods when the
governing consensus had broken down or when one party was excluded from
access to power for an extended period. Given the interaction between regional
interests, the breakdown of consensus was as likely to' occurwithin the parties
(intra-pary) as is was between the parties (inter-party), Consequently, there are
examples of bipartisan governments founded on elite interest held in common
across pary lines, such as in 1886 and 1946 (Dix 1979: 304-307).
Elites recognized "when intra-elite conflict had gone too far" and moderates on
both sides would be drawn together,by mutual interests, "to create the basis of a
new consensus" (Wilde 1978: 34). Consensus appears to have been easiest to find
when commonly held economic interests were threatened. For example, the
Thousand Day War virtually destroyed the Colombian economy and resulted in the
loss of Panamá to the United States. Following the war elites on both sides
"recognized the value of power sharing" (Hartlyn 1988: 28), particularly in the
years of rapid economic growth between 1910 and 1920. They understood that
"the benefits of interparty peace were abundant ... and had astrong economic
incentive to end and pre vent the renewal of fratricidal warfare" (Wilde 1978: 34).
It should also be noted that the partyelites were not always able to control
political violence. In elite pact negotiations which were a prelude to a new power
sharing consensus the moderates or accommodators leading the process had to find
common ground with moderates in the opposing party and contain hardliners in
their own party. They were also confronted by deeply held hatreds generated in
the party rank and fie by partisan affiliation, These hatreds often superseded elite
political or economic objectives. At times, therefore, the rank and file membership
was difficult to control and the elites were forced to "let the violence run its
course" before imposing an accommodation (Dix 1979: 306).
2.6 The constant of clientelismo
Political power in Colombia has historically been consolidated and exercised
through clientelistic relationships. Clientelismo occurred as a reward, usually in the
form of patronage, in exchange for support, The reward could take the form of
government contracts, licenses, a position in the public service or in local or
regional government, or a favour such as the granting of title to land he1d within
the public trust. The promise of reward could be reinforced by the use or implied
threat of force. Clientelismo occurred on two distinct axis between: (i) the state
and elite groups, institutionally represented by the Liberals and Conservatives; and
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(ii) between elites in the two parties and their supporters in civil society,
It has already been established in Chapter 2.4 that control of the resources of the
state was critical to Colombian elites in the absence of other economic
opportunities. The party elite-state relationship was, therefore, frequently motivated
by the desire for partisan enrichment. According to Wilde "the state was a prize
of the parties; it was important for what they could get from it ,.. the state's own
structures and institutions, its own potential public values, were subordinated to
the collected particularistic goals of the c1ientelistic parties"'(WildeI978: 36). In
this light, the state apparatus became a "mediator" through which members of the
two parties "distributed power and privileges among themselves" (Pearce 1990: 5).
The second axis of clientelismo occurred between the partyelites and their
supporters in civil society. The success of the parties was based in their ability to
mobilize their supporters for both elections and wars. In turn, the capacity of party
elites to mobilize supporters and consolidate their loyalty was based on the ability
of elites to distribute some of the rewards of power. Clientelismo began in the
19th century within the context of the dependent relationship between peasants and
landlords. Hartlyn notes "the lower c1asses were drawn in to the conflcts (between
elites), especially in rural areas, because of their dependence on the landlord"
(Hartlyn 1988: 19). To consolidate support and guarantee the loyalty of the rural
populations the landlord would "promise of some favour or reward" (Pearce 1990:
20).
With the evolution of pary bureaucracies in the mid to late 1800s, local landlords
were replaced by a network of regional party bosses responsible for mobilizing
support and distributing patron age when the respective parties were in power.
Party infrastrueture created "a vertical hierarchy of various brokers which formed
a pyramid from the local organizers to the regional bosses to the national elites.
Within this pyramid the lower leve1 brokers furnished bodies for battles, both
electoral and martial, and their superiors, when in power, responded with jobs and
favours from the government" (Wilde 1978: 36).
The rank and file of the parties suffered from the same lack of economic
opportunities as the elites and were c1early aware of the implications which
electoral results and shifts in power had for their own well being (Bushnell 1992:
27). Berquist notes that "through alliance to one or the other party (peasants and
small landowners) secured a host of strategically placed allies in their struggle to
accumulate capital and land" (Berquist 1992: 66), For peasants, victory could
mean anything from "relief from military conscription for a son to effective police
protection from bellgerent neighbours to a favourable resolution of legal disputes ".
For wealthier small landowners victory could mean "access to government jobs,
advanced education for children, a favourable decision on the location of a road
or any of a hundre d other political or legal favours" (Berquist 1992: 66-68).
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Through these clientelistic relationships the parties "formed the most important
link between the top and the bottom of society" (Wilde 1978: 36), replacing the
state as a source of identity. Owing, in a large part, to the lack of distinct
ideologies and the use of clientelismo, party membership was homogeneous and
extended across dass and regions. The "quest for these stakes (the ability to
control patronageJ tied together the most diverse strata of society... the parties
could not be distinguished from each other on the basis of their social followings
(Wilde 1978: 36).30 Clientelismo was, therefore, a critical factor in reinforcing
partisan identification and contributed to the overall polarization:
2.7 The Armed Forces of Colombia
One constant that does not reach from history into the contemporary polit Y is the
role of the Colombian militar in political life. By the late 1970s, the Fuerzas
Armadas de Colombia (Armed Forces of Colombia; FAC) was the single most
important actor in political violence in Colombia and a force in politics and
society in its own right. However, historically the military in Colombia has been
weak. It did not play a sÍgnificant ro le in the construction of the state and, unlike
most other Latin American countries, did not develop as a independent political
force or mediator in the political process.
The Colombian elite which rebelled in 1828 against Gran Colombia and Bolívar's
vision of a federal South America distrusted his army, which was comprised
mainly of officers from Venezuela. The army was a centralizing force which
conflicted with the localized mentalities and ambitions of the regional elites. When
Gran Colombia collapsed the arme d forces were dismantled. Only a small, poorly
funded force was left in place and, "starved for resources, it became one of the
weakest armies in Latin America" (Pearce 1990: 16). By the time the Liberal and
Conservative parties began to consolidate in the 1840s and 1850s the military, as
a state institution, "was practically non existent" (Hartlyn 1988: 20). In 1850 the
army only had 500 men under arms (Wilde 1978: 35). Various attempts to
professionalize the military during the 19th century faI1ed. For example, efforts in
1848, 1861, 1883, 1891 and 1896 to open a school for officers were unsuccessful
as a result of resistance from civilian officials. Few officers had any formal
training and most received their positions through patronage appointment (Blair
Trujilo 1993: 26). It was 1943 before the first officer professionally trained in a
30 The homogeneous composition of the parties contributed to the unique dynamic of political
violence in Colombia. Historians note that neighboring villages of ten assumed opposing
political affiiations. These vilages had no other distinctions in terms of dass, race, religion
or the base of their economic activities. Over time, political violence assumed a local
dynamic beyond the control of elites as the vilages fought personalized and localized
contlicts between themselves. These contlcts often occurred in the name of avenging a past
grievance rather than any particular issue.
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Colombian school joined the militar high command (Wilde 1978: 35).
The civI1 conflcts which occurred prior to 1949 were fought largely by irregular
armies organized by the two parties and the state itself has never exercised a
monopoly on the use of force. The ary usually played a small role in these
conflicts, Where it did, it was often beaten by the better armed partisan forces, as
occurred in the Thousand Day War (Bushne111992: 28). Some historians contend
that the army took on the partisan colour of the party of government, and was
most often being seen to be aligned with the Conservatives. Army'officers played
a role in politics, however, they did 80 "more in their capacity as Liberals and
Conservatives than as generals or coloneIs" (Bushne111992: 28). Their traditional
ideological position was non-involvement in the political system (Blair Trujillo
1993: 3-10).
Bushnell notes that "at least a parial explanation (for the evolution of the
Colombian political system) can be found in the relative weakness of the military
as an independent political force, so that the consolidation of the two party system
was not disrupted by interludes of military dictatorship" (Bushnell 1992: 28). For
the purpose of historical context, therefore, the legacy of a weak military has two
implications. The political parties were unchallenged during the period during
which they consolidated. The military did not exist as an independent force to
condition the actions of the paries or interrupt civilian control of the state.
Historians agree that this was a major factor permitting the development of both
the parties and a formal democratic polit Y in Colombia.
In addition, the direct intervention of the armed forces was not an option open to
either civilian or military actors. Rather than "knocking on the barracks door" in
a time of crisis, as was the custom throughout Latin America, elite interests were
best protected either through the use of their respective irre gular forces and/or
through a new elite accommodation or pact. Irregular forces were a "power
capability" of the parties themselves and did not have any independence outside
of civilan objectives. Provoking a military take over was, therefore, not a viable
option, either in terms of the military's strength or the protection of elite interests.
37
3. La Violencia
The two decades between 1940 and 1960 represent a watershed in Colombian
history. The singular event at the center of this period was a de facto civil war
between Liberal and Conservative parties known as la Vialencia, 1946-1966 (the
Violence),31 The conflct has been called the "greatest mobilization of peasants
in the recent history of the Western hemisphere" (Hartlyn 1988: 43-44). However,
more importantly for the purpose of this study, the Violence marks the historical
moment when the axis of political conflct in Colombia shifted.
The Violence simultaneously integrated two distinct levels of conflct. On the one
hand, the threads of Bolívar' s knot described in Chapter 2 again came to their
logical culmination in a period of inter-party civil War between Liberal and
Conservative partisans. At the same time, however, the conflict became "an
incipient revolution" (Sánchez 1992: 80). The old bipartisan hegemony collided
with the demands of new challengers in civil society who assumed an independent
political identity outside of the traditional politicalorder. Their origins lay Ín the
silent revolutions of profound economic, demographic, social and cultural changes
which swept Colombia, and most other Latin American countries, during the first
half of the 20th century. The unresolved historical issue of land reform was also
criticaL.
The new axis of elite-new challengers conflct fundamentally altered the
relationship between elites and civil society by "exhausting the traditional
mechanisms of control, based in clientelismo and bipartisan domination"
(Unprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990: 144). Three implications of the shift are
relevant for this study: (i) for the first time in Colombian history intra-elite/inter-
party interactions were conditioned by the interactions between those elites and
new independent forces in civil society. In large part, this new axis of elite-new
challenger interaction formed the rationale for the 1958 National Front agreement;
(ii) in contradiction to transition theories employing the concept of elite pacts
outlined in Chapter 1.4, the Liberal and Conservative parties acted decisively to
exc1ude the new challengers from the political process. This exc1usion is one of
the central factors in the events described in Chapters 3 and 4; and (iii) the
exc1usion of new challengers and inability of the old bipartisan polit Y to address
the process of transformation created by the silen t revolutions provided the
31 Historians use different periods to define the Violence. The discrepancy is a result of their
use of different events as historical markers. The period of 1946-66 is based on Bergquist,
Peñaranda and Sánchez (1992: xii). Others use the periods 1949-1966 or 1949-1958.
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antecedents for the contemporary crisis of endemic political violence and human
rights violations described in Chapter 5 and 6 of this study.
3.1 Silen! revolutions: Transforming Colombian society
Many historians use Pécaut s characterization of the silent revolutions to describe
the economic, demographic, social and cultural changes which have occUlred in
Colombia since the 1930s (Uprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990: 144-148). The use
of the term "silent revolutions" specifically refers to the period between the 1930s
and the 1960s. Many of the trends which characterize these revolutions were
accelerated by the Violence and are stil occurring in Colombia in the 1990s.
The silent revolutions are not defined by singular events. Rather, they are a
process of gradual transformation which "eliminated the base of legitimacy of
party divisions" by creating new opportunities and sources of power outside of the
control of the bipartisan polit Y (Uprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990: 146). It is
beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive analysis of these
changes, However, it is important to summarize the main elements of the silent
revolutions insofar as they ilustrate: (i) the context in which new independent
political forces appeared; and (ii) the response of the traditional elites in the
Liberal and Conservative parties.32
Structural changes in the economy - Pécaut and others trace the origins of the
silent revolutions to the first large inflows of foreign capital which arrived in
Colombia during the late 1920s (Pécaut 1987: 110; Wilde 1978: 40). "Massive
societal changes (were) induced by growing economic ties with the outside world"
as export-led economic growth, dominated by the coffee sector but inc1uding other
commodities such as cotton and bananas, began the process of integrating
Colombia into world markets (Hartlyn 1988: 30).33 After 1930 industrial and
manufacturing sectors also grew rapidly, with related sectors averaging 11 percent
growth between 1930-1939 (Wilde 1978: 41; Revéiz 1989: 42). Industrialization
was "largely initiated by the traditional large landowning-merchants" who
expanded and diversified their economic base from more traditional activities such
as agricultural production (Hartlyn 1988: 34), The state "played an indirect and
minor ro1e" (Hartlyn 1988: 34), "providing the conditions under which the private
32 Definitive works on the process of economic and social transformation which occurred
between the 1930s and the 1950s include Pécaut 1987: Vol. I-IL; Revéiz 1989; Kalmanovitz
1989; Bergquist 1992; LeGrand 1992.
33 Wilde points out that "the vast societal process, modernization, came later to Colombia than
much of Latin America" (Wilde 1978; 40). As noted in Chapter 2, the late arrival of
modernization in Colombia contributed to the ability of the traditional parti es to retain their
hegemony of power until the 1940s.
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sector could take initiatives", inc1uding the development of economic,
communication and transportation infrastructure (Wilde 1978: 41; Pearce 1990:
37),
Changing demographics - Between 1918 and 1953 Colombia's urban population
grew from 21 percent to 43 percent of the total population (Wilde 1978: 41). By
1992 71 percent of Colombians lived in urban areas and that number is expected
to reach 75 percent in the year 2000 (UNDP 1994: Table 22). Population
displacement which occurred asa result of the Violence accelerated this trend
during the 1950s as "landlessness, extreme poverty and rural violence prompted
an exodus from the countryside and chaotic urbanization (Americas Watch 1986:
11). Rapid growth in the cities was accompanied by growth in the population in
general, which averaged 2.7 percent between 1964 and 1973 (Revéiz 1989: 178)
and continued at an average of 2,3 percent in 1992 (UNDP 1994: Table 23).
Demographic changes interacted with the structural changes in the economy. For
example, while the urban workforce increased, the number of persons employed
in sectors related to agriculture declined from 70 percent of the workforce in 1925
to 50 percent in 1951 (Wilde 1978: 40) and 17 percent in 1992 (Fedesarrollo
1994) .
Economic growth and disparity - Colombia's GNP increased 2.2 percent between
1939 and 1944, and 6,2 percent between 1945 and 1949 (Wilde 1978: 41). As
previously noted, high levels of growth continued through the 1960s to the 1990s.
However, there has been little "trickle down" of the benefits of economic growth
or modernization to civil society at large. Between the 1940s and 1960s the
majority of Colombians "experienced either a stagnation or relative dec1ine in their
standard of living" (America's Watch 1986: 11). In 1945 "almost three fourths of
the populations were peasants living in relative poverty and three percent of the
landowners monopolized half of the land" (Sánchez 1992: 76). During this period
the government did not adopt interventionalist economic policies nor did it
construct the social infrastructure which accompanied urbanization in many other
Latin American countries (Pécaut 1987: 572). While the state's income increased
four hundred percent between 1940 and 1949 (Wilde 1978: 42), with a
corresponding extension of central government authority /4 social expenditures
were virtually stagnant between 1930 and 1950 (Pearce 1990: 38).
Other modernizing influences also simultaneously came into play. For example,
the general leve1 of education in Colombian society began to gradually improve
in the 1930s, a process which acce1erated after 1950 (Uprimny and Varg as
34 Wilde notes that the state assumed new regulatory functions, strengthened controls over
banking and commerce and constructed new communication and transportation
infrastructure. New public agencies were created to oversee the expansion of the role of the
state (Wilde 1978: 41-44),
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Castaño 1990: 146). According to Planeación Nacional (National Department of
Planning) the number of students entered in primary education tripled between
1960 and 1986. During the same period the number of students at the secondary
leve! increased six fold, twelve fold in post-secondar education,35 and by 1992
60 percent of Colombian students completed their secondary school education
(UNICEF 1995: Table 4). The leve! of adult literary has also risen from
approximately 40 percent in 1940 (Sánchez 1992: 77) to 87 percent in 1992
(UNICEF 1995: Table 4).
The ideological power of the institutional Catholic Church also weakened,
undermining "one of the most important bases of social stability" (Uprimny and
Vargas Castaño 1990: 146). Historically, the Colombian Church is one of the most
conservative in Latin America. Since the 1920s the institutional Church has
opposed social organization outside of the bipartisan framework, particularly when
those organizations assumed a radical or populist discourse. However, as a res ult
of the silent revolutions and the circumstances around the National Front
agreement, the period after the 1940s saw a gradual dec1ine in the influence of the
Church in Colombian society. (Hartlyn 1988: 83; Uprimny and Vargas Castaño
1990: 144-147; Pécaut 1988: 110-124).
3.2 New actors in Colombian society
The silent revolutions created new sources of power and opportunity in Colombian
society outside of the traditional polity. With the sources of power came new
actors and new "loads" on the political system (Wilde 1978: 41). While the parties
were "still at center stage, the apron was now filing up with new characters",
inc1uding the new bureaucratic and regulatory agencies of the state itself (Wilde
1978: 42), The new actors built their own organizations capable of channellng and
satisfying the demands of their affiliates, undercutting the political parties and
affecting both the stakes and the exercise of the political process (Wilde 1978: 42;
Pécaut 1987: 500-501),
Over time, therefore, the new actors gradually eroded the power of the traditional
parties, inc1uding the effectiveness of clientelismo, as described in Chapter 2.6, on
which the traditional parties based their influence. Responding to the
transformations, both parties attempted to coopt the new actors within the logic of
the bipartisan framework. For example, the electoral success of the Liberal party
between 1930 and 1945 was founded, in large part, on their ability to integrate
trade unions and other interest groups arising from urbanization. (Pécaut 1987:
571-574; Wilde 1978: 45). However, the parties did not modernize as institutions.
They remained "vertical collections of factions" based in "oligarchical mechanisms
35 In the i 970s and i 980s the universities became important centers for the organized left.
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created for simpler times in a much less mobilized society" and dependent on the
decisions of a few men" (Wilde 1978: 46-58).
For the purpose of this study it is important to specify that not all of the new
actors appearing after 1930 can be considered new challengers . While the
distinctions may be arbitrar, it is useful to place the new actors in two distinct
categories,
New actors as an extension of the traditional elite - As notedinChapter3.1, many
elites adapted to structural changes in the economy and made the transition from
traditional agricultural production to agro-exports, industry and service based
sectors. Their interests were represented by gremios, business associations
representing specific sectors of the economy, which "evolved to ensure the state's
responsiveness to the private sector" (Pearce 1990: 72).36 The gremios originated
with the formation of coffee sector association FEDECAFE in the 1920s. They
consolidated their influence in the 1940s and 1950s and were formally involved
in policy making related to economic management by 1949 (Pécaut 1987: 507),
The political disintegration of the Violence strengthened the political influence and
legitimacy of the gremios. Pécaut notes the associations appeared to be "the only
institutions capable of guaranteeing a degree of cohesiveness in Colombian
society" (Pécaut 1987: 507). In the post- Violence era the gremios have been given
a growing role in government, "representing their interests as if they were the
interests of society itself" (Pécaut 1987: 507). This devolution of state power
effectively constitutes a gradual privatization of economic policy making, One
historian calls the gremios a "paralleI government by 1960" and a 1983 study
conc1uded that "after the President of the Republic, the most powerful person in
Colombia is the manager of (FEDECAFE)" (Urrutia as quoted by Pearce 1990:
97). The influence of the gremios, therefore, is also a significant factor in
determining the contemporary economic policies.
As elites, the gremios had an historical identity and leadership role within the old
bipartisan polity. However, the actions of gremios were increasingly conditioned
by the economic interests of their members rather than political affiliation. The
intervention of gremios had the longterm effect of depoliticizing debate around
economic management and other issues related to the stability of the political
system. It also weakened traditional partisan control and the ability of the parties
to use economic policy for their own purposes. Importantly, however, the gremios
did not challenge elite hegemony. When confronted by new challengers, such as
36 Pearce notes that, in part, the gremios developed in response to the expansion of the
regulatory function of the state in the post-war era, ensuring that those regulations did not
infringe on private sector interests. The gremios have also played a decisive role in blocking
state sponsored social programs (Pearce 1990: 72).
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trade unions or peasant organizations, "the ruling dass still united to protect
common interests" (Wilde 1978: 63; Pécaut 1987: 571-573).37
New actors as new challengers - The history of social organizations dates back to
the 19th and early 20th century. Urban artisans and manufacturing workers formed
the first labour union in 1909. As elsewhere in Latin America, militancy in the
labour force grew in the 1920s (Pécaut 1987: 90-95). Ofparticular importance are
the organized workers in the export production sector, such as bananas, oil and
coffee, and it was the strikes in the export sector which most effectivelydamaged
the national economy and foreign companies (Bergquist 1992: 55-57).38
Peasant struggles for land also gained militancy in the 1920s, and after peasants
were granted the right to unionise in 1931 a number of peasant leagues were
registered. However, no national movement came out of the peasant struggles in
the 1930s (Pearce 1990: 40-41).
The general objective of labour and peasant organizations as well as urban based
social protest groups has been to redistribute the private controlled resources and
to reorient the public resources. They have traditiona1ly, therefore, been met with
repressive reaction from the political and economic elites. Over time the response
of the traditional party leadership to the new social movement can be summarized
as follows: (i) subordination-integration under the Liberal Republic (1930-45); (ii)
repression-division after 1945 under the regimes of Lleras Camargo and Ospina
Pérez; and (iii) beginning in 1950, violent repression (Sánchez 1992: 87),
3.3 Gaitán and the Bogatazo: The national country against the
political country (1940- 1949)
"In Colombia there are two countries: the political country which concerns itself with electiol1s, its
bureaucratic sinecures, its business interests, its privileges and influences.. The political country or the
oligarchy are one and the same. And the national country, the people who think of their work, of their
health, of their culture.. We be/ong to the national country, to the people of çill parties who are goil1g
to fight against the political country, against the oligarchies of all parties. " (lorge Eliécer Gaitán,
quoted in Bermúdez Rossi 1982: 60).
Having identified some of the main trends contributing to societal change after
1930, it is important to consider the actual events leading to the breakdown of
political order in 1949. At the end of Second World War, Colombia still had an
37 For example, the gremios were involved the formation of paramilitary groups during the
1970 and 1980s which have been used to repress trade unions and social organizations,
38 The response from the government to these strikes was harsh. For example the massacre of
workers and their families by government troops after a strike in the United Fruit Company
banana enclave near Santa Marta in 1928. An estimated 1000 workers were kiled and more
than 12,000 became internally displaced (Pérez 1993: 18).
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"oligarchical structure, questioned insistently by popular forces during the two
preceding decades but not seriously threatened" (Sánchez 1992: 76). The high
coffee prices, increased leve Is of imports and industrialization and agricultural
expansion created a new era of prosperity. As previously noted, the prosperity was
not shared by the vast majority of Colombians resulting in considerable social
tension. However, Sánchez notes that "while potentially conflictive, the situation
was not necessarily a revolutionar one" (Sánchez 1992: 77),
Tensions and discontent in Colombian society were given a political identity in the
1940s by a new movement led by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the leader of the reformist
wing of the Liberal party. By the mid 1940s Gaitán created a new historical force
by uniting the marginados (groups in civil society outside of the leadership of the
parties and marginalized from the political process) across political lines. His
political discourse was populist and he spoke dearly of uniting the pueblo (people)
against the "oligarchy", the "real" country against the "political" country (Sánchez
1992: 78), "ceaselessly attack(ing) the corruption and bankruptcy of the old
system" (Wilde 1978: 38). Responding to the demands articulated by new
challengers and broadly felt in civil society Gaitan introduced two reformist
themes into the political discourse; economic redistribution and (expanded)
political participation. His populism was backed up by an ability to mobilize
demonstrations of social discontent "of such magnitude that ... the forces of the
status quo perceived it as a threat to the entire social edifice" (Sánchez 1992: 77).
To consolidate the new political force Gaitán attempted to escape the bipartisan
divisions and symbols. Gaitanismo invited political forces to realign themse1ves
in away that would transform the nature of the traditional polit Y , replacing the
Liberal-Conservative axis with a new dass oriented axis of political confrontation.
The result was a widespread political mobilization in the mid 1940s which was
reflected in a dramatic increase in electoral turnouts. Sixty four percent of eligible
voters cast ballots in the 1947 Congressional elections compared to 39.4 percent
1945 (Sánchez 1992: 76-80). Electoral mobilization further strengthened Gaitán's
position.
"For the party oligarchies Gaitanismo equalled "(a) revolution which threatened
the foundation of their interests" (Pearce 1990: 46). In response, the traditional
parties attempted to reintegrate the new political force into the traditional
framework. In 1947, Gaitán became the leader of the Liberal party, largely through
the efforts of the traditional wing of the pary to neutralize the new movement
through cooption. The Conservatives, led by Laureano Gómez, also sought to
maintain the country's social conflcts within the old vertical party divisions. The
years between 1945 and 1949, therefore, saw considerable political intra-party and
inter-party jockeying for position. While Gaitán attempted to organize civil society
across party lines in a new axis of confrontation against the traditional elite,
elements of the party elite were considering a bipartisan coalition against
Gaitanismo. The idea of a coalition was first suggested in 1946 by former Liberal
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President López Pumarejo and implemented by Conservative President Ospina
Pérez (1946-50).
At the same time the 1eader of the hardliner Conservatives, Laureano Gómez,
c1early identified Gaitan' s coalition with the Liberal party rather than as an
independent force. He attempted to undermine the development of Gaitanismo as
a united front of the pueblo by cornering Gaitán in his role as 1eader of the Liberal
party. Under Gómez's influence the dynamics of confrontation increasingly
assumed a partisan rather than c1ass character. A Conservative controlled para-
police force, the Chulavitas, was established to intimidate and murder Liberal
voters and by the end of 1947 political violence had c1aimed 14,000 victims. On
February 7, 1948 Gaitán led a silent protest of 100,000 people through the streets
of Bogotá, and delivered his speech for peace: "All we ask, Mr. President, is
guaranties for human life, which is the least that a nation can ask" (Sánchez 1992:
79-81).
Gaitán was assassinated on April 9, 1948. Spontaneous riots, known as the
Bogotazo, broke out in the capital city of Bogotá. The Bogotazo was "the greatest
urban riot in the history of the Western hemisphere" (Wilde 1978: 46). It was the
beginning of a multifaceted insurrection with two dominant aspects which reflected
the demands of the new challengers which Gaitán had articulated. The riots have
been interpreted as a social protest against economic disparity , corruption,
speculation, and the high cost of living. However, they also constituted a political
uprising against the old polit Y led by Gaitán's supporters. A revolutionary junta
was created and events in Bogotá provoked riots in other parts of the country. In
the two weeks following Gaitán's death "countless Colombian towns and rural
districts experienced a temporary inversion of the institutional order. It seemed that
a grand demolition of the oligarchical republic had begun" (Sánchez 1992: 83).
The leadership of the traditional parties managed to quickly regroup and put down
the rebellion. Moderates in both parties recognized the threat to the stability of the
system which the political conflict dimensions of the Bogotazo represented. Most
factions recognized the ne ed to eliminate the possibility that the Bogotazo could
be repeated, Implicitly this meant eliminating the danger that new challengers,
particularly the new urban based unions and rural peasant movements, might
become independent articulators of social protest and political opposition (Sánchez
1992: 84),
In response to the violence elites attempted to build a new bipartisan consensus
on five separate occasions between April, 1947, and October, 1949, inc1uding two
failed governments of National Unit y (Wilde 1978: 58). While trying to build a
new bipartisan consensus, the moderates also attempted to integrate the new social
forces unleashed by Gaitán into the traditional parties. However, the government
was dominated by the Conservative party faction led by Laureano Gómez who
began an arme d offensive to destroy the union movement and Liberal party
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structures at the local level. Gómez's offensive targeted both Gaitán's coalition
and the traditional structures of the Liberal pary. As offcial Conservative
sponsored violence continued, particularly in rural areas, the Liberals withdrew
from the coalitions and boycotted the 1949 presidential elections. Consequently,
the kilings escalated (Pee1er 1992: 53).
3.4 La Violencia (1946-66)
The worst incidence of fighting related to the Violence occurred between 1949 and
1953 when the parisan motivations were strongest. The lowest estimates place the
number of persons kiled during this four year period at 145,000 (Oquist 1980: 17-
18) while others contend that as many as 240,000 persons died between 1947 and
1953 (Aprile-Gniset 1991: 11). Although the estimates. of the total number of dead
between 1946 and 1966 vary greatly, most historians agree that a minimum of
200,000 persons were killed.
As determined by the mobilization of civil society described in Chapters 3.2 and
3,3, the Violence was a multifaceted process whose social and political features
as well as geographical focus changed as the conflct evolved over two decades.
The dynamics of confrontation occurred at two distinct 1evels.
Firstly, the Violence had an identity within the context of the old partisan struggle
outlined in Chapter 2. Laureano Gómez assumed presidency in 1950 as the leader
of a hardline Conservative faction which had provoked the rupture of the
bipartisan coalition governments created in the aftermath of the Bogotazo. Gómez
continued to place the escalating conflct in bipartisan terms making no distinction
between the traditional structures of the Liberal party and those elements of the
party which aligned themselves with other new challengers to form the Gaitán
coalition. Gómez believed that civil society had a subordinate role and that there
was no such thing as pueblo, "only a threatening mobil (Sanchez 1992: 79). In
response to the perceived threat posed by the new challengers he tried
unsuccessfully to establish a corporatist state in Colombia, along the line of
Franco's Spain.
In the countryside the Gómez government pursued a policy of violent and overt
repression against Liberals. The violence was organized and carried out by local
level Conservative political leaders and the Conservative supported Chulavitas
parapolice force. The historical relationship between the Conservatives and the
Catholic Church was also central. The Chulavitas and the Church played
/ complementary roles in marginalizing, repressing and murdering Liberal
supporters. In this sense the conflct also assumed a religious dimension and
fervour, although this was channelled within the partisan framework (Sánchez
1992: 79, 85).
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Gómez's anti-pueblo offensive rested on two factors that gave it an ideological
coherence at both the domestic and international aspects. Domestically he c1aimed
that their was an "organic link between Liberalism and Communism" and that
"Colombia is on the brink of fallng behind the iron curtain" (Gómez 1949 as
quoted by Sánchez 1992: 85-86). At a speech in Medellín in 1949 Gómez told
Conservative supporters "the Liberal party moves on feet of confusion and
stupidity , on the legs of brutality and violence that press into its immense
oligarchical belly; with a chest of ire, masonic arms and a tiny diminutiv e
communist head" (Gómez 1949 as quoted by Sanchezl992: 86). On the
international side, Gómez's principal ally was the United States who provided
diplomatic support, arms and capital (Sánchez 1992: 88). The ideological context
of the Cold War and McCartyism provided Gómez with additional legitimation
(Pearce 1990: 57).
At a sec ond level, the Violence became a challenge to the traditional elites posed
by Gaitán's cross-party coalition of social forces. As it evolved over time the
Violence increasingly assumed an identity within this second leve1 of conflct,
becoming "focused on the ongoing struggle for land and social mobility"
(Bergquist 1992: 70-72). The roots of legal (social and non governmental
organizations and non-traditional political paries) and ilegal (guerrila groups )
opposition to the Colombian government which emerged in the 1970s had their
roots in the period of the Violence.
For the purpose of this study the multidimensional character of the conflict may
be summarized into three general processes: terror, resistance and the breakdown
of social order,
Terror - The most visible aspect of the Violence was the mixture of official terror
and scorched-earth tactics which characterized the government' s offensive against
the Liberals. The Violence affected the lives, physical safety, psychology, and
possessions of hundreds of thousands of Colombians, leaving a tremendous impact
upon the collective memory of Colombian society. "Police and army detachments
arrived like cyc10nes to terrorize defenceless towns. Murderers, called pájaros
(birds), could often count on an extensive network of protectors or the complicity
of the authorities inc1uding political figures, who later, under the National Front,
would occupy positions in Congress, the cabinet, or foreign embassies" (Sánchez
1992: 87). The Chulavitas parapolice was particularly infamous for its "cruelty,
decapitations, mutilation, and sexual crimes" (Pearce 1990: 54).
Geographically, the terror expanded throughout Colombia's interior based on the
historical patterns of party loyalty described in Chapter 2 which pitted one town
against the next. While all strata of society within the Liberal party was affected,
however, the impact was not equal across those groupings. "Landowners,
businessmen, and the high ranking political chiefs could shield themselves from
the Violence in the anonymity of the big cities or sometimes in foreign exile"
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(Sanchez 1992: 90). It was, therefore, the traditional mass base of the Liberal party
which suffered the most.
Resistance - The second process was guerrila resistance which resulted in a
decisive break between elements of Gaitán's coalition and the traditional Liberal
party in 1952. By 1949 it was c1ear that the leadership of the Liberal party was
unable or unwiling to stop Conservative supported violence through civil
resistance. Guerrila groups spontaneously formed from within the rank and fie
of the Liberal party and Gaitán's coalition to protect communities. However,
guerrila warfare assumed different characteristics from the 19th century bipartisan
conflct. The Liberal elite, political leaders and landowners, did not directly
participate in the fighting, As a result the war inevitably became a conflict
between the government forces and resisters in civil society, assuming a "heroic"
dimension which it is of ten compared to the Mexican revolution (Sánchez 1992:
91).
The relationship between the guerrilas and the Liberal political parties assumed
a new dynamic in 1952. In August that year, the principal guerrila leaders
presented the Liberal leadership with an ultimatum: "either the (Liberal)
Directorate would lead the general revolt or the guerrilas would do so on their
own" (Sanchez 1992: 94). Based on historical patterns of political behaviour, the
Liberals elite were instinctively drawn to finding a new mechanism of bipartisan
consensus with moderate elite elements from the Conservative party rather than
finding an accommodation with the guerrila movement which had emerged from
the mass base of their own party. They were already alarmed by the scope of the
destruction which had been unleashed and their inability to control the guerrilas.
The Liberal leadership responded through former President López Pumarejo: "If
it is the last opportunity the Liberal leaders have to fulfil their historie destiny, as
contemplated or interpreted by the chiefs of the armed revolt, then we are resolved
to lose it! Moreover, if this means a definitive break with the pueblo, as the
guerrilas would have it, so be it." (As cited in Sánchez 1992: 94). The guerrila' s
ultimatum opened a new period of the Violence and confirmed the axis of elite-
new challenger confrontation that would be institutionalized in the 1958 National
Front agreement.
The breakdown of social order - The third process whieh derived from both terror
and resistance, was that of the social effects of the Violence. For example, The
Violence deeply effected the structure of rural property holding. Thousands of
threatened or harassed peasants either abandoned their parcels or were forced to
sell at prices far below the real value. As a result, the Violence provoked a rapid
and chaotic urbanization throughout the 1950s and early years of the 1960s.
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3.5 Military dictatorship (1953-1958)
In 1953 General Gustavo Rojas Pinila staged the first military coup to occur in
Colombia since 1854. Rojas hel d office until 1957, He was briefly replaced by a
military junta which served as a transitional government until civilian rule was
restored in 1958 through the National Front agreement.
The scholars cited in Chapter 1.4 usually refer to Colombia' s experience with
military dictatorship in black and white terms. However, the Colombian military's
intervention in politics had few of the characteristics stereotypic to a Latin
America coup, Rojas was placed in power through the initiative of civilian
politicians and removed five years later by those same civilans, The events of
1953 coincide more closely with the historical pattern of elite accommodation
through a pact rather than a classical coup. As such, the manner in which the coup
took place reflects the subordination of the military to civilian power.
By 1952 Colombia seemed to be on the "verge of an irreversible social and
political crisis" (Sánchez 1992: 100). Large areas of the country were devastated
and the violence "followed its own dynamic (of) local and personal agendas of
revenge and plunder" (Pee1er 1992: 92). Pee1er notes that the generalized nature
of the fighting made it increasingly difficult for the party leadership to "use
violence selectively for their own purposes" (Pee1er 1992: 92). Of particular
concern to e1ites in both parties was the growing independence of the guerrilla
groups associated with the Liberal party. As the fighting escalated the political
discourse of the guerrilas became increasingly radicaL. For example, in 1952 a
national conference of guerrila leaders proc1aimed the autonomy of the vast
Llanos region of Colombia and announced they were establishing "a popular and
democratic government" to implement land reform based on the principle of "land
for the people who work it" (Pécaut 1987: 560). The declaration threatened many
Liberal estate owners in the region, contributing to the definitive break which
occurred between the Liberals and the guerrilas in 1952.
The violence, therefore, threatened commonly held elite interests, effectively
drawing moderate elements of the two leadership together. As in the past, the
parties realized when the destruction "had gone too far" and they sought a new
form of intra-elite/inter-party accommodation. However, after four years of
fighting inter-party animosity was so deep, especially at the rank and file leveL,
that a third actor was needed to re-establish stability while the two parties worked
out a new governing pact (Pécaut 1987: 560). In this situation civilian elites "were
force d to look for some new form of (temporary) ad hoc consensus" (Wilde 1978;
58) and, lacking another alternative, they "essentially thrust (General Rojas Pinila)
into power" (Hartlyn 1988: 48).
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The 1953 coup occurred, therefore, at the initiative of the civilian leaders.39
Negotiations to ok place in 1952 and 1953 between the governing Conservatives
and the military with the full participation of the Liberals. Rojas initially received
the support of all significant factions of the traditional paries, the military, the
Catholic Church, the gremios and the non-communist trade unions and guerrila
groups (Hartlyn 1988: 48; Pécaut 1987: 517-518; Dix 1979: 313; Pee1er 1992: 92;
Wilde 1978: 58; Sánchez 1992: 100-101; BlairTrujilo 1993: 76-77; Revéiz 1989:
60).40 The 1eader of the Liberal pary described the coup as a golpe de opinion
(coup of public opinion) against the violence and, in a reference to Simón Bolívar,
public1y praised Rojas as the second Libertador (liberator)(Sánchez 1992: 101).
Commenting on widespread public support for the coup, Sánchez notes it is ironic
that "the military was received with the widest and strongest support given to any
ruler in the history of the country" (Sánchez 1992: 101).
Rojas and the military initially refused to take office. Pécaut notes that Rojas
vacilated "right to the last moment, publicly stating his preference for a civilian
solution" (Pécaut 1987: 518). Their reluctance was partly a matter of ideology.
Intervention went against the longstanding militar tradition of non-interference
in political matters as described in Chapter 2,7. However, the military was also
aware of the practical difficulties which taking office presented. During the pre-
coup negotiations one General commented "we the military do not have sufficient
capacity to govern the country" (Pécaut 1987: 518).
In establishing the characteristics of the Rojas administration it is important to
note that Rojas had no organizational infrastructure or political or military base
which was independent of civilian elites (Hartlyn 1988: 48; Pécaut 1987: 514-
517). It was understood that the military would take their direction from the
civilian politicians who continued to hold most government positions. "The same
civilian elites that placed Rojas in power (also) assumed that his government
would be transitory" (Blair Trujilo 1993; 77), "lasting no more than one normal
four year presidential term", expiring, therefore, in 1957 (Sánchez 1992; 110).
The objectives of the civilian elite in supporting the Rojas co up were to re-
establish order and contain the violence. They gave Rojas three tasks: (i) end the
violence; (ii) demobilize Liberal guerrila forces which formerly brake with the
party leadership in 1952; and (iii) reconstruct the are as affected by the fighting
39 Some Liberals called for military intervention as earJy as 1949 (Pécaut 1987: 514).
Conservative leader Gómez also tried to provoke military intervention in 1948 (Sánchez
1992: 85). It is important to note that there was no military uprising or violence associated
with the 1953 coup.
40
The only initial opposition to Rojas cam e from the Conservative supporters of Laureano
Gómez and the small Communist party (Hartlyn 1988: 48).
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(Sánchez 1992: 94-101; Pécaut 1987; 560).41 Scholarly opinion is divided on the
actual record and characteristics of the Rojas administration. He appearS to be
difficult to characterize in terms of a strict democracy-dictatorship dichotomy and
Sánchez notes that "it may be impossible to find such comfortable and schematic
solutions to judging the period" (Sánchez 1992: 111).42 However, more important
for the purpose of this study is the evolution of the relationship between General
Rojas and the civilian leadership which placed him in power.
Rojas broke with the traditional parties in 1955, Re attemptedto establish an
independent political base and "supplant the traditional parties by taking away
their mass support" (Peeler 1992: 92). Rojas' "third force" was build on a coalition
between reformist elements within the military and Gaitán' sold coalition of
marginadas (marginalized groups), many of whom had broken with the leadership
of the parties in 1952 (Blair Trujilo 1993: 80), Sánchez and others note that the
civilian elites who placed Rojas in power were "increasingly concerned that Rojas,
who had arms but no autonomous political force, was trying to build a base
through an armed forces-pueblo alliance, using the resources of the state to cement
the alliance ... (I)n a country where clientelismo was deeply rooted and helped
ensure the monopoly of the traditional parties, this development c1early threatened
the elite" (Sánchez 1992: 108).
Historians note that the inability of Rojas to establish an independent political base
may have be en his greatest failure (Wilde 1978: 58-61; Hartlyn 1988: 49).
Through his "erratic and arbitrar actions" Rojas alienated almost every important
sector: (i) his economic policies alienated the gremios (Hartlyn 1988: 48; Pécaut
1987: 572; Revéiz 1989: 60), a situation which was aggravated by a sharp
economic downturn in 1954 (Wilde 1978: 59);43 (ii) the Church distrusted the
"Peronist" trappings of the Rojas government (Hartlyn 1988: 48), A series of
confrontations, inc1uding incidents where the army fired on students from the
Jesuit University and tear-gassed a crowded church on Palm Sunday, widened the
rift (Wilde 1978: 60); (iii) Rojas lost support within the military itself. His mix of
"populism and corporatism" frightened conservative elements and threatened the
institutional unit y of the military. As civilan opposition grew and the Violence
continued, "the officer corpse came to believe that Rojas himself was a major
cause of disorder" (Wilde 1978: 60); and (iv) Rojas was unable to demobilize
Liberal guerrilas or establish an allance with new challengers such as the trade
union movement (Sánchez 1992: 100-110).
41 None of the scholars cited in this chapter refer to promises which may have been made to
the military in exchange for their assuming power. There also does not appear to be a
consensus on the motives of the military in accepting office.
42 The term "dictator" was first used to characterize Rojas by the Liberal press in 1955.
43 The US and World Bank also opposed Rojas' "Peronist" policies (Hartlyn 1988: 48),
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The attitude of the parties to Rojas began to change as early as 1954. The Liberal
and Conservative parties used the violence as instruments of political mobilization,
dec1aring through party owned press that Rojas solely was responsible for the
fighting (Sánchez 1992: 109). The "press became the privileged terrain of the
opposition and a pole of organization and unification for the dominant c1asses
against the "dictator" as they now called him". Rojas weakened his position by
responding with censorship (Sánchez 1992: 108-110). In 1956, the two traditional
parties formed a bipartisan Civic Front. When Rojas announced his intention to
stay in power after 1957, the parties were capable of mobilizing a general strike
to force his resignation. A military junta was established to administer the
economy and politics returned to the exc1usive realm of the traditional parties
(Sánchez 1992: 109-111).
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4. Transition to democracy: The National
Front and the return to historical constants
The National Front elite pact was a direct response of the civilian elites in the
Liberal and Conservative parties to a double threat to their hegemony: (i) the
mobilization of new challengers before and during the Violence escalated beyond
the control of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Efforts by both parties to
channel social conflct within the old bipartisan framework served to aggravate the
violence rather than contain it; (ii) General Rojas Pinila attempted to displace the
traditional parties by creating an army-pueblo allance based on the Gaitanista
coalition. The new alliance was based on coopting the traditional base of the
Liberal and Conservative paries in civil society.
In response to these threats, the traditional civilian elites saw the ne ed to cooperate
and restore their control of the political system "through the tested c1ientelistic
mechanism" (Pee1er 1992: 95) of an elite biparisan accommodation. The National
Front agreement, therefore, had three principle objectives: (i) to restore the Liberal
and Conservative parties to political office; (ii) demobilize new challengers and
rechannel social discontent through the traditional bipartisan polit y; and (iii) regain
the loyalty of the military and guarantee their subordination to civilian authority
(Wilde 1978: 59-62; Dix 1979: 307-308; Bustamante 1989: 20-21; Blair Trujillo
1993: 81-84; Pee1er 1992: 92-93).
Based on these objective and the historical context of the agreement, the National
Front can be seen to have three distinct levels of interaction:
Intra-elite\inter-party - The National Front was based on a series of mutual
guarantees "to address each parties fear of exclusion and repression by the other
(party)" (Wilde 1878: 62). The mechanisms were based on the principles of
alteración (alternation of political office) and paridad (parity between the Liberals
and Conservative) (Dix 1979: 308). These guarantees were formalized in separate
three written agreements negotiated between the Liberals and the Conservatives
between 1956 and 1958.44 and later entrenched in Colombia's polit Y through a
series of amendments to the Constitution of 1886, The constitutional amendments
44 The first agreement was negotiated in 1956 between former Presidents Lleras Camargo
(Liberal) and Gómez (Conservative) at Gómez's exile in Spain. They agreed to a five point
plan of action to return the two parties to power (Peeler 1992: 94).
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gave institutional substance and legitimacy to what had previously been
personalized inter-elite arrangements (Wilde 1978: 62).
The National Front agreement had a formal life of 16 years, remaining in effect
from 1958 until 1974. Some historians argue that, in practice, the agreement was
in effect for 30 years (Peñaranda 1992: 294). Elements of the National Front polit Y
could stil be identified in the 1990s in the Liberal administrations of Cesar
Gaviria Trujilo and Ernesto Samper Pizano. The power sharing mechanisms
inc1uded: (i) an agreement to alternate the Presidency between the two paries over
a duration of four terms. The first President was a Liberal and the last a
Conservative;45 (ii) both paries received half of the legislative seats (Congress
and Senate) regardless of the popular vote in a given district. The distribution of
the seats within the paries was made on the basis of proportional
representation;46 (iii) all cabinet positions, appointments to the Supreme Court the
public service and governorship and mayoralties were made on the basis of parity
between the two parties;47 and (iv) ordinary (nonprocedural) legislation required
a two thirds majority vote to be ratified,48
The provisions of the National Front were intended to prov ide guarantees for both
inter-party and intra-party interests. Dix notes that "party factionalism required
successive Presidents spend an inordinate amount of time and energy attempting
to maintain majority support within both parties, especially through the allocation
of public positions" (Dix 1979: 308). The principle of parity in government and
public service appointments became entrenched in the polit Y through practice and
continues de facto decades after the formal life of the National Front expired (Dix
1979: 310; Peñaranda 1992: 295; Pee1er 1992: 102).
Bipartisan civilian elite-military - The military traditionally played a subordinate
role in Colombian politics. Before 1953 they participated in inter-party
negotiations as "the c1ients of a civilian notable" (Bustamante 1989: 20). The
National Front marked the first occasion that the military to ok part in such
negotiations as an actor in its own right.
Talks between civilian and military officials regarding the transition to civilian
governance began as early as 1956 while Rojas was stil in power. In 1957 Rojas
was replaced by a military junta responsible for overseeing the transition. It was
45 The alternation of the office of the Presidency expired in 1974.
46 Parity in the division of legislative seats expired in 1974.
47 A further agreement between the parties stipulated that parity in the appointment of cabinet
and public service positions would be extended to 1978, "ensuring adequate and equitable
participation" of both parties (Dix 1979: 310).
48 Provisions requiring a two thirds majority for the ratification of ordinary legis1ation were
repealed in 1968 (Dix 1979: 310).
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agreed that the junta would remain in office only until the end of Rojas's official
presidential term in August, 1958, and focus on economic management. The
official position of the junta was that public order was primarily a political
problem for civilians to resolve. At a deeper leveL, the role of the military in
removing Rojas reflected a belief that the military by itself was incapable of
ending the partisan violence and containing the new challengers (Blair Trujilo
199~: 81; Wilde 1978: 59-61; Pee1er 1992: 94-95).
As noted, the objectives of the civilian elites were to remove . the military from
political office, regain their loyalty and guarantee the subordination of the military
to civilian authority. These terms fit within the military's tradition of non-
intervention in political matters. Within the new polit Y the military would not have
a partisan identity. Rather, it would act as the guarantor of the National Front
polit Y and defend the political system from internal threats (Bustamante 1989: 19-
20, 31; Blair Trujilo 1993: 81-83). This represented "a fundamental redefinition
of the military establishments role in Colombian politics" and its relationship to
civil society based on a new civilian elite-military alliance against perceived
threats to common interests (Bustamante 1989: 19),
In exchange for resubmitting to civilian authority the military was granted three
concessions: (i) the military received a guarantee that any "failings or excesses"
committed during the period of military rule would be considered the personal
responsibility of General Rojas Pinila (Wilde 1978: 60-61; Blair Trujilo 1993:
81-84). The agreement was effectively a guarantee of impunity and
nonaccountability; (ii) civilian elites agreed to support the "professionalization" of
the militar, in part as a mechanism to ensure its nonpartisan character.
Professionalization referred to redefining the military' s role in national secUlity,
modernizing the military's equipment to fight an irregular internal War'
professional and ideological training abroad (primarily in the US) and large
increases in the military budget (Bustamante 1989: 17-20). The military was
granted relative autonomy over how the process of professionalization would
occur; (iii) the military was given a role in the civilian decision-making process.
For example, regional leve1 government officials were obliged to consult with their
military counterparts on issues related to public order and internal security
(Bustamante 1989: 20-21; Blair Trujilo 1993: 82-84).
The National Front led, therefore, to a fundamental redefinition of the military's
role in politics by recognizing Colombia would have to reorganize its internal
security and defense forces in order to overcome the rural violence that had
gripped the country since 1948 (Bustamante 1989: 20). Elite unit y also meant that
the institution would no longer be used in party warfare between the Liberals and
Conservatives. However, loyalty to civilian elites remained after 1958, but it was
no longer based on its traditional strong ties to the Conservative party (Blair
Trujilo 1993: 88).
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Traditional elites-new challengers - The final axis of the National Front agreement
is characterized by the restrictions it placed on new challengers ' participation in
the democratic process: (i) no new challengers were involved in negotiations
leading to the National Front agreement; (ii) parties other than the Liberals and
Conservatives were explicitly exc1uded from participating in the electoral proeess
by the amendments to the Constitution of 1886 which institutionalized the National
Front (Sánchez 1992: 113). Any non traditional candidates would have to run
under either a Liberal or Conservative banner (Peeler 1992: 95); (iii) the National
Front contained no provisions regarding the eventual broadening of political
participation; (iv) the agreement was a political document and inc1uded no social
con tent to address historical issues, such as land reform, or changes in society
resulting from the silent revolutions occurring after 1930 (Wilde 1978: 68;
Sánchez 1992: 115),
This study argued in Chapter 3 that the traditional mechanisms for bipartisan
accommodation and control of the political system broke down in the 1940s as the
polit Y was personalistic, informal and: (i) unable to accommodate the demands of
new challengers in civil society; (ii) channe1 those demands through the old
bipartisan rivalry; and, consequently; (iii) unable to make the transition to a more
broadly based polity.
The National Front resurrected and institutionalized the pre-1953 polit Y and
"remarkably represented little more than that" (Wilde 1978: 62). On the one hand
the agreement sol ved the historical problem of providing guarantees that a given
party would not be exc1uded from the rewards of power. However, the National
Front inc1uded no provisions which addressed the structural changes in society
which led to the breakdown of the old system and the Violence. In explicitly
exc1uding new challengers, establishing a civilian elite-military alliance and
redefining the military's role as the guarantors of internal security the National
Front established the context for the contemporary crisis of political violence and
human rights violations.
Ironically, the National Front also undermined the intra-party mechanisms of
control, often referred to as depolitización partididsta (depolitization of the
parties). Paradoxically, bipartisan unit y under the 1958 National Front undermined
the mechanisms of social control held by the traditional elites. Historically, the
"irreconcilable" enemy had been anyone who belonged to the other party. With the
National Front agreement, Conservatives and Liberals shared power and members
of both parties eventually voted for a president of the other party. The
depolitization eroded the partisan rationale and party loyalty on which the stability
of the traditional political system was based, further fragmenting the political
system (Umprimny and Vargas Castaño 1990: 145).
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5. The crisis of the Colombian state and
human rights violations
Chapter 5 wil consider the legacy of the National Front elite pact and the
institutionalization of Bo1Ívar's knot in Colombia's contemporary polity. The
general period under review wil be 1958 to 1995. However, the empirical
evidence presented in Chapter 5 wil focus on the five yearS between 1990-1995
which inc1ude the administrations of Liberal Presidents Cesar Gaviria Trujillo
(1990-1994) and Ernesto Samper Pizano (August 1994- ). Focusing on this time
period permits an analysis based on the most current information.
Chapter 5 will contrast empirical evidence related to the actual outcomes of the
National Front pact against: (i) the outcomes assumed by elite pact scholars as
discussed in Chapter 1.4; and (ii) constitutional and legal mechanisms and
democratic institutions existing in the formal Colombian polit Y which guarantee
political participation, pluralis m and the protection and promotion of human rights.
It is important to state at the outset that the restricted nature of Colombia's
democratic polit Y can not be explained by authoritarian revers 
al or "slow death"
as argued by O'Donnell and others in Chapter 1.4. Rather, the National Front
agreement, and the subsequent pacts of autonomy and impunity outlined in
Chapter 6, institutionalized a civilian elite-military allance based on the protection
of common "vital interest" hel d by those two actors against new challengers in
civil society. Under this civilian-military pact the military remains subordinate to
civilian authority. As their incentive for entering into the pact the military has
be en granted growing autonomy by civilian politicians as a matter of state policy.
Consequently, decisions on basic social problems are interpreted, first and
foremost, as military problems and force has become a fundamental part of the
politicalorder.
In this situation contradictions abound, prompting some human rights observers
to c1aim that Colombia has a dual human rights policy (Comisión Andina de
Juristas 1994: 2) Colombia retains the appearance of a liberal democracy and
successive governments have stated that ending political violence and human rights
violations is their first priority , At the same time, agents of the state continue to
commt violations with impunity. State institutions of ten appear to be working at
cross purposes with each other, at the same time protecting and committing
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violations,49 According to one human rights observer "on the one hand we have
the constitution, laws and words. On the other hand we have blood and repression.
These are two pars of the same deliberate policy",50
5.1 Crisis of legitimacy of the Colombian state
The current situation in Colombia is characterized by extreme levels of political
violence which are a result of a crisis of legitimacy of the Colombian state. The
crisis of legitimacy is both one of governability and the legitimacy of the
institutions of the state in the eyes of civil society. It is the direct legacy of the
historical constants described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and the institutionalization of
those constants in Colombia's contemporary polit Y through the National Front elite
pact. The crisis appears to have deepened during the main period under review in
this chapter as the country's political institutions become "increasingly
incompatible with the process of modernization in Colombia" (Palacio and Rojas
1990: 70-73), According to Colombian Prosecutor General, restoring the
legitimacy of state institutions in the eyes of civil society is the most critical step
in solving Colombia' s problem of violence (Procuradurza General de la Nación
1994: 46-48).
As they interact, the different elements of the crisis of legitimacy create the
impression that political violence in Colombia occurs on a random basis and is
beyond the control of the state. This position is frequently taken by the Colombian
government when explaining its human rights record in the face of international
criticism. However, this study has argued that the violence is a direct consequence
of political choices, made by civilian politicians within a formal democratic
framework, regarding political participation, the management of social conflict and
policy related to public order.
For the purpose of c1arity it is important to briefly identify and summarize the
elements of the crisis. This summary constitutes the overall analytical matrix
within which the empirical information on human rights violations can be
considered.
(i) Almost 40 years after the National Front agreement the Colombian political
system remains dominated by the Liberals and the Conservatives parties. The
system is effectively c10sed to participation from other sectors of Colombian
society, A the same time, the membership base of the traditional parties has
become increasingly narrow as a result of the breakdown of traditional
mechanisms of control and, as institutions, the parties are being supplanted by
49 As in the case of tensions between the military and the state's human rights agencies.
50 Interview, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Bogotá, 2 May, 1993.
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other elite structures such as the gremios. The closed nature of the political system
has three significant implications in the contemporary polit y: (a) the political
system is increasingly fragmented and beyond the control of any given set of
actors; (b) democratic institutions do not serve either as a channel for concerns
held in civil society or as a mechanism for broad public debate; consequently (c)
democratic institutions are unable to mediate or resolve social conflct.
(ii) The disparity between rich and poor continues despite rapid economic growth
since 1958, Almost half of all Colombians lived below the poverty line in 1994
and new wealth created by recent economic reforms has only benefited a small
sector of Colombian society. Disparity and the closed political system have been
accompanied by a corresponding increase in social protest since the 1970s. The
protest comes from both traditional social organizations described in Chapter 3 and
a multitude of new organizations, inc1uding women's groups, environmentalists,
community, student and church based organizations and numerous sectoral based
organizations. The vast majority of these groups are legally constituted and "in a
nation atomized by interest groups, are creating politics without (the government
or the guerrilas)" (Chernick 1994: 14), These organizations present a growing
challenge to the government, paricularly in their ability to obstruct the
implementation of free market economic reforms.
(iii) All levels of social conflct have been militarized. As described in Chapter 2.7
the Colombian military has historically been a weak institution subordinated to
civilian authority. Through the terms of the National Front agreement the
subordinate relationship was institutionalized on the basis of protecting commonly
held civilian elite- military interests. However, the National Front also established
the conditions for military autonomy from civilian authority in pursuit of
protecting those common interests. The rationale for military autonomy is
reinforced by the dependence of civilian elites on the military's support to repress
political opposition originating from new challengers. In this context, civilian
officials have given the military a growing role in defining state policy related to
central political problems which should be under exclusive civilian control. In
particular, the military has considerable influence in defining the ideological
rationale and implementing policy related to public order, social conflct and the
ongoing war with the various guerrila groups.
(iv) The administration of justice appears to be breaking down. Three aspects
related to the justice system and the principle of accountability are relevant here:
(a) the judicial system has been politicized through the habitual use of state of
emergency powers since 1948 to repress legitimate social protest; (b) agents of the
state responsible for human rights violations enjoy almost absolute impunity. There
are effective1y no sanctions to deter them from committing violations; and (c) the
justice system is ineffective in dealing with escalating common crime. Legal
reforms, the legislative development of the 1991 Constitution and the allocation
of new resources to the justice system have focused on containing social protest
59
rather than dealing with common crime or the implementation of human rights
guarantees.51
The elements of the crisis interact with each other. They have a cumulative effect
and it can be difficult to distinguish the push of one factor from the pull of
another. However, the overall impact is to undermine the legitimacy of democratic
institutions in the eyes of civil society. Large sectors of the population do not see
themselves as stakeholders in the democratic process, Consequently, they do not
identify with the state nor do they feel morally bound by the decisions taken
within democratic institutions, The effect of impunity enjoyed by agents of the
state is particularly corrosive as it undermines the basic tenants of the rule of law
and accountabilty. One highly visible consequence of the crisis is that violence
has become generalized in civil society as at large. The majority of violent deaths
actually occur as the result of common crime rather than political or social
confrontation, More than 28,000 homicides were recorded in 1993, giving
Colombia the highest per capita murder rate in the world (Justicia y Paz, VoL7
No,2, 1994).
5.2 Duality: The paradox of democracy and human rights in
Colombia
Chapters 5.2 and 5.3 wil discuss the duality of the Colombian human rights
polity. In this con text, duality is defined as the immense disparity between the
offcial polit Y and the reality of the government's actions, or the "difference
between what is said and what is done" (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: l).
To establish the existence of this duality, Chapter 5.2 wil review formal
guarantees for political participation, pluralism and human rights while Chapter 5.3
wil contrast those guarantees with the government' s actual performance.
5.2.1 Democratie participation
Chapter 1.3 outlines the procedural minimalist definitions of democracy used by
scholars employing elite pact related theories. Based on the formal characteristics
of the Colombian system of governance it has been argued by these scholars that
Colombia is, in fact, a successful democracy. Democratic guarantees are based in
the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and the legislative development of the
constitution. The following are a sample of those guarantees:
Article 1 of the Constitution of 1991 defines Colombia as "organized in the form
of a united Republic, decentralized with autonomy in its regional entities,
Sl A considerable portion of the resources of the legal system are also directed towards
prosecuting drug traffickers,
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democratic, participatory and pluralistic, and founded ID respect for human
dignity . "
Article 2 dec1ares that the objectives inc1ude "facilitating the participation of all
in that affect their lives and the economic, political, administrative and cultural
well bein g of the nation."
Article 3 continues that "sovereignty rests exclusively in the people from whom
all political power emanates."
Article 40 of the Constitution of 1991 guarantees that "every citizen has the right
to participate in the creation, exercise and control of political power". Article 40.3
establishes the right of Colombians to "create parties, movements, political
organizations without any restrictions; to paricipate in these groups freely and
spread their ideas and programs."
Elections are held in Colombia every four years. The last elections of 1990 and
1994 were considered free and fair by the international community despite high
levels of political violence.52 There were no official restrictions placed on
political parties which might inhibit their participation in the electoral process.
Furthermore, no sectors of the electorate were restricted from participating in the
electoral process or assuming office if elected.
The elections of 1990 and 1994 were dominated by the Liberal party. Liberal
Ernesto Samper Pizano became President in August, 1994, replacing former
Liberal President Cesar Gaviria Trujilo (1990-1994). Samper narrowly defeated
Conservative candidate Andrés Pastrana. Four candidates from non-traditional
parties also participated in the campaign. Samper's Liberal party won a clear
majority in Senate and Congressional elections held in March, 1994, and 22 of 33
positions of governor in the October, 1994 departmental elections. Liberal victories
in the 1990 and 1994 elections has led many analysts to conclude that the party
is "now fully in control of the country's destiny" (Chernick 1994: 14). However,
candidates from non-traditional parties performed better in the October, 1994,
municipal elections, winning over 30 percent of the mayoral positions (Cambio 16
November, 1994).
5.2.2 State policy regarding the protection and promotion of human
rights
Three mechanisms provide the framework of the Colombian state' s human rights
policy:
52 For example, three presidential candidates were assassinated in the 1990 elections,
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(i) The international conventions to which Colombia is a signator establish the
minimum standards for human rights guarantees on which nationallaw is based.
Artic1e 93 of the Colombian Constitution states that obligations under international
treaty prevail over national law, and that the provisions of the constitution are
intended to conform with those treaties. Artic1es 93 and 214.2 further guarantee
that fundamental human rights as defined by International HumanItarian Law can
not be suspended whi1e a state of emergency is in effect. Depending on the nature
of the convention, these human rights guarantees may ex ten d into jurisdictions as
diverse as the labour code, programs related to women and children and the
healthcare system;
(ii) Artic1es 11-93 of the Constitution of 1991 provide extensive human rights
guarantees which extend to third generation human rights, such as economic,
social, cultural, consumer and environmental rights (Artic1es 42-82). Specific
artic1es wil be introduced in Chapter 5 as they relate to the given form of human
rights violation which is being reviewed. The human rights guarantees found in
the 1991 Constitution have been described as the most comprehensive and
progressive in Latin America. According to an America's Watch report the
constitution's "mechanisms (for the protection of human rights) reflect the most
advanced legal analysis ... they demonstrate an authentic concern for human rights
and the recognition of the urgency of restoring a coherent political institutions to
protect human dignity" (Americas Watch 1992: 138);
(iii) Human rights guaranteed under international treaty and the Constitution of
1991 are implemented through the legislative development of those mechanism.
The enforcement of human rights is the responsibility of the state human rights
bureaucracy.
Successive Colombian governments have promised full implementation of all
human rights guarantees as defined under national law and international
conventions. Former President Cesar Gaviria took initiatives early in his
administration which were seen as important prerequisites for reducing political
violence. Gaviria introduced a policy of "political opening" to bring traditionally
marginalized sectors into the political process. The cornerstone of the policy was
a new constitution, ratified in July, 1991. The constitution was written by an
elected constituent assembly, which inc1uded participation from across the political
spectrum, Peace agreements were also signed with five smaller guerrila groups
between 1990 and 1993, ending nearly a decade of negotiations.
In his August 1994 inaugural speech, President Samper stated "in my government
human rights wil be respected not at the point of a gun or through (human rights)
defense agencies, but as the natural development of my profound conviction that
no state can demand the respect of its citizens if (the state's) own agents act to
violate the rights of those citizens ... we wil end impunity" (Presidencia de la
República 1994c). Many observers were optimistic about initiatives taken by the
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President Samper government during its first months in office. The President
acknowledged that agents of the state were responsible for violations and said that
"internal conflict cannot be used as an excuse for violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law" (Presidencia de la República 1994c). However,
he disputes statistics presented by human rights organizations.
Shortly after the election President Samper issued aseven point human rights
strategy, inc1uding measures to provide more intern al control within the military
(Presidencia de la República 1994c). In addition, Samper: (i) appointed a High
Commissioner for Peace with a mandate to explore negotiations with the
remaining guerrila groups and took steps to open a dialogue; (ii) invited the UN
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions and the
Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit Colombia in 1994 and invited Amnesty
International to establish a permanent observer;53 (iii) facilitated the visit of the
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons to
Colombia in October, 1994; (iv) ratified the Second Geneva Protocol and proilised
measures to "normalize" internal armed conflct; and (v) promised to take
measures against impunity, to "eradicate" paramilitary groups, and to provide
assistance for victims of human rights violations and persons displaced by armed
conflct.
President Samper presented these initiatives as part of a comprehensive anti-
violence strategy to "protect the security of citizens" which will also inc1ude
measures to reduce common crime. A similar comprehensive anti-violence policy
was presented by Gaviria when he assumed office. In addition, the Samper
government' s economic strategy included programs directed at alleviating poverty.
Taken together, these initiatives address the fundamental aspects of political
violence and human rights violations.
Internationally, the Colombian government has been very concerned with its image
since the mid-1980s. The government' s sensitivity is due, in large part, to free
market economic reforms which create pressure on the government to attraet new
foreign investment. According to President Samper "a policy of defense of human
rights has become a condition for opening new markets, attracting investment and
access to strategic materials" (Presidencia de la República 1994c). The
government maintained an aggressive international public relations campaign to
counter criticism, It often disputed statistics and challenged both the credibility and
political bias of critical national and international human rights reports.
53 Amnesty International declined the invitation as a matter of policy.
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5.2.3 International human rights obligations
Colombia is a signator to most major international and regional human rights
treaties through its ratification of various United Nations (UN), Organization of
American States (OAS) and International Labour Organization (ILO) instruments.
These inc1ude: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Colombia has ratified ILO Convention 169
(Indigenous and Tribal Peoples), the American Convention on Human Rights,
inc1uding accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights,
and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. Colombia is
also a signator to the Geneva Protocols.
There have been three important exceptions to Colombia' s observance of
international instruments: (i) Colombia has not yet ratified ILO Convention 138
relating to child labour; (ii) Colombia ratified the Second Protocol of the Geneva
Conventions relating to internal conflict in December, 1994, after 15 years of
debate. There were no reservations in the implementing legislation; and (iii)
Colombia signed the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons in June, 1994. Implementing legislation for convention approved by the
Senate in October, 1994, inc1uded three significant reservations related to the
military justice system and the concept of due obedience. The implications of
those reservations are considered in Chapter 6 of this study, The reservations were
controversial and as of February, 1995, the proposed legislation had not been
presented to Congress. Human rights groups were lobby ing to defeat the
legislation rather than see the treaty ratified and the exceptions entrenched in
Colombian law,
5.2.4 The Colombian Constitution of 1991 and state human rights
agencies
The Colombian state has three official human rights agencies mandated by the
constitution to monitor and enforce the observance of human rights guarantees.
The Proeurador General de la Nación (Prosecutor General) is responsible for
investigating alleged human rights abuses committed by agents of the state (Artic1e
277). The Prosecutor is mandated to receive human rights complaints through a
network of regional offices, investigate those complaints and apply administrative
discipline in cases where guilt is established. The most severe form of
administrative discipline is the dismissal of a public officiaL. Actions taken by the
Prosecutor General are intended to complement other judicial processes as
proscribed by ordinary law, in the case of civilian employees, or the military
justice system where members of the public forces are involved. The Prosecutor's
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staff includes a special Delegate for Human Rights.
The 1991 Constitution also establishes the office of the Defensor del Pueblo
(People's Defender) (Artic1es 281-84). The People's Defender is appointed by the
President and functions as an Ombudsperson. The Defender is mandated to receive
complaints, investigate and denounce human rights violations and publish an
annual report but has no formal judicial power to prosecute cases. Work is
coordinated with the Prosecutor General under the authority of the Ministerio del
Público (Public Ministry).
The office of the Consejero Presidencial para los Dereehos Humanos (Presidential
Advisor for Human Rights) is an offcial advisory body, first to the President and
in general to the government and the state. The Presidential Advisor develops
analysis and policy, takes initiatives to promote a culture of human rights in
Colombia and of ten acts as an offcial spokesperson at the national and
international1evels. In addition, some sections of the Public Forces have their own
internal human rights offices. During the 1994 election campaign President Samper
promised to strengthen these offices "to promote respect for human rights in the
national police and armed forces, and to provide for better internal control.."
(Presidencia de la República 1994c). Samper promised to establish human rights
offices in the Defense Ministry , in all of the regional military battalions and to
improve human rights education for members of the Public Forces.
5.3 Official human rights policy: Rhetoric and reality
In total, 14,865 persons were officially reported killed in politically motivated
violence in Colombia during the four year administration of President Cesar
Gaviria (1990-1994) (Justicia y Paz, VoL.7, No.2 1994: 21). Amnesty International
reports 20,000 political motivated kilings between 1987 and December, 1993
(Amnesty International AMR 23/01/94: l). Most political violence took place in
the con text of the 40 year old armed conflict between the government and various
guerrila groupS.54 Perhaps more importantly than the actual armed confrontations
between the government and guerrila forces, the conflict created the conditions
and broader ideological rationale for human rights abuses committed against
civilian non-combatants, as se en in statistics. Of the almost 15,000 persons kiled
between 1990 and 1994,5,358 died in confrontations between government and the
guerrilas. Many were civilian non-combatants caught in the crossfire. The
remaining 9,507 victims died as aresult extra-judicial killngs or other forms of
abuses committed in non-combat situations, almost twice as many as were killed
in the actual fighting (Justicia y Paz, Vo1.7, No.2 1994: 21). The Prosecutor
54 Colombia has the oldest guerrila insurgency in Latin America. It predates the Cuban
revolution and the rise of guerrilla groups in other Latin American countries which occurred
in the late 1960s and 1970s,
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General confirmed that "the majority of human rights complaints made against
members of the public forces do not res ult from situations of combat"
(Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994: 48). Tens of thousands of Colombians
were also the victims of torture, detention under state of emergency laws and other
forms of violations inc1uding force d disappearance,
Despite offcial policy the weight of evidence, gathered over decades by reputable
national and international organizations and the state's own agencies, concludes
that agents of the Colombian state are the principle violatorsofhuman rights. In
1994 Colombian and international human rights organizations told the UN
Commission on Human Rights that "there exists a pattern of serious, persistent and
systematic violations of human rights violations ... the Colombian state is the
principle party responsible for attempts made against the right to life for political
or presumably political reasons" (UN doc. E/CN.4/ Sub,211994/NG0129 para. 6).
According to the Colombian Prosecutor General "Colombia's human rights
situation has seriously deteriorated ... and is now reminiscent of the experience of
many Latin American societies in previous decades ... it is of the gravest concern
that a democratic government would register such a high numbers of (human
rightsJ abuses" (Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994: 10-11).
In his 1993 report, the Prosecutor General found that the high incidence of
violations is a consequence of "the state' s lack of a c1ear and policy and strategy
regarding human rights which is evident in the actions of the security forces"
(Procuradurza General de la Nación 1993: 46-47). The Special Representative to
the UN Secretary General conc1uded in 1994 that where human rights programs
did exist they were frequently "ad hoc", "lacking coherence" and "out of touch
with reality" . "There appears to be a serious problems with the implementation of
such programs" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.l para. 124), These sources confirm
the criticisms frequently made by many human rights organizations who accuse
the government of having a "cynical" or "double policy" on human rights where
"the distance between the governments words and its actions has grown
intolerable" (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 2). Most importantly, the
Colombian government has been criticised by all levels of the international human
rights community, including by numerous UN Special Rapporteurs, for "damning
evidence" which demonstrates "the absence of political wil to overcome the
human rights crisis" (UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.411994/NG0I29 para.3e, also see
Amnesty International AMR 23/01194: 1-7).
According to the Andean Commission of Jurists "the first real actions of the
Samper government raise doubts regarding the cohesiveness and strength of its
(human rightsJ policy" (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 2). It is not c1ear that
a consensus exists within the government on human rightspolicy and some
suggested the government is not strong enough to move a progressive policy
through the conservative Congress.
66
At the national leve l, empirical information presented in Chapter 5 indicates that
the human rights guarantees found in the Constitution of 1991 are not respected
by the Public Forces. The government of Colombia has not taken serious measures
to enforce their compliance with official human rights policy. The government and
the military both deny that human rights violations are systematic or that they
occur as a matter of offcial government policy. Instead, they argue that the
violations are "isolated and unrelated cases" committed by persons "acting beyond
their authority" and, therefore, "their actions do not represent the institutional
policy of the state" (Presidencia de la República 1994a). However, human rights
organizations point out that military and police act within the legal framework of
state of emergencies powers and the government' s strategy of "total war", declared
by former President Gaviria in 1992, which specifically targets civilian non-
combatants. Human rights violations, therefore, are committed within official
policy related to the management of public order.
In addition, the ability of the state' s human rights agencies to monitor and enforce
guarantees is severely limited. Reports and statements issued by the Prosecutor
General and the People's Defender have been increasingly critical of the
government' s human rights record and have been important in documenting the
nature and extent of violations committed by agents of the state. In this sense,
state agencies create political space for public debate regarding human rights
policy and violations. However, both offices have limited resources and judicial
power. Officials complain that their investigations are of ten hindered by other
agents of the state, primarily the armed forces and the national police. According
to the Prosecutor General, the military's "misunderstanding of esprit de corps ...
creates problems in investigations, places obstac1es in the process, and impedes the
effectiveness of the justice system" (Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994:
17). The Special Delegate for Human Rights noted that "our investigators are the
targets for threats or violence when they investigate human rights cases (where the
military is involved). I myself have received death threats".55 Also "there seems
to be little high leve1 coordination between the government' s human rights
organisms and with other ministries such as Justice" which impedes the
effectiveness of their work (UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/61/Add.3 para.25).
It is important to also note that statistics reported by the state's human rights
agencies represent the minimum instance of a given violation. Many cases go
unreported. For example, in many regions of the country the state human rights
agencies are located inside or near the bases of the same military units which are
accused of committing the violations. This deters victims of violations from filing
a report. The Special Delegate for Human Rights of the Prosecutor General' s
office noted "there is a fear, on the part of many people bringing (human rights)
55 Interview, Special Delegate for Human Rights of the Prosecutor General's Office, Bogotá, 8
October, 1994,
67
complaints that their cases wil go nowhere. AIso, there is a fundamental lack of
credibility of the institutions of the state in general, and agencies responsible for
human rights in paricular" (Caja de Herrmientas, September 1994).
The working relationship between NGOs and the Colombian government has been
strained and the former President Gaviria was public1y critical of their work. State
of Emergency legislation invoked in 1992 specifically identified groups alleged to
support the guerrilas, opening all NGOs to investigation and prosecution,
sometimes under military jurisdiction. Reflecting the attitude taken by many in the
military towards human rights organizations, Major General Bonett, Commander
of the Second Division of the Armed Forces wrote "the subversives have managed
to win influence in the UN, the OAS, the Congress of the United States and the
non-governmental organizations" (El Tiempo, 3 October, 1994). Many human
rights workers believe the government' s public disposition created a hostile
political c1imate in which abuses committed against NGOs occurred,
President Samper initially appeared to take a more constructive approach. Shortly
after takng office Samper said he "considers NGOs to be (the government's) allies
in safeguarding fundamental rights" and in October, 1994, he established a joint
NGO and government commission to investigate the 1990 Trujillo massacre in
which 60 persons were killed by a paramilitary group (Presidencia de la República
1994c), However, human rights workers continue to report they are targeted for
abuses. For example, the President of the Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos-
Desaparecidos (Association of Families of the Detained-Disappeared;
ASFADDES) received death threats after making public statements critical of
President Samper' s human rights record.
Internationally, the Constitution of 1991 is gener all y thought to comply with or
exceed international standards, although the development of legislation to
implement those rights has frequently not yet occurred (Americas Watch 1992),
Colombia has, in large part, fulfiled its formal reporting obligations to the various
UN human rights bodies. However, it has been repeatedly criticized for the gap
between "laws and intentions and their implementation" and for "lacking factual
information regarding the actual situation" related to a paricular issue and the
implementation of programs (UN doc. CERD/C/1911SR.950 1992 para. 45), For
example, Colombia was asked to resubmit it's 1993 report to the committee
monitoring the Convention on Rights of the Child. The committee was concerned
"over the significant gap between the laws to protect and promote the rights of the
child and the practical application of those laws ... and discriminatory and advers e
social attitudes and practices, particularly among law enforcement officials,
towards vulnerable groups of children" (UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add,15 para. 6.).
Colombia has "repeatedly been in non-compliance with the recommendations and
decisions formulated by international organizations responsible for the protection
of human rights" (UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NG0/29 para.3g). For example, its
68
non-compliance with the decisions of the Interamerican Commssion on Human
Rights was described as "notorious" (UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/29
para.3g). It was also repeatedly criticised by international monitoring bodies for
the lack of progress in improving its human rights record. The Special Rapporteur
on Torture expressed his "consternation" at the "continued widespread use of
torture" despite numerous recommendations in his previous reports (UN doc.
E/CN.4/1994/31 para. 188). The Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions reported that he "continues to receive a large number of
allegations against agents of the Colombian state concerning the 'violation of the
rights to life. It is particularly disturbing to note that similar allegations have now
come before the Special Rapporteur for many years without any apparent
improvement in the situation" (UN doc. E/CNA/1994/7 para. 238).
In the same light, the government appeared to take advantage of the complexity
of the human rights situation to obscure its own responsibility for violations,
claiming that much of the violence was beyond its control. One Colombian
representative told the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
that "the violence of the drug cartels and the guerrilas is the main cause of human
rights violations..." (UN doc, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 17 para.72). This position has been
repeated by Colombian officials on numerous occasions, inc1uding in the inaugural
speeches of Presidents Gaviria and Samper. However, the c1aim is not supported
by the government' s own statistics, including the annual reports of the Prosecutor
General and the People's Defender. The Representative of the Secretary-General
for Internally Displaced Persons noted "the complexities, undeniable though they
may be, do not absolve the government of its responsibilities" (UN doc.
E/CN.4/1995/50/ Add.l para. 124. ).
5.4 Åctors in the violence
For the purpose of this study it is important to distinguish between the actors and
levels of political violence and analyze the interaction between them. The
distinctions are important insofar as they establish what role agents of the state
play in Colombia's political violence. There are at 1east four distinct forms of
violence, and actors associated with them, in Colombia. These inc1ude violence
commtted by the state (the Public Forces), violence against the state (guerrila
organizations), para-state violence (paramilitary groups in rural areas and
parapolice in urban areas) and commercial violence (drug traffickers).
5.4.1 The Public Forces
According to the Andean Commission of Jurists, the Public Forces were
responsible for 54,2 percent of the total number of recorded human rights
violations which occurred between January, 1993, and June, 1994. This figure
increases to 72 percent when violations committed by paramilitary groups, alleged
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to be supported by the Public Forces, are inc1uded (Comisión Andina de Juristas
1994: l). The church sponsored Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular
(Center for Popular Research and Education; CINEP) attributes 65 percent of
reported violations to agents of the state (CINEP 1994a: 67).
In his 1994 report the Prosecutor General records 7,598 formal complaints of
human rights violations made against members of the Public Forces between 1991
and 1993, inc1uding 68 massacres (Procuraduría General de la Nación 1994: 10).
The National Police recorded the highest number of corrplaints, which the
Prosecutor General attributed, in par, to police participation in quasi-military
operations against drug traffickers. For example, an estimated 100 civilians were
kiled in operations to recapture drug lord Pablo Escobar (Cambia 16, 10 February,
1994), Commenting on the discrepancy between state policy on human rights and
the high incidence of violations the Prosecutor conc1uded "the erratic behaviour
of defense and security agencies in terms of human rights violations appears to be
an intern al characteristic of these organizations". He pointed out that Colombians
"perceive the state's organisms of defense and security as the most repressive,
most aggressive, in that they apparently use two means in their dealings with civil
society; verbal and psychosocial mistreatment on one hand and torture,
disappearance and murder on the other" (Procuradurza General de la Nación
1994: 83),
Impunity is the central issue related to human rights abuses committed by
members of the Public Forces. In 1993-94, the Prosecutor General estimated that
the rate of impunity was 97 percent, meaning that only three percent of reported
violations resulted in penal sanctions. Only 10 percent of cases reported to the
Prosecutor General during that period resulted in an investigation. Unofficially,
Colombian human rights organizations place the impunity rate at over 99 percent.
The issue of impunity has also been repeatedly raised by various UN human rights
bodies.
Human rights organizations note that the statistics related to the military likel y
understate the case as members of the armed forces often try to hide their
responsibility for violations. Violations which occur in non-combat situations are
of ten blamed on the guerrilas, Dead civilan victims are also dressed in guerrila
uniforms and it is c1aimed they were kiled in combat. The Andean Commission
of Jurists reports such instances are "not isolated cases but apersistent pattern of
violence. Between January and September of 1993 alone there were 23 cases"
(Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 4). Two UN Special Rapporteurs also
conc1uded that "civilians kiled in combat are later presented to the public as
guerrilas, their corpses being dressed in military uniforms and guns ... placed in
their hands" (UN doc. E/CNA/1995/111 para,26).
In 1993 the public forces employed 234,251 persons, or 70 percent of all central
government employees, causing one business journal to conc1ude that "violence
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is the biggest employer in Colombia" (Portofolio, 13 September 1993). Defense
and security expenditures were projected to be 16.4 percent of the 1994 federal
budget. This compares against ni ne percent for all social expenditures
(Fedesarrollo 1994). The defense budget increased 56 percent in real terms and
25 new mobile brigades incorporating 23,000 soldiers were created in 1993
following the dec1aration of "total war" (CINEP 1994a: 76),
5.4.2 Guerrilla organizations
The Andean Commission of Jurists estimates that guerrila groups were responsible
for 25 percent of recorded human rights violations, where the author was
identified, committed between January, 1993, and March, 1994 (Comisión Andina
de Juristas 1994: l). Other human rights groups place the number slightly lower.
It appears that the instance of violations committed by the guerrilas has increased
in the past year, possibly as a result of internal control problems. There are
currently two main armed opposition groups operating in Colombia, the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia;
FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army; ELN).
Dissident factions of the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation
Army; EPL) are also stil active. Together these groups are thought to have 12,000
combatants under arms.
Five other smaller guerrila groups have recently demobilized, In 1990, President
Gaviria signed peace agreements with the Movimiento 19 de Abril (Movement of
April 19; M-19), Quintzn Lame, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular
Liberation Army; EPL), and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (the
Revolutionary Worker's Party; PRT). Negotiations with these groups began during
the previous Betancur and Barco administrations. In 1993 Gaviria also signed an
agreement with the Corriente de Renovación Socialista (Movement for Socialist
Renovation; CRS). By July, 1994, the government estimated that 5,200 former
guerrilas were participating in "reinsertion programs", although "reinsertees" point
out that money promised for the programs frequently does not arrive and they are
primary targets for human rights abuses.56
The guerrilas have been weakened by the same silen t revolutions which
undermines the political power of the two traditional parties. According to Antonio
N avarro W olff, politician and leader of the demobilized guerrila group M -19, "our
original idea was that people would take up arms and head to the mountains as a
res ult of general dissatisfaction with the politics of the country. This has occurred
in other historical periods... But we discovered that Colombia was a much more
urban country than we believed - that people in urban areas are reluctant to take
56 Interview, Corriente de Renovación Socialista, Bogotá, 60ctober, 1994.
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up armed action in the mountains... We also discovered that no one has been able
to create an army in the city".57
The guerrila' s ideological orientation differs by group, but mixes Colombian
populism with different interpretations of socialist or Marxist thought. Although
issues vary by region, guerrila groups have historically been involved in land
struggles and they appear to retain support in rural areas throughout the country.
The government c1aims that the guerrilas are common criminals and many in
Colombia believe that the guerrila movement has lost its "historicalsignificance",
particularly in the light of their reduced rural support base (El Tiempo, 20
November, 1992). However, a report prepared for the European Community found
"interviews ... left us no doubt that the guerrilas have a c1ear political agenda"
(Asociación SETA 1993: 9).
As protagonist in an armed conflct the guerrilas share a degree of responsibility
with the Colombian state, and other actors, for the generalized climate of violence.
Guerrila spokespersons have repeatedly dec1ared their intention to respect
international protocols on armed conflct and Amnesty International notes
"guerrilas have rarely committed indiscriminate attacks against civilians..."
(Amnesty International AMR 23/01194). However, instances where civilians are
kiled as a result of guerrila actions against military or economic targets seem to
be increasing.
The Colombian government maintains that 1,360 civilians were assassinated by the
guerrilas between 1990 and 1994, inc1uding some government officials and
elected political figures (Cambia 16, 14 March 1994). Hundreds of guerrilla
members have also been kiled in the past decades in internal purges and conflicts.
In one recent case, 35 demobilized EPL guerrilas, who were members of the
political pary Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Liberty; EPL), were
massacred by a FARC unit in the department of Urabá in January, 1994.
According to government officials 2,400 civilians and military personnel were
kidnapped by guerrila units between 1990 and 1994 (Cambia 16, 14 March 1994).
This represents about one half of the total as kidnapping by organized crime is
also widespread. The number of guerrila kidnapping has declined in the past year,
possibly as a result of a weakening in their operational capacity. Ransom money
is said to be one of the principle means of funding guerrila operations.
Kidnapping can also have political overtones. During the March, 1994,
Congressional election campaign the F ARC kidnapped five candidates and six
mayors in an attempt to disrupt the process (Cominsión Andina de Juristas 1994).
57 Interview with Navarro Wolff, quoted in NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol XXVLL,
January/February 1994,
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5.4.3 Paramilitary groups
There are an estimated 132 paramlitary groups in Colombia (Cambio 16, 3
October 1994). The groups have names like Colombia sin Guerrillas (Colombia
Without Guerrilas; COLSINGUER), Mana Negro (Black Hand), Escuadrón de la
Muerte (Squadron of Death) and Muerte a Comunistas y Guerrilleros (Death to
Communists and Guerrilas; MACOGUE), The groups are supported by, and
conduct operations on behalf of clandestine associations of the far right,
landowners, gremios (business organizations) and the dn1g carteIs. There is
extensive evidence of close cooperation between paramilitary groups and the
Colombian military and police.
The Andean Commission of Jurists estimates that the paramilitary groups were
responsible for 18 percent of all human rights violations committed between
Januar, 1993 and March, 1994, including extra-judicial kilings, massacres, and
causing disappearances (Cominsión Andina de Juristas 1994: l). One paramilitary
leader, Fidel Castaño Gil, is know n to have participated in, or to be the intellectual
author of, at least 400 deaths in the past 12 years, including four massacres of
peasants (Cambio 16, 3 October 1994). Human rights organizations believed that
paramilitary activity was on the increase in 1994. Trade union officials reported
that the groups have an operational capacity and sophistication, including the
capacity to coordinate campaigns at the nationallevel, that have never been seen
before,58
Paramiltary groups usually operate in zones under military control or zones of
conflct. The target of abuses committed by the groups are civilians, including
persons involved in social organizations and non-traditional political parties. The
pattern of operations suggests that the objective of the paramilitaries "is to
extinguish opposition" through intimidation or murder (UN doc.
E/CN.4/1995/50/Add,1/ para.42). Some groups are involved in social cleaning
operations in urban areas.
In regions where the groups operate, civilians are usually given the choice of
participating in paramilitary activities, 1eaving the area or being kiled. In the
community of El Carmen, often considered a laboratory for the paramilitary model
of counter - insurgency, over 300 persons were assassinated between 1990 and 1993
for alleged collaboration with guerrilas or refusing to participate in paramilitary
activities. Another 4,200 persons, or one third of the total population, were
displaced (Justicia y Paz, VoL7, No.2 1994: 5-20). In another example, the mayor
of Turbo, on the Atlantic coast, testified that paramilitaries disappeared 40 persons
from that community alone during 1993 (Cambio 16, 3 October, 1994).
58 Interview, Central Unitaria de los Trabajadores de Colombia (United Workers Central of
Colombia; CUT), Bogotá, 7 October i 994.
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Intimidation is also widespread. In September, 1994, three leaders of the petroleum
sector union, Fedepetrol/USO, received a letter stating "we know that Fedepetrol
is an organization of ELN delinquents ... (youJ are the next to whom we wil
apply our justice as we have to other guerrilas camouflaged as unions. Soon you
wil be dead. This is the best gift we can give the country and society wil thank
us," The letter was signed by COLSINGUER, which has c1aimed responsibility for
the assassination of at least five other union leaders.
Paramilitary groups were originally created by law 48 of 1968. Their activities
were coordinated until 1989 by the highest 1evels of the government and the
militar command within the framework of an overall counter-insurgency strategy.
By 1990 the UN Special Rapporteur on Summar or Arbitrary Executions found
that more than 100 such groups were operating (UN doc, E/C.N.4/1990/22/Add.l).
In 1989, then President Barco passed legislation banning paramilitary groups
(Decrees 813, 814 and 815/89). On assuming office in 1990, former President
Gaviria promised to "channeI all the efforts of the Colombian state into disarming
these groups..." (Presidencia de la República 1990) and President Samper has said
he wil "eradicate" the groups through a strategy which inc1udes enforcing the
original 1989 decrees, Both Gaviria and Samper denied any systematic government
involvement with paramilitaries.
However, in contradiction to the governments offcial policy, evidence of "full
complicity" between the military and paramilitary forces is "overwhelming"
(Asociación SETA 1993: 14). According to the Andean Commission of Jurists, one
type of paramilitary group is "made up of members of the arme d forces who
commit human rights violations under the protection of false identification. A
second is made up of civilians who are armed by the military and act under its
direction or tolerance" (Cominsión Andina de Juristas 1994: 4).
The 1994 report of the UN Human Rights Committee reports 622 cases where
military personnel were believed to be involved in paramilitary operations (UN
doc. Supplement No.40 (A/47/40) p.84), and the UN Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances documents information "which makes quite c1ear
(the paramilitary'sJ connection with military and police commands and units" (UN
doc. E/CN.4/1993/25 para. 169). According to one human rights official in the
Prosecutor General's office "it seems c1ear that a relationship (between the military
and paramiltary) exists. However, you can appreciate how difficult this is to
investigate. On numerous occasions we have been c10se to concluding a case when
suddenly the evidence or the witnesses just disappear... Our investigators have
be en threatened and themselves subjected to abuses. ,,59
Military support is both passive, such as allowing paramilitaries free movement
in militar controlled areas and freedom from arrest, and active, including
59 Interview, Office of the Prosecutor General, Bogotá, 12 October 1994.
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planning joint strategy and operations and providing intelligence and resources.
Officers with past relations to the paramilitaries, inc1uding the Commander of the
Armed Forces, Major General Gil Bermudez, have been promoted to the highest
levels of the militar. Those who "collaborate with paramilitary groups tend to be
more successful in counter-insurgency and are deemed more useful and thus
promoted" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add,1 para.43).
5.4.4 Drug traffickers
Colombia is the wor1ds large st producer of cocaine (El Tiempo, 12 October 1994),
and possibly the second largest producer of heroin after Burma (The Economist,
24 December 1994). With an estimated 100,000 hectares in production, Colombia
is also the second largest cultivator of coca leaves after Perú. Marijuana is grown
and exported in smaller quantities.
The drug trade dominates the international community's perception of Colombia,
of ten obscuring the broader sItuation of political violence. This perception is
created, in part, by the governments c1aim that drug trafficking is the principle
cause of violence in Colombia. However, national and international organizations
report that the drug cartels were responsible for only 1.8 to four percent of the
total number of reported human rights violations between 1991 and 1993
(Asociación SETA 1993: iv). A UN Special Rapporteur found that "the great
majority of 36 judges and lawyers kiled (in 1991) were not investigating the drug
trade, but the activities of paramilitary groups and massacres attributed to the
security forces" (UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992125 para,81).
Observers note that the government has political motivations for misrepresenting
the true extent of the human rights violations committed by the carteIs. However,
the low statistics understate the enormous impact of the drug trade on Colombian
society.
Historically, trafficking has be en dominated by two carteIs, based in the cities of
Medellín and Cali. The Medellín cartel, led by Pablo Escobar, assumed an
aggressive posture in its relationship to the state and attempted to gain political
influence through force. It developed a military apparatus capable of waging open
warfare against the government and its international allies. According to General
Manuel Manza, then head of the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad
(Security Police; DAS) and more recently a candidate in the 1994 Pre si denti al
elections, "we realized that the drug traffickers no longer operated like ordinary
criminals, like the mafia. They had become a state within a state ... and a political
arm in the MORENA party in the Magdalena Medio region, a territory that the
drug traffickers were on the point of totally controlling" (Maunel Manza as quoted
by Pearce 1990: 3),
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In creating the apparatus the Medellín cartel presented a threat that the government
could not ignore. At the height of the conflct in 1990 3160 civilians and 250
police and judicial officials were kiled in Medellín in fighting between the cartel
and the government forces (Manitzas 1991: 14; Americas Watch 1992: 116). The
Medellín cartel was effectively dismantled during the early 1990s and Pablo
Escobar was killed was by government forces in December, 1993.
The cartel based in Cali thrived almost unmolested during the war between the
Medel1n carel and the government. As a result, the United States. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimated that the Cali cartel was responsible for up
to 75 percent of cocaine exports to the US in 1994. In contrast to the Medellín
carel, drug traffickers based in Cali have thrived "by quietly cultivating political
influence through corruption" and "using sophisticated business methods" (The
Economist, 24 December 1994). The Cali cartel's strategy is to infiltrate rather
than con front the Colombian establishment and, despite the real efforts of many
Colombians, it is alleged to have penetrated the highest levels of Colombian
political institutions, the security forces and private business (CINEP 1994b: 289-
346). For example, in April, 1995, the Colombian Prosecutor General announced
that he was opening investigations into allegations that President Samper received
campaign contributions from the Cali cartel (Cambia 16, 27 June, 1995). Evidence
has been made public which shows that the Cali cartel cooperated with
government forces in their search for Pablo Escobar during 199360 and one the
Special Representative to the UN Secretar General conc1uded that "depending on
the region of the country, the drug traffickers are said to form alliances with the
Government, the arme d forces and the guerrilas to intimidate the local population"
(UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.l para.45).
Drug traffickers are careful to camouflage their activities by reinvesting their
profits in paralleI legal business. For example, the cartel is thought to own one
third of all agricultural land in Colombia and large numbers of peasants and
indigenous persons have been displaced by their huge land acquisitions (The
Economist, 24 December 1994). Money is also laundered through the construction
sector, which grew by 12 percent in 1993. According to one analysts "it is certain
that much of the construction which has improved (Colombia'sJ major cities has
been the result of (drug) money laundering ventures" (CINEP 1994b: 319). In
total, it is estimated that drugs accounted for up to 11 percent of the GNP during
the 1980s (CINEP 1994b: 286), or 50 to 60 percent of export earnings in 1990
(Kalmanovitz 1990).
60 The Cali and Medellín cartels were business rIvals and there was a history of Inter-cartel
violence. WIth the demise of the Medellín cartel the Cali drug barons took over theIr
production and distrIbution network and integrated markets formerly controlled by the
Medellín cartel into their own system. Working with the government forces, therefore, was a
business decision,
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The drug trade, therefore, has a larger corrosive effect on the Colombian society
than the violence its causes. Drug trafficking causes tremendous distortions in the
economy resulting in the misallocation of resources and effecting everything from
exchange rates, the balance of payments, land and housing prices and the tax
system. Drug funded enterprises also undercut legitimate businesses, forcing a
dependence in the overall economy on drug revenues.
The drug trade also has complex international dimensions which effect Colombia's
diplomatic and economic relations with countries where drugsare consumed. In
paricular, the USD 50 bilion "War on Drugs" has contributed to the general
militarization of Colombia, Colombian military officials and the US embassy in
Bogotá openly acknowledge that military aid intended for anti-drug operations is
used in counter-insurgency operations (Manitzas 1991: 11; Americas Watch 1992:
116). The War on Drugs may have also caused some countries to mute their
criticism of Colombia's human rights record. Amnesty International c1aims
Colombia receives complicit support "from powerful international alles for whom
Colombia's strategic and economic significance is of far more importance than its
human rights record" (Amnesty International AMR 23/01/94: 3).
5.4.5 Social organizations
In a con text of generalized economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s labour and
peasant unions increased in number and importance. In particular, the Asociación
Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Association of Peasant Users; ANUC)
became perhaps the most important national social organization. Created by the
government as a mechanism for cooptation in 1967, it soon gained independence
and became a combative movement which organized tens of thousands of peasants
through marches, civic strikes and land invasions in an attempt to halt the
expansion of cattle ranchers and commercial farmers and to preserve a peasant
economy and demand the right to land (Pearce 1990: 93).
Throughout the country Juntas de Acción Communal (Community Action Groups;
JAC), play an important role at the local levels in providing the community with
social services. These groups were originally created under the National Front as
a means of social control. However, many of them became autonomous. The
1980s has also been a period of the growth of new social movements, such as
women' s groups, urban protest groups, organizations working for the internally
displaced, and a large number of national and local human rights organizations.
Social and popular movements no longer have the capacity for national
mobilization due to decades of repression and the assassination of a large part of
their leaders and membership. However, their presence is still of great importance
at the local leveIs, where they are engaged in community work, such as building
schools, roads and providing health services.
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5.5 CivIl and political human rights
Chapters 5.5 and 5,6 will consider empirical information on the human rights
situation in Colombia. It wil draw on the findings of various UN human rights
bodies, the human rights agencies of the Colombian state and national and
international non governmental organizations. The categories used to present the
information are related to Colombia's main human rights obligations as found
under national and international instruments.
Political participation
Despite constitutional guarantees, the real ability of persons outside of the two
traditional parties to participate in the political process is severely limited by
violence. Over 2,444 members of the Patriotic Union (UP) have been assassinated
since the party was formed in 1985 (Nueva Sig lo, 10 July, 1994), inc1uding 17
persons between January and September of 1994. One of the most recent victims,
Senator Manuel Cepeda, was kiled by the paramilitary group, Death to
Communists and Guerrilas (MACOQUE), in August, 1994. Cepeda is the fifth UP
Congressperson or Senator assassinated and he was the pary's last remaining
representative in the Senate, UP officials presented a complaint of genocide to the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in July, 1994, calling the kilings
"part of a systematic effort, on the part of the military, the government and others,
to exterminate our democratic leaders" (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 7).
Many social organizations and non-traditional political parties have been weakened
by decades of repression and are unable to prov ide a counterbalance in political
debate or policy making. Restrepo calls this "the systematic extermination of
democratic leaders ... who are being annihilated in an atmosphere of impotent
indifference on the part of the government" (Restrepo 1992: 282), a sentiment that
is reaffirmed by most non governmental human rights organizations. Observers
believed that the space for legitimate social action continued to shrink between
1990 and 1995.
Historically, voter abstention in elections is very high. Most Colombians appear
to believe that they do not have access to the political system and their lack of
confidence is manifested in their absence from the country's political life Fifty-
seven percent of Colombians stayed away from the polls in the 1990 Presidential
which brought Cesar Gaviria to power. Sixty-six percent of Colombians abstained
from voting in first round of the 1994 Presidential elections in May and 58 percent
from the second round in June (Cambia 16, 30 May, 1994). The abstention rate
in the March, 1994, Congressional and Senate elections was over 70 percent and
68 percent in the October, 1994, gubernorial and municipal elections. Commenting
on the high rate of abstention from the 1994 Presidential elections, the Special
Representative of the UN Secretar-General for Internally Displaced Persons noted
".., there appeared to be no real motivation to chose one party over the other".
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Right to life
Artic1e 11 of the constitution states that "the right to life is inviolable, There wil
be no death penalty", Aric1es 2 and 44 also establish the right to life as a
fundamental human right and specify that it is the state's responsibility to protect
that right.
The Intercongregational Committee for Justice and Peace reports that, of the
14,852 persons who were kiled in politically motivated violence between 1990
and 1994, 8,174 persons were the victims of either politically motivated
assassination or presumed political assassination (Justicia y Paz, VoL.7, No,2 1994:
21). The Andean Commission of Jurists reports approximately 3,600 politically
motivated assassination between January, 1993 and March, 1994, or an average
of seven persons a day (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994). In the vast majority
of the cases the persons responsible for the assassinations are alleged to be
members of the armed forces, national police or paramilitar groups.
According to the Prosecutor General' s 1994 annual report the groups most
affected, in order of the number of recorded violations, are peasant farmers, small
businesspersons, union members, members of non-traditional political parties and
demobilized former guerrilas (Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994). The
frequency with which extra-judicial killings were reported remained relatively
constant throughout the Gaviria administration. In the first six months of 1991,
1,100 extra-judicial kilings were reported to the Special Rapporteur for
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. The Special Rapporteur received
information on 1,200 extra-judicial killings during the first six months of 1992
(UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/46 para, 188), causing him to state in his 1994 report that
"it is particularly disturbing to note that similar allegations have now come ... for
many years" (UN doc. E/CN.4/199417 para.238).
Forced or involuntary disappearance
Artic1e 12 of the constitution states that "no person shall be subjected to forced
disappearance..." Officially, there have been over 2,000 unsolved disappearances
since the first case was reported in 1978. Amnesty International reports that 1,500
disappearances occurred after the victim was known to have be en detained by the
Public Forces (Cited in Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: l), The Prosecutor
General received formal complaints against members of the public forces in 785
cases of forced disappearance between 1991 and 1993 (Procuradurza General de
la Nación 1994: 10), and as of December, 1993, the UN Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances reported it had transmitted information
on a total of 895 cases to the Colombian government and had received no
response on 700 of those cases (UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/26 p.46).
According to the UN W orking Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
"most of the disappearances occurred in areas under strict military control. Those
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of ten reported to be responsible were the army, the police and paramilitary groups
acting with impunity and believed to have links with members of the security
forces" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/26 p.46). Noting that the instance of disappearances
is not declining, the Working Group conc1udes "this would appear to be largely
due to the phenomenon of impunity..." (UN doc, E/CN.4/1993125 para.95).
According to ASFADDES, "there are no cases where a person has been
convicted..." for causing a disappearance,61 and in arecent speech the Public
Minister confirmed that impunity in the case of disappearances is "100 percent"
(El Espectador, 9 October 1994), ASFADDES also c1aimsthat the number of
disappearances actually increased during the first months of the Samper
administration.
Torture and ill treatment
Article 12 of the constitution states "no person shall be subjected to ... torture or
cruel treatment or penalties". However, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture
calls the practice "endemic ... especially in zones of conflct" (UN doc.
E/CN.4/1994/31 para,188) and an NGO report to the UN Commission on Human
Rights c1aimed that "torture is a systematic practice" (UN doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/29 para,3e). The Prosecutor General's 1994 report
retords 635 formal complaints made against members of the Public Forces on
allegations of torture between 1991 and 1993, noting a 23 percent increase in
complaints during 1993 over the previous year (Procuraduría General de la
Nación 1994: 9). The Comisión Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz
(Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace) reports 436 documented
cases between 1990 and 1994, also noting an increase in the instance of torture in
recent years (Justicia y Paz, VoL7, No.2 1994: 21).
Human rights groups estimate that only a small percentage of cases are actually
reported, a fact that the Prosecutor General acknowledges. Research done by
human rights groups found that victims and their families are frequently threatened
not to report their torture or are forced to sign disclaimers stating that they were
well treated during their detention (Justicia y Paz, Colectivo de Abogados José
Alvear Restrepa, and CREDHOS 1994),
Impunity for torture appears absolute. The Prosecutor General reports that eight
percent of complaints made against members of the public forces in 1993 resulted
in administrative sanctions (Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994: 31-33),
There appears to have been few or no cases of penal sanctions administered
through the military justice system.
61 Letter from the President of ASFADDES to President Gaviria, 29 June 1994.
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Freedom of assembly and association
Freedom of association is probably one of the fundamental rights most seriously
under attack in Colombia. The systematic repression of non-traditional political
parties, social organizations and unions violates many rights guaranteed under
national and international law. In this respect, it is useful to consider the situation
of the Colombian labour movement. The constitution provides comprehensive
rights to Colombian workers, inc1uding the right to form a union (Artic1e 39), the
right to enter in to collective bargaining, the right to strike (limited in the case of
essential services) and the right to participate in the management of companies
(Artic1es 54-56). The state is charged with the responsibility of implementing these
rights through the labour code based on the principles of equality and special
protection for women and minors (Aricle 53).
Colombia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a trade
unionist. Between January 1986 and October, 1994, 1,542 persons affiliated with
the CUT have been assassinated, a full two percent of the federation' s
membership. That figure inc1udes 178 assassinations in 1993. The ILO reports that
52 percent of all union members killed in the world during 1992 were Colombian.
The CUT also estimates that a total of 4,000 of its members have be en arrested
under state of emergency public order laws.
Internally displaced persons
A 1994 study by the Catholic Bishops of Colombia found there were 586,261
internally displaced persons in Colombia. Almost the entire country is affected and
17 departments report bein g aware of 10,000 persons or more who have been
displaced from within their borders. Most internally displaced persons are peasants,
inc1uding indigenous persons. Almost 60 percent are female, an estimated 40,000
of whom were widowed in the violence just be fore ha v ing to flee. Seventy one
. percent were under the age of 25 (Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia, November-
December 1994). In addition, there were an estimated 60,000 Colombian refugees
living in Ecuador and Venezuela (US Committee for Refugees 1994: 158-159.
Internally displaced persons are forced to abandon their permanent homes because
of violence resulting from armed conflct between the government and guerrila
forces, the operations of paramilitary groups or because their security is jeprodized
by human rights abuses, threats and harassment. They do not cross international
borders, and, therefore, do not have rights under the jurisdiction of the
international refugee system. Colombia has a long history of forced internal
displacement. During the Violence (1946-66) an estimated two milion persons
were forced to flee the countryside and move to urban areas or remote regions of
the country.
Until recently, the Colombian government did not acknowledge the problem of
displacement, in part "because (the government) perceived the problem as a
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consequence of violence for which it had repeatedly denied responsibility" (UN
doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add,1 para.74). As a result of the growing humanitarian
crisis the Samper administration has acknowledged the problem and the
Representative of the UN Secretary General reported he was encouraged by
"modest and tentative" government initiatives (UN doc, E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.l
para. 1 11). However, the administration has yet to present concrete proposals and
the Special Representative notes that further initiatives and "a depolitization of the
situation are required" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.l para.74).
5.6 SocIal and economIc human rights
Garretón writes that democratic consolidation required "the definition of a new
model of economic development '.. that can point the way to the elimination of
structural poverty" (Garretón 1995: 147). Economic, social and cultural rights are
not considered in the minimalist procedural definition of democracy used in
Chapter 1.3. However, they require independent consideration as the growing
disparity between rich and poor in Colombia is an important source of social
tension and one of the fundamental elements in the crisis of legitimacy suffered
by the Colombian state. In addition, extensive economic, social and cultural rights
are guaranteed by the Colombian Constitution of 1991 (Artic1es 42-82) and under
various international conventions to which Colombia is a signatory.
The Colombian economy
The number of Colombians living in poverty has increased despite rapid economic
growth in recent decades. The disparity between rich and poor is the primary
cause of social conflct in Colombia, particularly where social organizations have
resisted free market economic reforms. The result is an ironic situation of
escalating political violence accompanied by economic prosperity. Most violence
is concentrated in zones of prosperity , such as the oil producing departments,
rather than in the poorest areas of Colombia. Commenting on this paradox, the
President of one of Colombia' s largest business associations noted "the economy
goes well but the country goes badly" (Palacio and Rojas 1990: 71).
Since the early 1970s, Colombia has sustained the highest level of aggregate
economic growth in Latin America, averaging three percent annually. The
Colombian economy grew 5.3 percent (projected) in 1994,5.1 percent in 1993,3.5
percent in 1993 and 2.1 percent in 1992 (Fedesarrollo 1994, No.9), causing some,
such as The Economist magazine, to refer to it as one of the new Latin American
"tiger economies" (The Economist 24 December 1994). Colombia was not effected
by the international debt crisis of the 1980s to the same ex tent as other Latin
American countries and experienced growth rates of 3.6 to 5.3 percent while many
other economies in the region actually shrank.
Colombia's gross national product (GNP) in 1993 was approximately USD 50
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bilion giving the country the fourth largest economy in Latin America.
Colombia's USD 1,250 per capita income leve1 is also one of the highest in Latin
America. The foreign debt stood at USD 17 bilion in 1992, or 37 percent of the
GNP. Performance regarding debt as a percentage of GNP compared favourably
to other important Latin American economies, such as Chile (48.9% of GNP),
Mexico (34%), Argentina (30%) and Venezuela (61 %), Servicing Colombia's debt
consumed 36 percent of export earnings (World Bank, 1994: 206-207, Table 23).
Inflation rates have remained relatively stable at 23 percent (projected) in 1994,
22.6 percent in 1993 and 25.7percent in 1992, and anti-inflation policies have
been an important element of overall economic planning (Fedesarrollo, No.9,
1994) .
Colombian governments have traditionally followed a conservative economic
strategy, often voluntarily implementing structural adjustment st yle policies that
have been prescribed by international financial institutions, such as the IMF and
the World Bank, elsewhere in Latin America, During the late 1980s then President
Barco began a process of gradual economic liberalization. In 1990, President
Gaviria accelerated and expanded the process of liberalization through his policy
of apertura económica (economic opening), dec1aring that "internationalization"
and the integration of Colombia into global markets were his primary economic
objectives.
The right to an adequate standard of liv ing and freedom from hunger
The Colombian governments Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadzsticas (Department of National StatistIcs; DANE) estimated that 47.1 percent
of Colombians lived below the poverty line in 1994, an increase from 40 percent
in 1988 (DANE cited in Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: 16), The World
Bank, the UNDP and UNICEF all estimate that 42 to 45 percent of Colombians
live be10w the poverty line (Consejo Gremial Nacional 1994). DANE recently
found that 33.6 percent of Colombians live in "critical poverty" and can not meet
their basic nutritional needs. UNDP reports that poverty level reaches 70 percent
in rural areas where 30 percent of Colombians live (UNDP 1994: 134, Table 3).
An additional 15-20 percent of the population live just above the poverty line and
could fall below it with a small change in their economic fortunes (DANE cited
in Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: 16).
Income distribution is highly concentrated. Three percent of landowners control
70 percent of agricultural land (UN doc. E/CN:4/1995/50/Add.l para.30). In 1991
the World Bank estimated the poorest 20 percent of the population earned 3.6
percent of Colombia's GNP. The UNDP's 1994 report found the poorest 40
percent earned only 12.7 percent of the national wealth in 1992. In contrast, the
richest 20 percent earned 56 percent of the national wealth with the top L O percent
earning 40 percent (World Bank 1994),
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Government expenditures grew from 11 to 16 percent of the GDP between 1990
and 1994. Correspondingly, in 1990 the Gaviria government promised that social
expenditures would reach 22.5 percent of GDP by 1993 (UN doc.
E.CN.4/1994/NGO/34 para,3d). However, social spending actual dec1ined during
this period, accounting for between eight and nine percent of total expenditures
(DANE cited in Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: 16). As aresult, Colombia's
state expenditure of eight USD per capita is one of the lowest in Latin America
(UN doc. E.CN.4/1994/NG0/34 para.4c). Spending on healthcare accounted for
1.7 percent of the GDP or about half of the UNDP's recumiended leveL. UNICEF
estimated that only 60 percent of Colombians had access to healthcare between
1988 and 1993 (UNICEF 1995: 71, Table 3). DANE found that 80 percent of
persons living below the poverty line had no health insurance (DANE cited in
Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: 16).
The right of everyone to work and the enjoyment of just and
favourable working conditions
Artic1e 25 of the constitution states "all persons have the right to a job in fair and
dignified conditions". The World Bank estimates there are 20 million persons of
working age in Colombia (World Bank 1994: 210, Table 25). Official
unemployment in the formal sector fluctuated between 10 and 12 percent during
the four years of the Gaviria administration, dipping to a low of 7.8 percent in
December, 1993. These figures do not accurately reflect the situation in rural
areas, the instance of under-employment, which effects 15.5 percent of formal
sector workers, or involuntary partime or temporary work, which effects 18
percent of workers (Fedesarrollo, No.9, 1994).
DANE estimated that 52 percent of the Colombian workforce was employed in the
informal sector in 1994 (DANE, cited in Caja de Herramientas, August 1994: 16).
Informal sec tor work can inc1ude selling items in the street or piece work done in
the home. Persons in the informal sector often are not inc1uded in offcial statistics
and do not receive the same benefits or wages as workers in the formal sector,
inc1uding the protection of labour legislation and social security. The minimum
wage is set annually by government decree in consultation with business and
unions, The 1994 minimum wage was 99,000 pesos a month, or approximately
USDI25. The minimum wage has been consistently established below the rate of
inflation, losing seven percent of its real earning power over the four years of the
Gaviria administration (Fedesarrollo, No.9, 1994), Unions walked out of
negotiations to establish the 1994 wage to protest the dec1ine in the real value of
salaries.
In 1993 22 percent of workers in the formal sector earned below the minimum
wage, and approximately sixty percent earned below two minimum wages which
is considered near the poverty line requirement for a family of four. Figures for
peasant farmers and persons in the informal sec tor were not available. However,
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the instance of poverty is considerably higher in these sectors. Fifty percent of
workers in the formal sector do not have social security benefits, such as health
insurance or pension. Work also appears to be unstable. Twenty-five percent of
employees in larger firms and 37 percent in micro-enterprises had been in their
jobs less than one year in 1992 (Fedesarrollo, No.9, 1994).
The right to education
Artic1es 44, 64, 67, 68, 69 and 70 guarantee broad education rights, inc1uding
universal education for children, religious education, bilngual education for
indigenous groups and training for workers.
In 1993 expenditures on education were three percent of the GDP. The
constitution provides for paralleI public and private education, The UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights points out that 60 percent of education
occurs within the private system (UN doc. E/C. 12/1991/SR. 17 para,50). According
to the Colombian representative to the committee, these are for-profit institutions
and exist "because the Colombian state does not have the resources to provide free
education to the entire population" (UN doc. E/C.12/1991/SR.18 paras.55-56).
Effectively, therefore, Colombia has a two tiered system where the quality of
education often depends on the ability of familes to pay, The situation is
particularly difficult for a "large portion of rural and indigenous (and black)
children (who) have been economically marginalized and have limited or no access
to adequate education..." (UN doc, CRC/C/15/Add.15 para.8).
Public system teachers report they are paid poorly and of ten are the target of
threats and harassment. For example, the Federación Colombiana de Educadores
(Colombian Federation of Teachers; FECODE) reports 47 teachers were
assassinated between 1991 and 1992, and more than 400 others received death
threats (UN doc, E/CN .4/1992/30 para, 109). Education in zones of conflct is often
interrupted by violence, and human rights workers report that it is not uncommon
to find children who have little or no education, particularly among children who
are internally displaced.
These statistics provide an overview of the economic situation and some of the
most important economic, social and cultural rights. As reported to the UN
Commission on Human Rights, they "tend to prove that poverty is constantly
increasing despite improved marcoeconomic indices '.. and show that the social
situation is steadily deteriorating as the disparities in the redistribution of income
are increasing" (UN doc. E.CN.4/1994/NGO/34 para.6d).
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6. Pacts of autonomy and pacts of impunity
Chapter 6 wil consider the mechanisms which allow the paradox of democracy
and systematic human rights violations to exist. The period under review in
Chapter 6 wil be 1970 to December, 1994, encompassing the "Dirty War" to the
first months of the Presidency of Ernesto Samper Pizano. During this period
interests mutually held by the civilian elite and the military establishment were
increasingly under threat from growing opposition in civil society. As aresult,
maintaining the political system has required two new civilian elite-Public Forces
pacts: (i) a pact of autonomy for the military which allows them to pursue
commonly held civilian elite-Public Forces interests; and (ii) a pact of impunity
which allows the Public Forces to avoid accountability for their role in systematic
human rights violations.
As noted in Chapter 1.5, the two new pacts are fundamentally anti-democratic and
reinforce the anti-democratic aspects of the original National Front elite pact. They
are political agreements between the civilian elites and the establishment of the
Public Forces. The institutional mechanisms which gave the two pacts force are
entrenched in: (i) the Colombian Constitutions of 1886 and 1991; (ii) state of
emergency powers; (iii) reforms to the Colombian legal system which make state
of emergency decrees related to intern al security a permanent part of ordinary law
and, therefore, extend emergency powers to periods of normal constitutional
governance; and (iv) the military justice system. This study argues that the pacts
effectively neutralize the democratic characteristics of the Colombian polity. As
a result, "force has become a fundamental part of the politicalorder" (Restrepo
1992: 287),
Comparisons can be drawn between the use of formal constitutional and legal
mechanisms in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin AmerIca. Entrenching the power
of former authoritarian actors in the constitutional and legal framework of the
post-transition polit Y compromises the ability of new civilian governments to
consolidate democratIc governance. "New democratic governments, therefore, mus t
seek to eliminate (or at least contain) authoritarian enc1aves on the one hand, while
initiating the process of consolidation on the other" (Garetón 1995: 147).
6.1 Pacts of autonomy
To explain the origins, rationale and implications of the elite pact of autonomy
between the civilian government and the Colombian Public Forces both national
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and international factors must be considered.
The national con text.
Nationally, the analytical and empirical framework in previous chapters has
established the dual nature of Colombian democracy. Chapter 5 demonstrated that
Colombia has a formal liberal democracy and one of the most advanced systems
for the protection and promotion of human rights in Latin America. At the same
time, Chapter 5 presented empirical evidence to demonsträte that the Colombian
state, through its Public Forces, is the main actor responsible for the political
violence and human rights violations. The roots of the paradox lie in the
Colombian state's crisis of legitimacy, the institutionalization of the historical
constants outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 through the National Front elite pact and
the extension of those constants into the contemporary polity. Chapters 1.5, 2.7
and 3 also argued that the militar is the subordinate parner in a civilian elite-
Public Forces alliance designed to maintain the political system in the face of
growing new challengers ' opposition. While military autonomy continues to grow
the subordinate dynamic of that relationship continued into the 1990s,
To complete this information, this study wil briefly review the overall strategy
employed by the civilian government and the Public Forces to contain new
challengers and maintain the political system. The levels of political violence in
Colombia have remained relatively constant since 1958, causing some Colombian
historians to question if the Violence really ende d or simply moved into a new
phase (Sánchez 1992: 114). However, what has changed is the strategic
framework, or model of repression, used by the civilian elite-Public Forces alliance
to maintain the political system. Changes in the model have been conditioned by:
(i) the evolution of new challengers; and (ii) the ideological deve10pment of the
definition of "internal security" employed by the military. It is necessary to briefly
consider the changes in this strategy as they provide the context for both the pacts
of autonomy and impunity.
Since 1958, succes sive Colombian governments have perceived legitimate social
protest arising from the crisis of the state as a threat to the state itself. They
responded with a combination of armed force and legal repression through state
of emergency powers:
(i) In the 1970s, civilian governments relied on legal measures to control social
protest, repeatedly invoking state of emergency rule. Extraordinary powers were
used extensively to detain political activists, and 60,325 political prisoners were
reported between 1970 and 1979. These persons predominantly belonged to legal
trade unions, opposition political parties, human rights organizations, social
workers, peasant and indigenous organizations (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/111
para.25). Torture was reported to accompany detention (LIDERLIP 1990: 16).
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(ii) By the 1980s, the use of extraordinary legal mechanisms appeared to be
insufficient to control opposition. Colombia moved into a period know n as the
"dirty war". According to the Representative of the UN Secretary-General for
Internally Displaced Persons, "the dirty war denotes the selective extermination of
left-wing political activists, such as members of the (Patriotic Union), trade
unionists, members of popular and human rights organizations, teachers etc." (UN
doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.l para,25.). Legal repression through extraordinary
powers continued. However, it was combined with the use of armed force,
including the creation of paramilitary groups. The shift instrategy is reflected in
statistics from the period. While the number of political prisoners during the 1980s
dedined to 21,000, the instance of extra-judicial kilings increased from 1,053 in
the 1970s to almost 13,000 between 1980 and 1989 (LIDERLIP 1990: 16).
(iii) In October, 1994, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General found that
"...the dirty war has not yet subsided" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/50/Add,1 para.25).
Human rights violations committed by agents of the state occurred in the con text
of a "total war" or "integrated war" strategy. Total war is designed to bring the full
legal, political, economic, rhetorical and miltary weight of the state to bear against
the states legal and arme d opponents. It combines repression (through force or
legal means) with economic measures and incentives, propaganda and an
international campaign. The victims of abuses are stil politically unaffiiated
persons living in zones of conflct or members of legal organizations critical of the
government. By circumstances of where they live, or by their participation in
legitimate political activity , victims become "part of the enemy" . The Prosecutor
General refers to this form of counter-insurgency as "removing the water from the
fish" (Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994: 47).
The international context
This study does not consider that the security doctrines adopted by the Colombian
military were externally imposed by the United States or any other outside power.
In many respects, Colombia has often maintained its independence from the US,
particularly in security matters related to the drug trade. However, international
tensions arising from the Cold War and the consequent implementation of the
Doctrine of National Security in Latin America played an important role in the
ideological development of Colombia's own internal security policy (Blair Trujilo
1993: 90-97).
Since World War Il, Colombian foreign policy has been characterized by a dose
relationship to the United States. In 1951 Colombia was the only Latin American
country to send troops to support the United States in the Korean war. In this way
Colombia showed its wilingness to "defend the strategic interests as well as the
values of Western democracy" (Sánchez 1992: 88), The military relationship
between Colombia and the Unites States was formalized by Colombia's adherence
to various bilateral and regional treaties and security arrangements which bound
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the nations of Latin America to a collective security arangement against
"communist" intervention (Loveman and Davies 1989: 163).
Colombia was among the first countries to join in a hemispheric security
framework designed by the United States, including the Tratado Interamericano
de Asistencia Recíproca (Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; TIAR),
the socalled Río Pact of 1945. In 1952 Colombia and the United States signed the
Pacto de Asistencia Militar (Military Assistance Agreement; P AM) and Colombia
becomes the cite of the first Latin American counter-insurgency training school
(Pearce 1990: 63). Through a series of US sponsored Inter-American conferences
Conferencias de Ejércitos Americanos (Conferences for American Armies; CEM)
a common anti-Communist ideology among Latin American armed forces was
developed and consolidated in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution (Pearce
1990: 63).
In the 1950s the Colombian military also started to receive arms from the United
States for use in its war against internal subversion (Blair Trujillo 1993: 91),62
and a growing number of officers were being trained by the US itself.63 During
the 1970s and the 1980s Colombia was the second largest recipient of US military
62 Between 1961 and 1967, Colombia received USD 60 milion from the US in military
assistance for counter-insurgency and "economic development", all administered by the
army, and a further USD 100 million in military equipment (Pearce 1990: 63).
63 Between 1950 and 1963 an annual average of 250 Colombian militaries were trained in US
military schools. Between 1964 and 1970 the average number increased to more than 300
per year (Leal Buitrago 1989: 251). In the Escuela de las Américas (School of the
Americas) in Panamá, the United States were responsible for the training of 45,331 Latin
American military officials between 1946 and 1984. Colombia ranks second in Latin
America in having military personnel trained in that school, 4,593 until 1984, 100 less than
Somoza's Nicaragua (Reyes Echandía, "Legislación y Seguridad Nacional en América
Latina" , Revista Cemla, del Centro de Estudios Militares de America Latina, No. 2,
December 1985, cited in Ruiz 1993: 15). Between 1987 and 1990, in Fort Benning, Georgia
(US), 2,031 Colombian militaries were trained in counter-insurgency strategies, placing
Colombia as the Latin American country with the highest num ber of militaries trained in
that school (Department of the Army, United States Army School of the Americas, Fort
Benning, Georgia, Student Projections 1987-1990, cited in Ruiz 1993: 16),
In 1963, US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara explained to a House Appropriations
Committee: Probably the greatest return on our military-assistance investment comes from
the training of selected offcers and key specialists at our military schools and training
centers in the United States and overseas. These students are hand-picked by their countries
to become instructors when they return home, They are the coming leaders, the men who
wil have the know-how and impart it to their forces. I need not dwell upon the value of
having in positions of leadership men who have firsthand knowledge of how Americans do
things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make friends of such men. (Emphasis
added). (US House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations
Appropriations for 1963, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., Part I, p. 359, quoted in Lernoux
1991: 163-164).
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aid in Latin America (Bustamante 1989: 18), and the high levels of assistance
have continued in the 1990s as a result of the war on drugs. Therefore, the
professionalization of the Colombian militar was largely subsidized by the US.
This allowed Colombia to "car out (militar) professionalization without
experiencing debilitating conflict between the militar and the government over
the allocation of economic resources" as occurred in many other Latin American
countries (Bustamante 1989: 18).
High levels of military assistance, interaction with Latin American dictatorships
through common security arrangements and domestic events made the Colombian
military "highly receptive" to the dominant ideology of the period related to
internal and collective security; the National Security Doctrine. The National
Security Doctrine became the explicit manifestation of the anti-Communist
ideology, and counter-insurgency warfare became the Latin American expression
of the Cold War. The National Security Doctrine was first developed in Brazil at
the Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College; ESG) and gained force
domestically and through the US redefinition of the concept of security.64
By 1976 Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Perú and Uruguay had
installed National Security military regimes, In contrast, Colombia maintained
civilian rule. However, both civilian and military elites adopted the National
Security Doctrine and the US designed counter-insurgency strategy to. combat
intern al subversion (Leal Buitrago 1989: 249-256). As one minister, Rafael
Hernández, expressed in a speech to the Armed Forces: "the principle enemy of
Colombia and the armed forces is the internal enemy, dominated by a foreign
imposed Marxist ideology, which threatens the existence of Western Civilization"
(Revista Fuerzas Armadas No.6, 1961, p.621, cited in Blair Trujilo 1993: 95).
It is misleading, therefore, to argue that the US imposed a given security ideology
on Colombia. While the external actors influence the ideological reorientation of
Colombian security policy, the National Security Doctrine found fertile ground in
military institutions and Colombian civilian elites who were threatened by growing
social discontent (Blair Trujilo 1993: 116). The results of the doctrine are seen
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The National Security Doctrine is based on the idea that the enemy of national sovereign ty
was no longer an external enemy, but an enemy within the nation. The internal enemy was
groups or persons who attempt to change the dominant structure of power. Military
intervention was, therefore, considered necessary to guarantee the survival of the values of
Western Christian democracy (Reyes Echandía 1991: 145). To defend Christian values it is
necessary to sustain "a permanent war that is fought on all levels; economic, military,
political, and psychological ..." According to the doctrine "the most dangerous expression of
the new strategy of international communism is the revolutionary war. When confronted by
communist penetration, (that) represents the destruction of the basic moral foundations from
which the Western and Christian civilization derive ... society is under the obligation of
drastic self-defense" (Blair Trujilo 1993: 111-112).
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in the implementation of Dirty War tactics in the 1970s and 1980s. One reason for
continued civilian rule and militar subordination to civilian power was the fact
that both elite groups had a similar perspective. A coup, therefore, was
unnecessary and a large part of the militar establishment held to the historical
principle of non interference in political matters (Blair Trujilo 1993: 181).
6.1.1 Mechanisms for military autonomy
In the years following the National Front agreement, the militar gradually
assumed public and internal security functions in a series of incremental steps
(Bustamante 1989: 20).65 Consequently, what were formerly political issue under
civilian authority increasingly became defined as military problems which required
a militar solution. According to Marc Chernic "the formal arrangement of elite
cooperation developed through the National Front accords, the methods of
incorporation of middle and popular sectors, as well as the systematic practice of
marginalizing and repressing alternative forms of political organization resemble
the patterns of dominance found in certain authoritarian regimes." (Quoted in
WOLA 1989: 15).
The militar was given growing autonomy to restore "public order", which led to
a progressive militarization of the structures of Colombia's democratic institutions
(WOLA 1989: 15-16):
(i) the central government appointed military officer to gubernorial or mayoral in
regions of conflct;
(ii) regional civilian authorities were instructed to consult with militar
commanders on all internal security and public order issues, This led to the
militarization of local government and public administration;
(iii) the virtually permanent state of siege described in this chapter further gave
the military the means to impose their views with increasing frequency over local
civilian government;
65 Colombian journalist and historian Arturo Alape describes the evolving relationship between
the civilian govemments and the military during the 1960s and 1970s as follows: "It is
evident, that during these presidential periods, violence of a political character has deepened,
becoming an element of strong influence in daily life All types of activities are
contaminated, in a tense atmosphere where violence breathes in its distinct manifestations.
This element has created a dependency - in some instances more profound that others -
between the government and the armed forces. It could be said that this relationship is like
an umbilical cord, necessary and definitive to sustain and defend the stabil it y of the
institutions." (Alape 1985: 353).
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(iv) in jurisdictional conflcts the central government almost invariably supported
the armed forces;
(v) the militar's influence over the administration of justice grew as a result of
a jurisdiction expansion of the areas governed by militar law;
(vi) the military also acquired a significant measure of controlover education, by
establishing so-called military academies which were secondar schools modeled
after Colombian military schools and under the direction of the Defense Ministry
(Bustamante 1989: 21-22).
These measures reflect the deepening of the military' s presence in Colombian
society and politics beyond simple matters of public safety. According to one
human rights observer "the militar' s structure is more coherent than the
government's and they probably have a better idea of what is going on in the
country than any politician".66 However, they were undertaken at the initiative
of civilian politicians as a matter of policy rather than under the threat of military
intervention. Consequently, the militarization of the structures of government did
not appear as an erosion of the national government' sauthority. In spite of their
greater autonomy, the military remained subordinate to the politicalorder
established by the Liberal and Conservative parties (Bustamante 1989: 21).
6.1.2 State of emergency
Since April 9, 1948 every Colombian president has resorted to emergency powers
to deal with actual or perceived crisis during his administration. Consequently
Colombia has been governed almost uninterruptedly since 1948 under a state of
emergency. This authority derived from the Article 121 of the 1886 Constitution,
which provided that in case of war or internal commotion, the President could
declare a state of siege, suspend laws deemed "incompatible" with the situation,
and issue decree laws to deal with the crisis. Artic1e 121 and its subsequent
amendments provided for very limited checks on the exercise of emergency
powers. The president needed only to dec1are a state of siege and obtain the
written consent of each minister before the dec1aration could go into effect
(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1994: Note 14),
Under the continually renewed states of siege since the creation of the National
Front, the military acquired criminal jurisdiction over crimes of subversion. The
National Police were incorporated into the Armed Forces under the control of the
Minister of Defense, leaving Colombia without any security force responsible to
66 Interview, Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación (National Plan for Rehabilitaion; PNR), Bogotá,
4 October, 1994.
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civilian authority. Military power reached its zenith during the Turbay
administration (1978-1982) with the Security Statute (decree 1923 of 1978) which
expanded military authority and severely restricted civil and political rights.
Americas Watch in a 1982 report conc1uded that "when President Betancur (1982-
86) began his administration two Colombias existed side by side: a functioning
democracy and a militarized society in which human rights are grossly abused"
(Americas Watch 1982: 3).
The last period of emergency rule under the Constitution.of1886 (1984.;91) ended
with the ratification of a new constitution on July 9, 1991. However, the initial
normal constitutional government was short lived, President Gaviria dec1ared a
State of Internal Upheaval on July 12, 1992, and on four subsequent occasions
during his administration. President Samper has refrained from dec1aring an
emergency during his first months in office. However, public order laws passed
by the Gaviria administration remain in effect.
State of emergency provisions are, in effect, Colombia's second or hidden
constitution. The habitual use of emergency powers on the part of succes sive
Colombian governments demonstrates a lack of wil to respect democratic process
and pursue policy related to security and public order within the norms defined by
the country's constitution. This creates a situation of "civil dictatorship" which has
become "the principle mechanism for neutralizing the human rights (guarantees)
established in the constitution" (Gustavo Gallon as quoted in Justicia y Paz, Vo1.6,
No.2 1993, p.7).
Chapter 6 of the 1991 Constitution provides for government under Estado de
Excepción (state of emergency). The artic1es distinguish between Estado de
Guerra Exterior (Artic1e 212, State of External War) and Estado de Conmoción
Interior (Artic1e 213, Internal Upheaval). The President may declare a State of
Internal Upheaval for an initial period of 90 days, with the possibility of renewal
for two succes sive 90 day periods subject to approval of the Senate, Artic1es 213-
215 grant the President sweeping powers to legislate by decree and "suspend laws
incompatible with the State of Internal Upheaval". These decrees can remain in
effect for 90 days after the emergency is lifted (Artic1e 213), providing for a
maximum period of emergency rule of 360 days. However, there is nothing in the
constitution which prevents a government from declaring a new State of Internal
Upheaval one day after an old dec1aration has lapsed. Under the old constitution
emergencies could be dec1ared for an indefinite period (Article 121, 1886
Constitution),
Former President Gaviria dec1ared a State of Internal Upheaval on the following
occaSlOns:
On July 12, 1992, a State of Internal Upheaval was dec1ared to prevent the release
of L ,200 persons charged under terrorism laws. The majority of these persons were
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not associated with a guerrila or drug organization, but were members of legal
political and social opposition groups. In this case, emergency rule was used to
suspend the right of Habeas Corpus as guaranteed by Artic1e 30 of the 1991
Constitution.
On November 8,1992, following formal breakdown ofpeace negotiations between
the government and the FARC and ELN on October 31. The imposition of
emergency rule was accompanied by a Presidential dec1aration of Guerra Total
(total war) or Guerra Integral (integrated war) against the guerrilas and drug
traffickers, Gaviria introduced at least 40 new public order or "anti-terrorist"
decrees. In particular, legal organizations suspected of aiding the guerrilas were
targeted for investigation and legal sanctions.
The November, 1992, emergency dec1aration was renewed by the Senate, on the
request of the President, for the maximum two additional terms and expired in
August, 1993, State of emergency decrees remained in effect for a further 90 days.
In May, 1994 a State of Internal Upheaval was again dec1ared to prevent the
release of hundreds of prisoners detained under public order laws. The dec1aration
was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court which found that
emergency powers could not be used to compensate for inefficiencies in the
judicial system.
The 1991 Constitution specifies that a State of Internal Upheaval may only be
declared in the event of "grave disturbance which poses an immediate threat to the
institutional stability or security of the state, together with the citizens, that can not
be resolved through the ordinary powers of the police" (Artic1e 213). However,
there is a consensus among human rights observers, in Colombia and the
international community, that the situation has not warranted the use of emergency
powers as described by the constitution. For example, the Interamerican
Commission for Human Rights of the OAS reported that Gaviria's use of
emergency powers was "of concern ... both in terms of their legal justification and
the restrictions created on fundamental rights", This is particularly the case in the
use of the dec1aration of a State of Internal Upheaval to avoid the release of
persons held under anti-terrorism laws. "It does not appear that gaining a legal
advantage against the accused (persons) constitutes a grave disturbance of public
order" (CIDH 1993: 56-58). According to the human rights organization, the José
Alvear Restrepo Lawyer' s Collective, "in our judgement, the grave circumstances
required by the constitution (for a dec1aration of Internal Upheval) do not exist"
(Corporación Colectivo de Abogados 1994: 4),
State of emergencies provisions often appear to contradict human rights guarantees
provided in the constitution and under international agreement. The message to
civil society is that the state is unprepared to live within its own rules. AIso, while
the emphasis of legal reform has targeted groups which challenge the state, the
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justice system seems unable to reduce rampant common c rime ,
6.1.3 Making the state of emergency permanent
The President has the option of presenting decrees made under a state of
emergency to Congress for consideration as legislation. If approved, the decrees
become part of ordinar law. The effect is to make aspects the a state of
emergency permanent even during periods of normal constitutional government.
According to the People's Defender, Dr. Jaime Córdoba Triviño, "this is nothing
less than prolonging by subterfuge the state of legal abnormality" (Cordoba
Triviño as quoted in Amnesty International AMR 23/01/94: 32).
The majority of the State of Internal Upheaval decrees enacted during the Gaviria
administration have been approved as legislation and are par of the ordinary
judicial system. Between 1965 and 1987 persons accused of political crimes were
tried under the military justice system. This practice was dec1ared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in 1987 and is forbidden in the 1991 Constitution. Then
President Barco responded with a series of exceptional public order and anti-
terrorist measures made under the 1984-91 State of Emergency. The decrees
lapsed when the emergency was lifted in 1991. However, they subsequently
became the basis of the Gaviria administration's Nuevo Código de Procedimiento
Penal (Code of Criminal Procedures), which was passed as legislation in
November, 1991, and is now part of ordinary law. The Code was expanded
throughout Gaviria's term in office, notably when many emergency decrees made
after the dec1aration of "total war" in November, 1992, became law in 1993.
The stated intention of Barco's original decrees and Gaviria's Code of Criminal
Procedure was to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Colombian judicial
system to respond to political violence, increase the conviction rate of "terrorist
and narco-terrorist" offenses and protect members of the judiciary from reprisaIs.
Extraordinary measures are not unwarranted given the frequent attacks made
against police and judicial officials, inc1uding assassinations, by the drug cartels
in the late 1980s. However, the code institutionalizes some of the worst aspects
of emergency laws issued under prior succes sive states of siege and has a much
broader application. It "impinges on basic due process rights guaranteed under the
Colombian Constitution", undermines the authority of the Colombian judiciary to
safeguard basic human rights and pre serve the rule of law" and "creates norms and
procedures that violate fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution
of Colombia,.." (CIDH 1993: 65).
One of the cornerstones of the new penal code are tribunales regionales (public
order courts) which are mandated to try "terrorist and narco-terrorist" offenses,
Under court procedures the identity of the judge (juéz sin rostro ) and the
prosecutor are secret. The identity of witnesses is secret and the possibility of
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meaningful cross-examination by the defense is extremely limited. Evidence is also
secret and can not be challenged in court or reviewed by the defense. Defendants
can be hel d for extended periods without trial which may result in their effectively
serving a prison term without actually being convicted. Defense counsel is unable
to challenge the Prosecutor' s decision to imprison the accused and members of the
armed forces may investigate cases and gather evidence. This is in violation of
Artic1e 213 of the constitution but formalizes the practice in many parts of
Colombia where the militar is the strongest government presence.
Rather than prosecuting drug traffckers or guerrilas, the public order courts are
used to repress civil organizations. During 1993 the National Penal System
recorded a total of 30,000 detention. More than L 0,000 of the se were persons
accused of offenses under the public order system (Comisión Andina de Juristas
1994). It is estimated that only six percent of the persons prosecuted in recent
years were drug dealers or members of a guerrila organization. The remaining 94
percent had no political affiliation or were identified with legal organizations and
prosecuted on the basis of their participation in open and legal activities, such as
a union strike, Unions, peasant organizations and political parties are common
targets (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1994: 21).
Human rights groups refer to this form of political intolerance as a
"criminalization of social protest" or "judicialization of internal conflct" which
constitutes "no less than a dismantling of the rule of law". A study by the Andean
Commission of Jurists conducted during 1993-94 found that "the grand majority
of detainees should not be under the jurisdiction of a secret judge" as the charges
against them can not be substantiated or did not constitute a terrorism offense
(Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994).
The procedures and use of the public order courts constitute a significant
politicization of the justice system which easily lends itself to abuse. According
to Amnesty International "terrorism" can now mean "anyone who is opposed to
the government" (Amnesty International AMR 23/01194: 32), The Andean
Commission of Jurists conc1udes the courts "are simply a means of exercising a
form of legal repression against sectors of society, who, for their inconformity, are
considered enemies of the established order" (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994).
The US based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights called the system "cynical"
reflecting the "State's desire to repress political opposition and social protest on
the pretext of combatting terrorism and narcotics trafficking" (Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights 1994: 21).
Human rights organizations point out other problems. The armed forces can
effectively capture who they want without respect for normal judicial process or
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Decree 1820 of 1992 give the miltary the
powers of the judicial police, even though Art 213 of the constitution specifically
states that civilians may not be investigated or judged by the military. Persons are
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detained on the basis of falsified evidence or unsubstantiated and unsigned
"intelligence" reports. This often occurs to cover for an ilegal arrest. Evidence is
frequently given by questionable witnesses, such as paid informants, persons
alleged be to members of paramilitary groups which are cooperating with the
military or cases of personal revenge. The defense has no means of establishing
the motive of the witness.
6.2 Pacts of impunity
Impunity in Colombia is almost absolute. The rate of impunity in alleged cases of
human rights violations is estimated to be between 97 and 99 percent.67 There
are, therefore, almost no cases where judicial sanctions have been applied to deter
agents of the state from committing human rights violations. The high instance of
impunity has been extensively documented over decades by reputable national and
international organizations, various Rapporteurs within the UN Human rights
system and by the governments own human rights agencies (UN doc.
E/CN.4/1995/111 para, 77, 92; Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 2). The
problem was also recently acknowledged at the level of the state by both
Presidents Gaviria and Samper.68
Previous chapters have argued that the polit Y established by the 1958 National
Front and the civilian elite-Public Forces allance has resulted in gross and
systematic human rights violations, Such violations seem unlikely in a situation
of democratic governance built on the defining elements of democracy presente d
in Chapter 1.3. Specifically, under the principles of the rule of law and
accountability agents of the state responsible for such violations should be
sanctioned and, therefore, deterred by the judicial system from committing future
violations. Gross and systematic human rights violations which occur as the
consequence of state policy, and on the scale which exists in Colombia, are most
likely to be committed where agents of the state are shielded from the legal
consequences of their actions; a situation of impunity,
Based on the empirical evidence presented in previous chapters it can be implied
that there is a tacit agreement between dominant elements of the Colombian
civilian elites and the military establishment which allows impunity to exist as part
67 This figure is based on recent reports of the Colombian Prosecutor General and varIous
Colombian human rights organizations (Comisión Andina de Juristas 1994: 1-3).
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In his inaugura1 speech President Samper stated "our policy of peace wil on1y be successful
when we have improved the administration of justice and won the battle against impunity.
Impunity is a major cause of vIolence ... when agents of the state vIo1ate the law they wil
be punished" (Ernesto Samper Pizano, El tiempo de la gente, Bogotá, August, 1994).
97
of implementing a larger internal security policy (LIDERLIP 1991: 25-55).69
Such a conc1usion is supported by the findings of numerous human rights bodies,
official and non governmental, who allege that impunity occurs primarily as a
result of the lack of political wil on the part of the civilian government to
pro sec ute agents of the state alleged to have commtted violations (Comisión
Andina de Juristas 1994: 1-4). For example, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture commented "it does not appear that the government has taken serious
measures or shown the political wil to end impunity ... (the government has) no
excuse for allowing human rights violations nor their perpetuation through
impunity" (UN doc, E/CN.4119941111 para, 106). Americas Watch furtherreported
that "impunity is a result of the lack of political wil on the par of the Colombian
government to end political violence and ... (it) continues to threaten the
Colombians despite the new instruments in the Constitution of 1991 which protect
and promote human rights" (Americas Watch 1992: 142).
6.2.1 The miltary justiee system
The legal mechanisms which allow impunity to occur are found within the
framework of the Colombian justice system. Under Artic1e 221 of the Constitution
of 1991 all crimes or disciplinary infractions committed by members of the Public
Forces "while in active service" are tried under the fuero militar (military justice
system), Under this definition, human rights violations are considered an "act of
service" and fall under the jurisdiction of the military courts. In turn, the military
system has become the principle mechanism for permitting impunity (UN doc.
E.CN.4/1995/111 para.87-107). The Prosecutor General recently informed the UN
Rapporteur on Torture that "the militar justice system has shown itself entirely
ineffective in trying and convicting members of the State Defense and Security
bodies responsible for ... violations (UN doc. E.CN.4119951111 para. 92) and in
a letter to the Colombian Senate the Prosecutor confirmed that impunity within the
military system was "1 00 percent" .
Human rights organizations point to the many inconsistencies within the military
system which lend themselves to abuse:
(i) The judge of first instance is the commanding officer of the accused (Tztulo ll,
Segundo Libro del Código Penal Militar). Within the militar hierarchy this
officer is also responsible for the conduct of the accused and, in fact, may be the
person who gave the order for the abuse to be committed. The militar system
69 This statement must be qualified by acknowledging that there are important groups within
the state apparatus who actively oppose impunity, including persons who hold elected
position and agents of the state. This study acknowledges the real actions and commitment
of these persons. However, attempts to end impunity have been consistently blocked by an
allance between more powerful civilian and military elite factions.
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also functions under the principle of due obedience which compels soldiers to
carry out all orders under threat of disciplinary action (Artic1e 217 of the
Constitution of 1991). The trial judge, therefore, may be both judge and defendant
at the same time and there is no separation of the justice system from the
military's operational chain of command;
(ii) Trials are effectively c10sed to civilian oversight or participation, inc1uding
intervention from other government agencies such as the Prosecutor General or the
People' sDefender;
(iii) There are no c1ear definitions of military crimes related to human rights
violations;
(iv) There are extreme limitations placed on the military judicial process which
effect both militar and non militar investigations, These limitations may be
practical in nature owing to the isolation of many regions where violations occur.
However, the Prosecutor General, in a report to the European Community and
many other observers conc1ude that the current system also encourages an "esprit
de corps" which protects military officials from any serious judicial penalties for
their actions. "This protection is effective in almost all cases because of the fuero
militar" (Asociación SETA 1993). The Prosecutor General also reports that
"evidence is frequently concealed (by the military) or attempts are made to divert
investigations". Once a decision has been made by the military courts, "which
frequently hurry to try a case and hand down a favourable decision", the accessed
"enjoys the principle of res juridica and a new review of the case can not be
made" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/111 paras. 98-99);
(v) Finally, "fear of further violence prevents victims and witnesses from taking
legal action" (E/CN.4/1995/111 para.78). Human rights organizations c1aim that
wItnesses and the families of human rights victims are commonly intimidated by
the military, inc1uding being subjected to human rights violations themselves, to
ensure that they do not take legal action.70
There is no question of the actual efficiency of the military justice system.
Offenses related to disciplinary infractions are punished quickly and severely.
Between January, 1992, and May, 1994, military courts made decisions in a total
of 4304 cases of which 4103 decisions related to disciplinary offenses (El
Espectador, 9 October 1994). However, the Colombian Public Ministry reports
that, between January, 1992 and May, 1994, 90 percent of the cases in which
military judicial proceedings were halted, or where the accused was absolved,
related to crimes committed by members of the public forces against civilians. The
Colombian Supreme Court has criticized the systematic use of the "lack of
70 Interview, Justicia y Paz, Bogotá, September 1993.
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definitive proof' as a rational to dismiss military judicial proceedings (Asociación
SETA 1993: 59). Taken in the context of the existence of extensive legal
mechanism to protect human rights, the empirical evidence further suggests a lack
of political wil at all levels of the system to end impunity. "Thus Colombia
c1early fails to ful fil its obligations under international law to ... punish those
responsible" (UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/111 para,107.).
The Prosecutor General may investigate human rights violations and apply
administrative sanctions. The maximum sanction is dismissaL.The Delegate for
Human Rights of the Prosecutor General' s office estimates a 30-40 percent success
rate in pro sec uting violations in cases where there are investigations, although the
Delegate noted that only a small percentage of reported cases actually conc1ude
with an investigation.71 As a res ult, it may be said that there are "relative levels
of impunity in Colombia" (UN doc, E/CN.4/1995/111 para. 78),72 However, the
Prosecutor General reports "in many cases, the decisions of the military justice
system are in open contradiction to the decisions of the Prosecutor, under which
circumstances disciplinary sanctions lose much of their dissuasive power
(Procuradurza General de la Nación 1993: 17), Colombian law provides no means
of reconciling inconsistent decisions and the Article 9 of the Military Penal Code
specifies that no person may be tried two times for the same offence.73
Impunity and the military justice system have been the target of extensive national
and international criticism. The key issue is the legal and moral definition of the
7l Interview with the Delegate for Human Rights of the Prosecutor General's Office, Bogotá,
October 1994.
72 Applying administrative sanctions has an important moral value in the absence of penal
sanctions. However, such sanctions rarely correspond with the seriousness of the crime in
question.
73 In one well known case, a military court acquitted Lieutenant Colonel Luis Filipe Becerra
Bohórquez of the massacre of 13 peasants at Rio Frio in October, 1993. The military
claimed the peasants were members of a guerrila gro up and were killed in combat.
Subsequent investigations by the Prosecutor General and a separate commission of national
and international human rights organizations concluded the peasants were not guerrillas and
that the military had invented the story to cover their actions, After the Prosecutor's
investigation Becerra was dismissed from the military. However, no further action was taken
against him. Becerra had also been investigated by the Prosecutor General for organizing
two earlier massacres of 20 banana workers in the Honduras and La Negra plantations on
March 4, 1988, Urabá, Antioquia. The military offcers who participated in the Urabá
massacre were tried by military courts. Then Major Becerra, was supposed to be under
arrest between August 31, 1988 and December 7, 1989, and again after August 17, 1990,
pursuant to warrants issued by the Public Order Court and later by the Appellate Public
Order TribunaL. Nonetheless, Becerra was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, attended a course
in the United States when he should have been in custody, and was subsequently transferred
to the Department of Public Relations (E-5) at the General Command of the Army. One
Second Lieutenant and two Corporals who also participated in the massacre were promoted
to respectively Full Lieutenant and to Sergeants (Americas Watch 1992: 14-15).
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concept of "act of service", Human rights organizations maintain that abuses can
not be considered within the concept of public or military service and, therefore,
must be tried under ordinary law. The military and Presidents Samper and Gaviria
have strongly resisted all attempts to try violations allegedly committed by
members of the public forces under civilian jurisdiction. Militar officials c1aim
that only "the interests of the subversives would benefit" from such reforms.74
The debate intensified between June and October, 1994, after Colombia signed the
OAS Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons. The
position taken by the Colombian government reflects its unwilingness to move
decisively to end impunity. Colombia public1y committed itself to supporting the
OAS convention, making no offcial mention that it was considering reservations.
Laws related to forced disappearance and the convention were ratified by the
Congress and Senate (proyecto de leyes 152 of 1992 and 331 of 1993) in June, but
were vetoed by President Gaviria in the last days of his administration. Aversion
of the law incorporating the changes proposed by Gaviria was presented to the
new Congress by President Samper and ratified on October 4, 1994.
In a letter to the Congress and Senate dated July 6, 1994, Gaviria called the OAS
convention "unconstitutional", He proposed it be ratified with tliree reservations.
Most importantly, Article LX of the convention states that persons accused of
causing a disappearance wil be tried under ordinary law. Processing such charges
under the military justice system is specifically prohibited and causing a
disappearance may not be considered an "act of military service". According to
Gaviria, these provisions conflct with Article 221 of the Colombian constitution
which states that members of the Public Forces can only be tried under military
law.
The People's Defender "does not share the views of the government ... forced
disappearance is a civil crime and can not be tried under the public force's own
jurisdiction... Disappearance is not a crime related to the responsibilities of the
military and police as described by the constitution."75. While two high-ranking
Generals argued in published newspaper artic1es that allowing members of the
Public Forces to be tried in civilian courts would undermine the system of military
discipline, the Prosecutor General told the Senate it "would not modi fy or
undermine the militar system, only c1arify the notion of public service in the light
of the constitution" .76
74 Major General Bonett as quoted in El Tiempo, 3 October, 1994,
75 Letter from the People's Defender to Dr. Juan Guillermo Angel Mejía, President of the
Senate, 29 July, 1994.
76 Letter from Hernando Valencia Vila, Prosecutor Delegate for Human Rights to Dr. Jorge
Ramón Elias Nader, (then) President of the Senate, 12 July, 1994.
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During the 1994 election campaign and the debate over the OAS Convention,
President Samper promised to introduce reforms to the militar justice system
designed to reduce the instance of impunity. He has since specified that any
reforms wil take place in the context of the existing miliar justice system,
effectively leaving the framework of the system itself untouched.
6.3 Some implications of impunity for democratie consolidation in
Colombia and Latin America
Chapter 1.5 noted that there are almost no instances in Latin America where the
persons responsible for human rights violations during the decades of military
dictatorship have been hel d accountable for their actions through the due process
of law. As in Colombia, pacts of impunity were negotiated throughout Latin
America as a condition of transition and subsequently institutionalized in the
civilian polit Y through legal instruments which prevented future prosecution
(Loveman 1994: 115-118). Situations of impunity have significant consequences
for the consolidation of democratic governance as the issue "strikes at the very
heart of the limits and possibilities of transforming the former authoritarian state"
(McSherry 1992: 464).
Impunity represents an "imposed limitation on the transition process itself as well
as on important constitutional aspects of the political system that followed" which
compromises the consolidation process (Love man 1994: 117). The implications of
situations of impunity have not been widely analysed by scholars. However, there
is a body of research which suggests that impunity fundamentally undermines the
process of democratic consolidation by: (i) allowing former authoritarian actors to
retain sufficient political autonomy to condition the actions of democratically
elected civilian regimes; and (ii) placing the institutions and individuals
responsible for past human rights violations above the rule of law, in effect
providing a guarantee against accountability (Loveman 1994: 116-119; McSherry
1992: 463-465).
Echoing these conc1usions, an international tribunal of non governmental
organizations convened in 1992 found that impunity has undermined the process
of the consolidation of democracy in Colombia and Latin America by: (i) leaving
intact the state institutions and structures responsible for human rights violations,
and, therefore, allowing violations to continue; (ii) undermining the rule of law
and the legitimacy of democratic institutions; (iii) destroying public confidence in
the judicial system; (iv) legitimizing, before civil society, conduct which destroys
accepted norms of civilized human behaviour, creating an acceptance of political
violence; and (v) encouraging private justice (LIDERLIP 1991).
At another level, impunity is a highly emotive issue whose implications extend
well beyond the relative democratic value which may or may not exist in formal
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state institutions. Despite the transition to democratic governance the issue of
reconciliation for past human rights violations is stil widely debated in civil
society throughout Latin America, Addressing deeply held and emotional
sentiments in civil society represents the "unfinished business" of democratic
transition. As political, economic, social and cultural factors all interact to create
the environment in which state institutions function, it can be held that allowing
issues of past abuses of power to remain unresolved contributes to the a general
destabilization which hinders consolidation (Garetón 1995: 156-157).
The debate regarding impunity has be en fuelled by recent discoveries in Paraguay,
Chile, Argentina and Brazil whicnindicate that the number of human ngnts
violations which occurred during the years of military dictatorship is significantly
higher than officially recorded (Guardian Weekly, 19 March, 1995). The effect of
the debate has been to provoke a "belated public examination of conscience ... and
open old wounds which have never healed" (Guardian Weekly, 7 May, 1995). For
example, it was revealed that miltary officers in Argentina "consulted the Catholic
Church for a Christian way of eliminating political prisoners" (Guardian Weekly,
8 March, 1995). As a result of this and other revelations, the Church, which was
closely aligned with the Argentine miltary, has called for a public review of its
conduct during the "Dirty War". The decision has reopened old and unresolved
conflcts within the Church, and between the Church and civil society. Commented
one priest, "if there is one thing that is lost in the terror, it is the truth. We acted
without con science and ... now we must face that we were cowards" (Herald
Tribune International, 10 May, 1995). However, the offcial position of the
Government of Argentina is to "forget the past" and no new offcial process of
reconciliation is being considered (Herald Tribune International, 30 April, 1995).
In the case of Colombia, empirical evidence presented throughout this study
suggests that impunity has allowed politically motivated violence to occur.
However, many observers also argue that impunity is a decisive facto r contributing
to the violence which is generalized in society at large. Impunity is not restricted
simply to the instance of human rights violations. Rather, it also occurs in relation
to the prosecution of common crime. In April, 1994, the National Department of
Planning revealed figures which conc1uded "the probability that a (common) crime
wil not culminate in a judicial determination of culpability is 97 percent in
Colombia" (UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NG0/29 para.c). The high levels suggest
a general breakdown of the legal system which is frequently attributed to the lack
of legitimacy of state institutions. In this respect, the Prosecutor General found
that, "the high instance of impunity is a cause and not a consequence of violence"
(Procuradurza General de la Nación 1994: 18).
The effect of impunity is particularly corrosive when it is enjoyed by agents of the
state who act outside the rule of law, effectively legitimizing other forms of non
political violence. For example, impunity encourages persons to seek private
justice. One human rights activist noted "it is quicker and cheaper to hire a sicario
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(paid assassin) than take a case to court." 77 In interviews, children displaced by
political violence indicated that "we lose hope for the future. Any day they can
come and kilI me like they did to my father and nobody wil do anything, so why
should I go to school or think about tomorrow".78 Colombian social workers note
that violence in itself is not enough to cause longterm depression often witnessed
in these children. "(This) only happens when violence is accompanied by
impunity, which causes a fe eling among the children that there is no justice and
no security for their families ... every day we see that hopelessness itself is the
cause of further domestic violence".79
77 Interview, Bogotá, 12 October 1994.
78 Interview, Bogotá, October, 1993.
79 Interview, Bogotá, October, 1993.
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7. Conclusion
This study has focused on the limitations of elite pacts as a mechanism for
democratic transition and consolidation. The concept of elite pacts has been a
central analytical component of theories used to explain the process of democratic
transition and consolidation occurring in Latin America since the late 1970s.
Colombia is widely regarded by transition scholars to be a successful example of
a country which made the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance
through an elite pact mechanism; the 1958 National Front agreement between the
Liberal and Conservative parties, However, the post-transition polit Y in Colombia
is characterized by extreme 1evels of political violence. The weight of empirical
evidence demonstrates that the Colombian state is the principle actor responsible
for that violence. By considering the limitations of elite pacts, this study has
attempted to explain the paradox between the coexistence of formal liberal
democracy and gross and systematic human rights violations.
Contrary to the outcomes anticipated by elite pact related transition theory , this
study has argued that transition by pacts has resulted in the evolution of a
restricted political system in Colombia characterized by endemic political violence
and gross and systematic human rights violations, In the face of growing social
protest and a crisis of legitimacy of state institutions in the eyes of civil society,
the response of the Colombian state has been a dual policy of repression while at
the same time state officials promote the protection of human rights and
democracy. This study has presented empirical evidence to explain the origins and
mechanisms of that dual policy. It has also argued that the restricted nature of the
polit Y and violence in Colombia are a direct and implicit result of the conditions
established by National Front elite pact.
Empirical and historical information presented in this study has argued that the
inability of transition theory to fully account for the Colombian paradox is found
primarily in three factors. The combination of these three factors are important in
explaining both the limits of transition theories and the current situation in
Colombia:
Downplaying the role of civil society - Transition theories give only limited
consideration to the ro1e of civil society in the transition and consolidation process.
In particular, transition theories downplay or ignore the importance of the
interactions and conflcts between elites and new challengers arising from civil
society.
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Scholars using the example of Colombia tend to argue that the National Front pact
was a response to military dictatorship and the violent inter-party conflct. The
pact mechanism is interpreted as an attempt to secure a democratic transition to
address both those factors. The fact that Colombia subsequently returned to a
formal liberal democracy, uninterrupted by authoritarian reversals, is interpreted
as a result of the success of the National Front and the democratic intentions of
state leaders. However, scholars employing transition theory do not consider that,
in many societies, the basic conflct dimension is not necessarily between the elites
themselves. Rather, it occurs between elites and new challengers in civil society
who are perceived to threaten elite interests. This is particularly true for societies
with growing economic disparity, inc1uding Colombia and many other Latin
American countries.
This study has argued that, in the case of Colombia, it was precisely the
interactions and conflcts between civI1 society and elites (civilan and military)
which motivated the pact makers and determined the characteristics of the National
Front. This study has maintained that an important defining element of the elite
pact negotiation process, the inc1usion of new challengers, was missing in the
Colombian transition. Actors from outside the traditional Liberal and Conservative
parties were explicitly exc1uded from the process. Their exc1usion is crucial to
understanding developments in Colombia subsequent to the 1958 and the restricted
nature of the polit Y consolidated in that period.
Downplaying historical structures and constants: BoUvar's knot - Most transition
scholars emphasize the relationship between the mode of transition and the
prospects for democratic consolidation. However, in using Colombia as an
example of a successful pacted transition they appear to largely overlook the
historical structures and constants existing prior to military rule and the
implications of those constants for democratic consolidation.
The National Front was an attempt by the pact makers to restore and
institutionalize historical constants and extend those constants into the post-
transition polit Y . In practical terms this implied restoring the exc1usive controlover
state apparatus and resources historically enjoyed by the two traditional parties.
Therefore, an understanding of historical circumstances is critical in explaining the
National Front agreement and its legacy.
In addition, by downplaying the importance of modernization and structural
transformation occurring in Colombian society between the 1930s and the 1950s
transition theory does not account for the implications of the silent revolutions and
the weakening of c1ientelistic mechanisms of political control. This study has
argued for the importance of analyzing transition processes in a larger historical
context. Seen in this larger context, the National Front pact was based on anti-
democratic objectives and was not a viable mechanism for transition given the
many changes in Colombian society, inc1uding growing demands for political
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lparticipation and representation arising from new sectors of civil society.
The civilian elite-Public Forces alliance and its importanee for democracy -
Finally, transition theories consider pacts between the civilian and military elites
as crucial for securing a transition to democracy, Arguments appear to be based
on the assumption that civilian and militar elites are competing actors. Within a
democratic polit Y , therefore, scholars maintain that the military must assume a
subordinate role to civilian power. However, the transition scholars cited in this
study do not appear to consider a situation where a civilian-militar elite alliance
against new challengers exists as the cornerstone of a post-transition polity. In the
case of such an allance the military may assume a subordinate position to civilian
authority and stil be granted the relative autonomy it needs to pursue internally
generated doctrines of public order and internal security.
Militar subordination to civilian control is one of the conditions which leads
scholars to characterize Colombia as a democracy, However, these scholars do not
fully consider several important aspects of the Colombian case: (i) historically, the
Colombian miliary has been subordinate to civilian power. Many aspects of this
subordination actually continued during the period of military rule during the
1950s, and were institutionalized in the National Front pact. In this one regard the
National Front did not alter historical patterns of civilian-military relations; (ii)
however, this study has used empirical evidence to argue that the civilian elites
and the miliary establishment forme d a new axis of allance in the face of rising
opposition from new challengers in civil society, This alliance was based on the
protection of common interests from a commonly perceived threat. Under the
terms of the National Front pact the military remains in its subordinate position
to civilian elites. Their role within this alliance is to act as the guarantor of the
political system. In exchange, the military was given relative autonomy to control
matters related to internal security. Therefore, subordination and autonomy can
occur simultaneously when they happen within the context of protecting interests
commonly held between the civilian elites and the military and a consensus exist
between the parties.
The new civilian-military alliance is neglected by scholars. Debate regarding the
relative values of military dictatorship versus civilian rule is, therefore, interpreted
in a stereotypic way rather than by considering the de facto role of the military in
the current violence or the fact that subordination and violence can be part of the
same security policy. This study has argued, therefore, that the simple existence
of uninterrupted military subordination to the civilian power does not in itself
imply a democratic polity. In this light, it can also be said that civilian control
over the military is not a guarantee for democracy and respect for human rights.
Further, this study has used empirical evidence to explain that an authoritarian
revers al in Colombia is neither like ly or necessary as there is no fundamental
conflct between the civilian elites and the military. Without the benefit of this
information, the conflict in Colombia after 1958 is often interpreted as occurring
107
between the state and armed opposition groups and drug barons rather than an elite
(ci vilan and military)- new challengers conflct.
As a res ult of the narrow consideration of civilian-military relations and the
relationship between elites and civil society scholars also overlook the pacts of
autonomy and impunity established between the civilian elites and the military
subsequent to the National Front. These pacts together with the National Front
pact allow the paradox between formal liberal democracy and political violence
to exist. It was precisely the mobilization in civI1 society which determined the
objectives and mechanisms of these two additional pacts.
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